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Preface 
A myth of origin and evolution: In the beginning, I set out to write a 
book about character in narrative. It seemed to me that from Henry 
James through E. M. Forster and Walter J. Harvey down to most re­
cent narratologists, the study of character had always gotten too 
mixed up with discussions of plot or action (the what-is-character-
but - the - determination - of - incident? - what - is - incident - but - the-
illustration-of-character? syndrome). I intended to isolate the ele­
ment, analyze its nature, and report my findings to a breathlessly 
waiting critical world. As the title of this book indicates, however, I 
too have ended by mixing up the study of character with the study of 
plot—what is here called progression. I have ended this way, of 
course, because the events of the middle of my story pushed me in 
this direction. The more I tried to isolate the species, the more I be­
came convinced that the task was impossible: the only way to cap­
ture the species' dazzling variety was to link it to the chief influence 
on that variety—the larger context of the whole narrative created by 
the progression. 
Once I adopted a double focus on character and progression, the 
study also became implicated in many other kinds of questions about 
the interpretation of narrative—questions about thematizing, audi­
ence, cultural codes, narrative structure, and resistant reading. Since 
virtually all these questions applied to every narrative I would treat, 
and since my conviction about the variety of character required me to 
treat numerous narratives, I could not reach the end of my story until 
I found some means to balance the investigation of the various ques­
tions against the demands of treating the numerous narratives. I 
found my way to a (re)solution through a strategy for managing the 
progression of my own argument. 
The introduction seeks to acquaint the reader with the main prin­
ciples of my rhetorical approach to narrative and to explain the vari­
ous terms that I employ to discuss character and progression. The 
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chapters in the main body of this study then take on a double task: 
each investigates a question about the relation between character and 
progression in a specific narrative, and each explores the connections 
among that question, my proposed answer, and a broader theoretical 
issue in the interpretation of narrative. Thus, for example, Chapter 1 
looks at character and progression in 1984 and Pride and Prejudice in 
connection with an orthodox neo-Aristotelean attack on thematic 
interpretations, while Chapter 6 examines those elements of A Fare­
well to Arms in connection with the feminist critique of the novel 
presented by Judith Fetterley. There are two features of this organi­
zational schema that have especially important consequences for the 
progression of the whole argument. (1) Some concepts, e.g., those 
about the multiple audiences of narrative, that are employed early on 
without much comment get examined at some length in later chap­
ters. (2) The later chapters not only build on the work of the early 
chapters but they also continually recontextualize the conclusions of 
those early chapters. 
As a result, the later explorations frequently have implications for 
the earlier ones. For example, after the theoretical discussion of pro­
gression in Chapter 4, there is a lot more to say about the progression 
of Pride and Prejudice than I say in Chapter 1; similarly, after the dis­
cussion of evaluating character in Chapter 6, there is a lot more to say 
about every narrative I examine. In order not to overtax the patience 
of my reader, however, I typically press on with the forward move­
ment of the argument rather than repeatedly circling back to supple­
ment discussions that purport to have closure if not completeness. In 
other words, although many of the argumentative strands of the ear­
lier chapters are picked up in the later ones, numerous retrospective 
implications of the later ones are left as implications. Still, the re­
contextualizing effect of that forward progression is designed to re­
inforce one of the implicit claims of the whole study: the rhetorical 
transactions offered by sophisticated narratives have a complexity 
that many of our existing interpretive practices fail to recognize. 
This last claim is closely related to a feature of the argument that is 
very much in evidence from the outset: this study employs a lot of 
terms and distinctions—some original with me, some not—as it goes 
about its work. I am not yet in Gerard Genette's league as a coiner of 
appropriately high-sounding, scientific, and expensive terms—a "mi­
metic function" or a "local instability" cannot even afford the entry 
fee to compete in the same league as a "homodiegetic narrator" 
or a "heterodiegetic analepsis"—but I am aware that at times my 
more humble inventory may itself seem overstocked. The apparent 
grounds for prosecution, however, are also the grounds of my de­
fense: when I try to shave the terminological beastie with a razor bor­
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rowed from Ockham, I find it to be more clean and smooth than 
shaggy and rough. The defense rests, in other words, on the claim 
that analytical entities are not multiplied beyond necessity but are 
produced by the task of doing justice to the complex rhetorical trans­
actions offered by skillfully told narratives. 
I have called this narrative of origin and evolution a myth partly 
because it omits so much of the lived version of the story. It leaves 
out the indispensable help of numerous students at the Ohio State 
University who helped me work out my ideas about character and 
progression, especially Jane Zinman, Steve Jensen, Amy Goodwin, 
and Steve Busonik; it fails to acknowledge the provocation and good 
advice of colleagues at Ohio State and elsewhere who read all or parts 
of the manuscript at different points, especially Ralph Rader, Walter 
Davis, David Riede, David Richter, and Peter Rabinowitz. My simpli­
fied narrative does not account for the important influence of my 
friend, Jamie Barlowe Kayes, who listened and constructively re­
sponded to my harangues about most of what I say here and who in 
turn instructively harangued me about Fowles. The myth shamelessly 
neglects the pervasive influence on my thinking exerted by my col­
league, James Battersby, who responded to numerous versions of my 
ideas with wisdom, generosity, and an active pencil, and who has en­
gaged me in a decade-long conversation about literature, interpreta­
tion, and critical argument from which I have profited immensely. To 
all of these people, I want to express my gratitude for making the 
story of this project too complicated to narrate. The greatest omission 
in the myth is the role of Betty Menaghan, my partner in love and lo­
gistics, who directly and indirectly shared—and felt—all the progres­
sions and regressions of the writing (and the waiting). To her, I am 
grateful beyond words—even beyond narrative. 
Some of the material in this book has appeared earlier in somewhat 
different form. Portions of the Introduction are to be found in "The­
matic Reference, Literary Structure, and Fictive Character: An Exami­
nation of Interrelationships," Semiotica 49 3-4 (1984): 345-65, and in 
"Narrative Discourse, Character, and Ideology," Reading Narrative: 
Form, Ethics, Ideology, ed. James Phelan (Columbus: Ohio State Uni­
versity Press, 1988), pp. 132-46. This latter essay also contains a small 
part of Chapter 6. A portion of Chapter 1 appeared in "Character, 
Progression, and the Mimetic-Didactic Distinction," Modern Philol­
lology 84 (1987): 282-99. And some of Chapter 2 is to be found in 
"Character in Fictional Narrative: The Example of John Marcher," 
Henry James Review 9 (1988): 105-13.1 gratefully acknowledge permis­
sion to reprint this material. 

Introduction 
Character, Progression, and 
the Rhetorical Interpretation 
of Narrative 
i 
Some twenty years ago, in a critical age more innocent than our own, 
David Lodge advanced the argument that everything in a novel could 
be explained by reference to an author's choice of language, and that 
therefore character is only a convenient abstraction from verbal signs. 
Part of Lodge's argument involved the following "watch, I'U-show-
you" demonstration: 
If I wish to describe an actual person, Mr. Brown, I might be able 
to choose between calling him tall or big, dark or swarthy. . . . But I 
could never "choose" between calling him tall or short, dark or fair. 
If he is a character in a novel, however, I can choose to describe 
him as tall and fair, or short and dark, or short and fair, or tall and 
dark. I can also call him Mr. Green or Mr. Grey or by any other 
name. I could conceivably call him all these things for a special 
literary effect: Mr. Brown, or Green as he was sometimes called, was 
short, but tall with it. His fair-complexioned face was swarthy. As one of 
his friends remarked, "Grey is a difficult man to pin down."1 
In an earlier book, I have argued at some length that Lodge's example 
actually works against his case because it shows that character cannot 
be fully explained by reference to language alone.2 The passage de­
scribes a particular chameleon-like character, and though the charac­
ter may still be in process (indeed he may always be in process), the 
representation of him in the first two sentences puts constraints on 
the language of the third. If that sentence is to remain a summary that 
also adds to the description, there are countless things the friend can­
not say, including, for example, "Brown is an easy man to pin down." 
My claim in short is that Lodge's attempt to collapse character un­
der language actually shows that character can put constraints on 
language. 
Since in the earlier book my focus was on the role of language in 
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fiction, I pursued those implications of the claim most relevant to my 
developing argument that language played a great variety of roles, 
ranging from the crucial to the incidental, in the achievement of fic­
tional effects. Now I want to consider some other implications of 
Lodge's passage and my reading of it. What else can we conclude 
about character in imaginative literature besides the fact that it is or at 
least can be a nonlinguistic (or translinguistic) element? In one re­
spect, of course, Lodge's commentary on his demonstration is very 
much on target: this description does not refer to a real person.3 Fur­
thermore, Lodge's setup and execution of the description foreground 
its artificiality: Brown-Green-Grey is neither real nor the image of a 
real person but rather is a construct, designed as an amusing display 
of authorial ingenuity which will also make Lodge's argumentative 
point about the importance of language in fiction. Although our 
awareness of, say, Hamlet, or Huck Finn, or Clarissa Dalloway, as 
made-up is not foregrounded to the degree it is with Brown-Green-
Grey, we can recognize that such an awareness is part of our appre­
hension of them as characters. Part of being a fictional character, in 
other words, is being artificial in this sense, and part of knowing a 
character is knowing that he/she/(it?)4 is a construct. I will hereafter 
call the "artificial" component of character the synthetic. 
Lodge's example, I think, gets its punch from the interaction of this 
synthetic component with something else, namely, Brown-Green-
Grey's possession of recognizable traits: his being short, tall, swarthy, 
fair; his having surnames. In other words, the description creates its 
effect by playing off—and with—the way characters are images of 
possible people. Lodge gives Brown-Green-Grey traits that normally 
help us identify a person, but by giving this character two or three 
traits where one is usually present and by having the second and 
third contradict the first, Lodge takes away as he gives: this person is 
not really a person. To identify the concept implied in the phrase 
"this person/' I propose that we recognize a second component of 
character, what I will hereafter call the mimetic. 
If we were to abstract Lodge's example from its context, and ask 
what is the point of describing such a character, we could no doubt 
generate a variety of answers: it is a comment on the way the times 
require us to perform multiple social roles; it is a response to all those 
male poems about the inconstancy of women, suggesting that men 
are fickle through and through; it is a paean to the complexity of even 
the most ordinary individual. I am not interested here in choosing 
any of these answers as superior to the others, and, indeed, I shall 
later return to discuss why all in one important way miss the mark. 
But I am interested in what this ordinary ability to generate such an­
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swers suggests about literary character. The ability is no doubt con­
nected with what Jonathan Culler has identified as that part of literary 
competence called "the rule of significance"—"read the poem as ex­
pressing a significant attitude concerning man and/or his relation to 
the universe."5 (Thus, my later question will in effect be why we 
would be incompetent to follow that rule here.) More pertinent to my 
purposes here, the ability to generate such statements of significance 
reveals another component that character may have. In each state­
ment, Brown-Green-Grey is taken as a representative figure, as stand­
ing for a class—the individual in modern society, men, the ordinary 
human, respectively—and his representativeness then supports some 
proposition or assertion allegedly made by Lodge through his text. 
This exercise suggests, then, that character also has a thematic com­
ponent, while my claim that each of the three statements of signifi­
cance somehow misses the mark suggests that this component may 
not always be developed. 
In summary, this further consideration of Lodge's colorful creation 
indicates that character too can be multichromatic, that it is a literary 
element composed of three components, the mimetic, thematic, and 
synthetic, and that the mimetic and thematic components may be 
more or less developed, whereas the synthetic component, though 
always present, may be more or less foregrounded.6 The logical next 
questions are whether the synthetic, by virtue of its ineradicable pres­
ence, ought to be privileged in our theoretical account of character 
and whether we can determine under what general conditions the 
mimetic and thematic components get more or less developed. Again 
it will be useful to work with a specific case in which the creation of a 
character is the focal point of the text. So I move from Lodge's Brown-
Green-Grey to Browning's Duke of Ferrara, a more complex creation 
than our flexible friend. 
In an essay on issues facing contemporary American criticism, 
Jonathan Culler offers in capsule form the structuralist view of char­
acter, one suggesting that critics should turn away from what I have 
called the mimetic component of character and privilege the synthetic 
component: "The most intense and satisfying reading experiences 
may depend upon what we call involvement with characters, but suc­
cessful critical investigation of the structure and effects of a novel, as 
a literary construct, may require thinking of characters as sets of 
predicates grouped under proper names/'7 Culler's discussion in 
Structuralist Poetics of Todorov's and Barthes' work on character clari­
fies this view by shedding light on what he means by predicates. 
Todorov, he says, "proposes to treat characters as proper names to 
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which certain qualities are attached during the course of the narrative. 
Characters are not heroes, villains, or helpers; they are simply sub­
jects of a group of predicates which the reader adds up as he goes 
along/'8 In S/Z Barthes treats Sarrasine as "the meeting place of tur­
bulence, artistic ability, independence, violence, excess, femininity, 
etc."9 Note first that Culler's conception of character as a collection of 
predicates does not go beyond interpretation—the predicates (or 
qualities) sometimes must be inferred from seeing a proper name as­
sociated with speech, thought, or action, or indeed, with speech 
associated with another proper name. By simultaneously depending 
at least in part on interpretation and denying any importance to the 
mimetic component, Culler does bring the thematic component of 
character (and then by extension of narrative in general) into an 
almost equal prominence with the synthetic. One consequence of 
Culler's conception is that it can resolve many critical disputes about 
particular characters by declaring that such disputes are themselves 
the result of a common category mistake. Applying Culler's concep­
tion to, say, the notorious dispute about whether the governess in 
The Turn of the Screw is sane or insane, we could conclude that the 
dispute stems from the mistaken assumption that the character is a 
representation of a possible person. Jettisoning that assumption, we 
could then more properly understand the character as the meeting 
place of both sane bravery and insane paranoia. 
Applying this view to Browning's poem yields the following re­
sults. Through the use of pretended speech acts, Browning has made 
"Ferrara" the meeting place of many predicates or qualities: im­
periousness, power, unscrupulousness ("I gave commands; Then 
all smiles stopped together"); vanity ("She thanked . .  . as if she 
ranked / My gift of a nine-hundred-years-old name / With anybody's 
gift"); possessiveness ("None sets by / That curtain I have drawn for 
you but I"); appreciation of beauty ("I call that piece a wonder now;" 
There she stands / As if alive"). In addition, two rather incompatible 
qualities meet under "Ferrara": "mental instability," a quality inferred 
by concluding that the emissary from the Count is an inappropriate 
audience for the speech acts of the poem; and "boldness," a quality 
inferred by concluding that the emissary is an appropriate audience. 
Since the poem is Browning's creation of a character, this delineation 
of predicates gives us the major structural elements of the whole. The 
full structure results from the intersection of this larger set of predi­
cates with a smaller set grouped under "my last duchess," a set 
whose most important members are friendliness, beauty, openness to 
pleasure. The poem reveals the character of the Duke by indicating 
how the set of qualities associated with his name dominates over the 
set associated with "my last duchess." 
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If we analyze the poem according to a conception of character that 
gives weight to the mimetic component, we get markedly different 
results. As Ralph Rader has pointed out in an analysis that assumes 
the importance of the mimetic component, Browning's task is to cre­
ate the illusion that we are not reading a poem but overhearing part 
of a conversation.10 More specifically, Browning seeks to make the 
Duke's speech appear to be motivated entirely by the dramatic situa­
tion, even while it paints a complete portrait of him—complete, that 
is, within the limits of the implied dramatic situation. In sum, the 
Duke is a character whose mimetic component is overtly emphasized 
while his synthetic component, though present, remains covert. At 
this stage of the analysis, his thematic component does not figure 
prominently, but I will later discuss its place in the poem. 
It may seem odd to argue that the synthetic remains covert when 
we are reading a poem written in rhymed couplets, but a short 
thought experiment suggested by Rader will help justify the point. 
Who is responsible for the rhymes, Browning or the Duke? The fact 
that we instinctively answer "Browning7' indicates the kind of in­
volvement with the Duke we have: we have only his voice but we do 
not hear him rhyming. The synthetic is there but it remains covert. To 
the more general question of whether a poem will always appear 
more synthetic than prose, I answer, not necessarily. Whenever we 
read a title page which tells us that the work is a novel, we know we 
are reading something as synthetic as any poem. But neither this 
knowledge nor our perception of line breaks, stanzas, and rhymes 
necessarily prevents our participating in the mimetic illusion. To par­
ticipate in the illusion is to enter what Peter Rabinowitz has called the 
narrative audience; to remain covertly aware of the synthetic is to en­
ter what Rabinowitz has called the authorial audience.11 In other 
words, the authorial audience has the double consciousness of the 
mimetic and the synthetic, while the narrative audience has a single 
consciousness of the Duke as real. I will be discussing the nature 
of—and the relation between—these audiences in more detail in later 
chapters; for now let me just note that the authorial audience is the 
ideal audience that an author implicitly posits in constructing her 
text, the one which will pick up on all the signals in the appropriate 
way. When I speak about "our" responses in the pages that follow, I 
am referring to the responses of this audience. The narrative audience 
is that group of readers for whom the lyric, dramatic, or narrative 
situation is not synthetic but real. For the mimetic illusion to work, 
we must enter the narrative audience. To enter it in Browning's poem 
is to imagine oneself an invisible eavesdropper who hears and sees 
just this part of the interview between the Duke and the envoy. 
Within the general conception of "My Last Duchess" sketched 
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above, we must choose between the view of the Duke as mentally 
unstable and the view of him as extremely bold. Is the Duke's confes­
sion of his crime against his last duchess an unwitting self-revelation 
or a purposeful warning? I follow Rader in concluding that it is a 
purposeful warning whose purpose will be accomplished only if it 
does not appear to be a warning. The Duke must not appear to be 
warning for the same reason that he never openly objected to the 
frequent smiling of the duchess: "E'en then would be some stooping; 
and I choose / Never to stoop." This hypothesis about the Duke's 
character is superior to one that says he is out-of-control for two main 
reasons, one general, the other specific. First, it gives a definite, posi­
tive motivation for this speech in this situation, whereas the alterna­
tive is a faute de mieux account (I can't see any reason why the Duke 
would say this to the envoy from the father of his next wife, so he 
must be crazy). Second, this conclusion more adequately explains the 
rather elaborate business the Duke goes through before the main 
revelation. 
I said 
"Fra Pandolf" by design for never read 
Strangers like you that pictured countenance, 
The depth and passion of its earnest glance, 
But to myself they turned (since none puts by 
The curtain I have drawn for you but I) 
And seemed as they would ask me, if they durst 
How such a glance came there; so, not the first 
Are you to turn and ask thus. 
(11. 5-12; emphasis mine) 
The inference is that the Duke is acting with premeditation here: he 
is determined to make the envoy "sit and look at her" so that he can 
tell his story and thereby give his warning-sans-stooping. 
Furthermore, this hypothesis, with its emphasis on the relation 
between the overt mimetic and covert synthetic components of the 
Duke, allows for some important insights about Browning's control 
of the whole, a control which is perhaps most impressive in the 
conclusion: 
Will't please you rise? We'll meet the 
Company below then. I repeat, 
The Count your master's known munificence 
Is ample warrant that no just pretence 
Of mine for dowry will be disallowed; 
Though his fair daughter's self, as I avowed 
At starting, is my object. Nay, we'll go 
Together down, sir. Notice, Neptune, though 
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Taming a sea-horse, thought a rarity, 
Which Claus of Innsbruck cast in bronze for me! 
(11. 47-56) 
It is here at the end that we learn for the first time that the Duke's 
auditor has come on business relating to the Duke's next marriage. 
This delayed disclosure is of course a direct consequence of the mi­
metic imperative: as the poem is constructed, any prior definition of 
the situation by the Duke would seem an obvious contrivance by 
Browning. As Browning follows the mimetic imperative, he also in­
creases the effectiveness of the poem as a constructed object. The 
details illuminating the dramatic situation function not just as expo­
sition but also as climactic strokes in the portrait of the character. The 
Duke's horrible imperiousness has been revealed in his account of 
how he handled the Duchess. But the sheer audacity that accompa­
nies that imperiousness and adds substantially to its horror is made 
known only when we realize the audience and the occasion for the 
Duke's speech.12 In addition to making this exposition an effective 
device for the achievement of completeness in the poem, Browning 
makes it contribute substantially to the arresting quality of the por­
trait he is drawing. Because the full dimensions of the Duke's charac­
ter dawn upon us only gradually and only in retrospect, they dawn 
upon us more powerfully. Finally, these concluding realizations are 
brilliantly set off by the last two lines of the poem, in which the 
Duke symbolically encapsulates his purpose ("Neptune taming a sea­
horse7'), even while, as Rader also points out, he seems to insist that 
he has been talking only about art throughout the whole monologue. 
Comparing the analysis based on Culler's conception of character 
with the one based on a conception that gives weight to a mimetic 
component, we find some interesting results. Despite their consider­
able differences, both analyses offer worthwhile insights into the 
poem. Choosing between them is also a matter of choosing the kind 
of knowledge that one wants from a theory of character. Culler sug­
gests that his conception will lead to a better understanding of the 
"structure and effect" of works. I think that the parallel analyses in­
dicate that his claim is misleading. The structuralist analysis does not 
yield any substantial account of the effect of the poem and has little 
to say about the specific structure of the whole. Instead, it identifies 
the basic elements out of which the structure of both the text and the 
character are created; this identification of basic elements is both the 
weakness and the strength of the analysis. By identifying the basic 
elements, the structuralist can indicate something about the materials 
out of which the mimetic analyst will build his account, but such an 
indication comes at the price of failing to offer any well-developed 
interpretation of its own. 
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The mimetic analysis, on the other hand, commits one to develop­
ing an account of the structure and effect of a work. Judged by that 
shared criterion, it does offer a superior way of theorizing about char­
acter. But the differences in the results of the analyses suggest that, 
Culler's reference to structure and effect aside, the methods are not 
always competitive and that each could be used for a different critical 
purpose. Where the structuralist analysis tends toward the inclusive 
(e.g., in its identification of semantically incompatible predicates), the 
mimetic tends toward the restrictive: it chooses among incompatible 
traits, it tries to build as precise a portrait of the character as possible. 
Where the structuralist remains suspicious of the emotional involve­
ment that comes from viewing the character as a possible person, the 
mimetic analyst regards that involvement as crucial to the effect of 
the work. In short, where the structuralist seeks an objective view 
of the text, one which foregrounds the text as construct, the mimetic 
analyst takes a rhetorical view, one which foregrounds the text as 
communication between author and reader. Since I want my theory 
to account for the structure and effect of texts by accounting for such 
communication, I shall pursue the rhetorical (and mimetic) view here. 
The consequences of choosing the rhetorical over the structuralist 
conception of character become even greater as we consider the role 
of the thematic component within the rhetorical conception of Brown-
ing's poem. Whereas the Duke has been defined for the structuralist 
as the meeting place of many thematic qualities, the rhetorical analy­
sis to this point has neglected the thematic component of the Duke7s 
character. Does the Duke have a role in the structure of the poem that 
leads to our abstracting thematic conclusions from it? The best an­
swer, I think, is yes and no. On the one hand, it is fairly easy to 
construct thematic propositions that are implied or reinforced by 
Browning's creation of the Duke, propositions that would go right 
along with the structuralist conception of the character.13 A partial list 
would include: to execute one's spouse for her friendliness is horrible; 
to possess beauty by killing it is reprehensible; power corrupts; men 
(frequently) treat women as possessions that exist for the sole pur­
pose of giving them pleasure. On the other hand, these propositions 
are not conclusions that the poem itself leads one toward in the way 
that, say, Golding's Lord of the Flies tries to lead the reader toward the 
conclusion that humans are inherently evil. Instead, these proposi­
tions are in effect taken for granted by Browning. The powerful effect 
of his portrait does not depend on his demonstrating the truth of 
these assertions; rather these are general propositions whose truth 
Browning presumes independently of our reading the poem and on 
which he relies to make his portrait more arresting. 
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We can usefully distinguish between the thematic elements of a 
character like the Duke and of one like Jack in Golding's novel by 
making a distinction between a character's dimensions and his or her 
functions. A dimension is any attribute a character may be said to pos­
sess when that character is considered in isolation from the work in 
which he or she appears. A function is a particular application of that 
attribute made by the text through its developing structure. In other 
words, dimensions are converted into functions by the progression of 
the work. Thus, every function depends upon a dimension but not 
every dimension will necessarily correspond to a function. The Duke 
has many thematic dimensions (attributes that may be considered for 
their potential to contribute to thematic assertions) but essentially no 
thematic function: the work progresses not to make assertions but to 
reveal his character. Golding's Jack has many thematic dimensions— 
his lust for power, his willingness to destroy nature for his own 
advantage, his greater concern with short-term advantage than long-
term good, and so on—that all contribute to his main thematic func­
tion of demonstrating the strength of inherent evil in humans. The 
distinction between dimensions and functions allows us to see why 
applying the rule of significance to the case of Mr. Brown-Green-Grey 
would be an act of literary incompetence. Lodge's character, like 
Browning's, has thematic dimensions—he is male and chameleon-
like, he resists fixities, and so on—but no thematic function: the text 
achieves closure before it develops the thematic potentiality of these 
dimensions. 
The distinction between dimensions and functions also applies to 
the mimetic and synthetic components of character, though, as we 
shall see, it has a greater relevance to the mimetic. Furthermore, it 
allows me to resituate the importance of the mimetic component 
within the general rhetorical approach to character I have been defin­
ing. The distinction between dimensions and functions is based on 
the principle that the fundamental unit of character is neither the trait 
nor the idea, neither the role nor the word, but rather what I will call 
the attribute, something that participates at least in potential form in 
the mimetic, thematic, and synthetic spheres of meaning simultane­
ously, Thus, the rhetorical theorist need not stipulate in advance that 
the characters in a given work will be represented people, or themes 
with legs, or obvious artificial constructs. The theorist only commits 
himself to the position that a character may come to perform any of 
these functions or indeed all three of them to varying degrees within 
the same narrative. 
An analogy with the way speakers use utterances may clarify the dis­
tinction between dimensions and functions. Most utterances contain 
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a potential for signification greater than the signification actualized, if 
only because most utterances do not take advantage of the signifying 
potential of the sounds used to make them. Nevertheless, a speaker 
may take advantage of this signifying potential by shaping his utter­
ance in such a way that its sounds call attention to themselves. The 
teacher who bids good morning to his class in rhymed couplets con­
veys an attitude with those rhymes that is simply not present in a 
prosaic greeting. Or to take a more standard example, recall how 
Pope in "An Essay on Criticism" reinforces his dictum about sound 
echoing the sense by exemplifying his point in his own lines: 
Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows, 
And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows; 
But when loud surges lash the sounding shore, 
The hoarse, rough verse should like the torrent roar. 
When Ajax strives some rock's vast weight to throw, 
The line too labors, and the words move slow. 
(11. 366-71) 
Similarly, when an author creates a character, she creates a poten­
tial for that character to participate in the signification of the work 
through the development of the character in three spheres of mean­
ing; that potential may or may not be realized depending upon the 
way the whole work is shaped. 
At the same time, we need to remember that, as we read, charac­
ters do not come to us first as attributes which we recognize as di­
mensions which then become transformed into functions as we look 
on in wonder, but that they come to us already in the process of being 
shaped into functions, or (especially within the mimetic sphere) as 
already functioning. When we read, "Miss Brooke had that sort of 
beauty that seemed to be set in relief by poor dress/' or "Emma 
Woodhouse, handsome, clever, and rich, seemed to unite in her per­
son the best blessings of existence," we are immediately encountering 
characters who are already performing mimetic functions. The point, 
in other words, is that my rhetorical theory of character is claiming to 
offer analytical distinctions that allow us to understand the principles 
upon which works are constructed rather than claiming to offer a 
blow-by-blow description of what happens when we read.14 
II 
This sketch of a framework for a rhetorical approach to character also 
indicates the conditions that must be satisfied for that sketch to de­
velop into an adequate working theory of character in narrative. (1) 
We need to explore further the nature of the three components, in­
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eluding the relation between dimensions and functions. (2) We need 
to investigate the range of relations among the three different func­
tions. (3) We need to investigate the nature and variety of narrative 
progression so that we can better understand the mechanisms by 
which dimensions get converted into functions. Fully satisfying these 
conditions will be the task of the later chapters, but here I can take 
some initial steps toward satisfying the first and third conditions. 
Mimetic dimensions, as we have seen, are a character's attributes 
considered as traits, e.g., the Duke's maleness, his position of power, 
his imperiousness, his boldness, and so on. Mimetic functions result 
from the way these traits are used together in creating the illusion of 
a plausible person and, for works depicting actions, in making par­
ticular traits relevant to later actions, including of course the devel­
opment of new traits. In works where the traits fail to coalesce into 
the portrait of a possible person, e.g., Swift's creation of Gulliver, or 
some modern works intent on destroying the mimetic illusion, a char­
acter will have mimetic dimensions without a mimetic function. 
Moreover, within the creation of a possible person, a particular trait 
might serve only to identify that character, e.g., the detective who 
always eats junk food, and the trait might not (though it often will) 
have any consequences for his later actions—or for our understand­
ing of them. In such a case, the character has a mimetic dimension 
that is incidental to his or her mimetic function: the plausibility of the 
portrait would remain without the trait and the rest of the work 
would be essentially unaffected by its absence. 
Silently underlying this discussion of the mimetic component are 
some messy problems. First, all this talk about characters as plausible 
or possible persons presupposes that we know what a person is. But 
the nature of the human subject is of course a highly contested issue 
among contemporary thinkers. Although this study of character can 
have consequences for that debate, I shall not take it up directly here. 
Not only would such a discussion require lengthy excursions into bio­
logical, philosophical, psychological, sociological, and economic ter­
ritories that would preclude the exploration I have just begun but, 
more important, such a discussion is not a necessary preliminary to 
the rhetorical study I am undertaking. For that to be justified, it is 
enough that authors write with some working notion of what a per­
son is and with some belief that characters can (or indeed, cannot) 
represent persons and that as readers and critics we can discern these 
ideas in the work. At the same time, this principle means that for 
certain works we may need to invoke the findings of psychology, 
sociology, economics, biology, and/or philosophy because authors 
may be drawing on (or perhaps anticipating) these findings in their 
representations of the mimetic components of character. Thus, for 
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example, it seems to me necessary to know something about the 
psychoanalytic understanding of character to enter the authorial au­
dience of Light in August: certain features of the representation of Joe 
Christmas as a possible person that are rendered comprehensible by 
that knowledge remain virtually inscrutable without it. On the other 
hand, we do not need such an understanding to enter the authorial 
audience of, say, Tom Jones or Pride and Prejudice: the characters in 
these works, though perhaps susceptible to psychoanalytical inter­
pretation, are constructed and offered to us on different principles. 
The second problem is related to the first: how to specify ade­
quately the criteria by which to judge a given representation of a char­
acter as plausible or not. For the most part, such a representation is a 
matter of conventions and the conventions change over time as both 
ideas about persons and fictional techniques for representing persons 
change. Modern readers may have a hard time finding Pamela An­
drews a possible person but Richardson's contemporary readers (pace 
Henry Fielding) did not. Thus, I think that for my purposes flexible, 
shifting criteria are superior to fixed ones. Since my goal is to under­
stand the principles upon which a narrative is constructed, I shall 
seek to make my judgments according to what I know or can infer 
about the conventions under which a given author is operating. Fur­
thermore, we ought to recognize from the outset that it is very easy 
to call any character's plausibility into question by abstracting the 
character's behavior from the situations which influence it. Is it really 
plausible that a man who has been king all his life would be able to 
learn anything about himself by giving up his kingship and then 
hanging around on a heath in a storm with a fool, a disguised friend, 
and someone pretending to be mad? Come off it, Mr. Playwright. 
Finally, in addition to judging plausibility in connection with the 
whole web of circumstances surrounding a character's actions, I will 
out of respect for the variety of human behavior and experience seek 
to err on the side of generosity rather than of parsimony in judging 
plausibility: the dividends that might accrue to our remaining open to 
the idea that such and such a person could exist and behave in such 
and such a way in such and such a situation are more rewarding than 
the satisfaction we might get by initially questioning the plausibility 
of such a creation. 
Thematic dimensions, as we have seen, are attributes, taken indi­
vidually or collectively, and viewed as vehicles to express ideas or as 
representative of a larger class than the individual character (in the 
case of satire the attributes will be representative of a person, group, 
or institution external to the work). Just as characters may be func­
tioning numerically from our first introduction to them, so too may 
they be functioning thematically, but just as the full mimetic function 
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is often not revealed in the initial stages of a narrative, so too may 
thematic functions emerge more gradually. In works that strive to 
give characters a strong overt mimetic function, thematic functions 
develop from thematic dimensions as a character's traits and actions 
also demonstrate, usually implicitly, some proposition or proposi­
tions about the class of people or the dramatized ideas. Usually, the 
narrative will then use these functions to influence the way we re­
spond to the actions of the character, and sometimes the progression 
may make these functions crucial to the work's final effect, even if the 
work is not organized to convince us of a particular proposition. We 
shall see an example of such a narrative shortly, when I turn to dis­
cuss Lardner's "Haircut." In works where the artificiality or the syn­
thetic nature of characters is more overt, thematic dimensions get 
developed into functions somewhat differently: the representative 
quality of the traits or ideas will usually be explicitly revealed in the 
action or the narrative discourse. Golding's initial description of Jack 
connects Jack's physical appearance with the conventional image of 
Satan. Thus, Jack's physical attributes immediately give him a the­
matic dimension that is of course later converted into a thematic 
function. 
The distinction between the mimetic and thematic components of 
character is a distinction between characters as individuals and char­
acters as representative entities. In attaching the notion of "plausible 
person" to the mimetic component, I do not mean to imply that my 
own working concept of a person precludes representativeness. It 
seems to me that our understanding of people in life also commonly 
has a thematic component: we see the traits that others possess as 
defining a type of person or a set of ideas and attitudes that are not 
peculiarly their own. We say, "He's a sixties flower-child," or "She's a 
radical feminist," and imply that the identities of these people can be 
summed up by a set of ideas or values associated with those descrip­
tions. At the same time, we (i.e., those of us sharing a fairly wide­
spread, though less than universal, belief about how to treat other 
people) commonly regard ourselves as more enlightened, more open, 
more tolerant, if we refrain from making any quick leaps from traits 
to themes. Indeed, we label those who leap from skin color or sex to 
assumptions about a person as racist or sexist. As I have already sug­
gested in the discussion of "My Last Duchess," we must also resist 
the automatic ascription of traits to themes in literature. In both cases, 
then, the problem arises not from thematizing itself but from doing 
so prematurely or carelessly, i.e., without sufficient attention to the 
relation of the trait to the rest of the person or character and the situ­
ation and actions in which he or she is engaged. 
On the other side of this similarity between people and literary 
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characters, there is, of course, a significant difference: however much 
we may wish that Ronald Reagan or Howard Cosell or the next door 
neighbor were just an artificial construct, each of them is undeniably 
organic, just as Elizabeth Bennet and Prince Hamlet of Denmark and 
Hester Prynne are undeniably synthetic. One consequence of the dif­
ference, I think, is that we are given a greater license for thematizing 
in literature; though we must remain wary of hasty jumps from trait 
to theme, we are likely to be invited to make more considered ones. 
Because literary characters are synthetic, their creators are likely to be 
doing something more than increasing the population, more than, try­
ing to bring another possible person into the world. They are likely to 
be increasing the population in order to show us something about the 
segment of the population to which the created member belongs. 
As this point implies, the ineradicability of the synthetic compo­
nent marks it off from the mimetic and thematic components: in the 
synthetic sphere dimensions are always also functions. Synthetic di­
mensions will always be synthetic functions because they will always 
have some role in the construction of the work; this role may be extra­
neous or disruptive, the character's other components may interfere 
with the success of the synthetic function, but the function cannot be 
eliminated. Furthermore, although every mimetic and thematic func­
tion implies a synthetic function, not every synthetic function implies 
a mimetic or thematic one. The unnamed emissary in "My Last Duch­
ess" has a mimetic dimension by virtue of his status relative to both 
the Duke and the Count, but he has no functions other than the syn­
thetic one of being the appropriate addressee for the Duke's veiled 
warning. (The Count, of course, is a character with mimetic and the­
matic dimensions but no corresponding functions.) Nevertheless, it 
does make sense to distinguish characters like the Duke of Ferrara 
whose synthetic status remains covert and those like Christian in Pil-
grim's Progress whose synthetic status is foregrounded. Although this 
distinction is not strictly parallel to the distinction between dimensions 
and functions for the other two components, it does capture a similar 
phenomenon: the development of a potentiality in the character into 
an actuality. The means by which the synthetic component can be fore­
grounded are many and diverse, but one is especially noteworthy be­
cause it exploits the artificiality of the material out of which the char­
acter is made. An author can focus the reader's attention, through a 
narrator, another character's speech, or even an action, on the charac-
ter's name or the descriptions of the character so that we regard the char­
acter as symbolic rather than natural. When I construct a narrative in 
which Smoothtalk meets Bumpkin on a bustling boulevard in Urbia, 
then I am inviting my readers, fit and few as they may be, to regard 
the characters as constructs designed for some thematic purpose. 
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III 
Progression, as I use the term, refers to a narrative as a dynamic 
event, one that must move, in both its telling and its reception, 
through time. In examining progression, then, we are concerned with 
how authors generate, sustain, develop, and resolve readers' inter­
ests in narrative. I postulate that such movement is given shape and 
direction by the way in which an author introduces, complicates, and 
resolves (or fails to resolve) certain instabilities which are the develop­
ing focus of the authorial audience's interest in the narrative. Authors 
may take advantage of numerous variables in the narrative situation 
to generate the movement of a tale. In general, the story-discourse 
model of narrative helps to differentiate between two main kinds 
of instabilities: the first are those occurring within the story, in­
stabilities between characters, created by situations, and compli­
cated and resolved through actions. The second are those created 
by the discourse, instabilities—of value, belief, opinion, knowledge, 
expectation—between authors and/or narrators, on the one hand, 
and the authorial audience on the other. To recognize this difference 
in kind I reserve the term "instabilities" for unstable relations within 
story and introduce the term "tension" for those in discourse.15 Some 
narratives progress primarily through the introduction and compli­
cation of instabilities, whereas others progress primarily through ten­
sions, and still others progress by means of both. In examining 
progression, we are also involved in considering narratives as deve­
loping wholes. In order to account for the effect of, say, a com­
plication of one instability, we will need to consider the previous 
development of that instability and its relation to other instabilities or 
tensions as well as the way it is disclosed to the reader. To do a similar 
analysis for all such complications would lead one to an analysis of 
the whole narrative. The point, in other words, is not that all parts of 
a narrative are directly concerned with instabilities or tensions, but 
rather that all parts of a narrative may have consequences for the pro­
gression, even if those consequences lie solely in their effect on the 
reader's understanding of the instabilities, tensions, and resolution. Let 
me illustrate this conception of progression, and some of its conse­
quences for the way in which I shall seek to develop my rhetorical 
theory of character by a look at a short narrative that progresses both 
by tension and instability. I choose Ring Lardner's "Haircut" in part 
because, as a narrative analogue to the dramatic monologue, it also 
fits in with the progression of examples in this chapter. 
Just as the poet in a dramatic monologue seeks to create the illusion 
that his audience is not reading a poem but overhearing part of a 
conversation, so Lardner seeks to create the illusion that his audience 
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is not reading a story but overhearing a barber's rambling monologue 
to a new customer. Lardner builds the illusion in large part by em­
phasizing the haphazardness of the barber's speech—Whitey fre­
quently shifts topics with no more transition than a "Well" or a 
"But I was going to tell you." Like the poet in the dramatic mono­
logue, Lardner needs to sustain the illusion of unartistically delivered 
speech even as he arranges it for maximum effect. But there is a sig­
nificant difference between Whitey's narrative and most dramatic 
monologues: while the speaker in a dramatic monologue may or may 
not talk directly about himself, the movement of the poem is typically 
a movement toward the disclosure of his character, whereas the 
movement of Whitey's narration is toward the disclosure of events 
involving other characters, particularly Jim Kendall, Julie Gregg, Paul 
Dickson, and Doc Stair. Significantly, however, the first major in­
stability among these characters is not introduced until after the half­
way point of Whitey's narration, when he says that "Jim was like the 
majority of men, and women too, I guess. He wanted what he 
couldn't get. He wanted Julie Gregg and he worked his head off try­
ing to land her."16 Indeed, at this juncture, the narrative divides 
neatly into two parts; everything before this point serves to disclose 
information about the four chief actors and their environment, infor­
mation that is necessary for the authorial audience's understanding of 
how and why they act as they do in the focused narrative of related 
events that follows this point. The apparently scattered information 
of the first half is brought into a coherent relationship as we draw 
upon it to infer the means and motives behind the central events of 
the story, Jim Kendall's humiliation of Julie Gregg and his subsequent 
death in what Whitey regards as an accident. This arrangement 
makes the second half of the story move with economy and power to 
its climax, but it raises some interesting questions about the first half: 
What does Lardner do there to propel the reader forward, and what 
happens to that principle of propulsion after the shift to a different 
principle just after the halfway point? 
In the terms introduced above, the initial principle of movement in 
"Haircut" is the tension between Whitey and the authorial audience: 
Whitey's judgments of Jim Kendall as a "card" (p. 25), as "kind of 
rough but a good fella at heart" (p. 24), are at odds with our much 
harsher judgments, and we read on in part for the pleasure of com­
municating with Lardner behind Whitey's back, in part to take in 
what he tells us about his small town, and in part to see how the 
portrait of our unreliable narrator develops. In other words, in the 
absence of any clear direction to the potential instabilities introduced 
in this first half of the narrative, Whitey becomes much like the 
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speaker in a dramatic monologue: he is as much the focus of our in­
terest as anything he tells us. 
Now what emerges from the tension and our interest in Whitey is 
a clear, if limited, mimetic portrait: he is a small-town barber who is 
garrulous, loves a laugh, is well-liked, and most significantly, for this 
is the source of the tension, is morally obtuse. He is unable to detect 
the cruelty of most of Jim Kendall's practical jokes and unable to dif­
ferentiate between such acts as Jim's kidding Milt Sheppard about the 
size of his Adam's apple, and Jim's falsely promising his wife and 
children that he would take them to the circus. In addition, Whitey 
has attributes that mark out a thematic potentiality: he is shown to be 
a representative of his own small town and thus of a small-town men­
tality. Whitey's occupation and personality make his shop the base of 
Kendall's operations, and indeed, the first joke of Jim's that Whitey 
tells about is directed at Whitey himself, and the barber is able to 
reply in kind. The occupation further identifies Whitey as a represen­
tative male—he is a man serving other men, talking and joking with 
them in a space where the women are excluded. In addition, Whitey 
seems to know and get on with everyone, and his nickname accen­
tuates his status as one of the gang.17 Finally, Whitey's very role in the 
narrative, passing on the gossip of the town to its new inhabitant, 
emphasizes his place as representative male.18 
The initial movement by tension has many consequences for the 
narrative after it shifts to its movement by instability. First, our un­
derstanding of Whitey's obtuseness operates to create one of the dra­
matic ironies of the narrative: given what we know of Whitey, we 
have little trouble seeing that his report of Jim Kendall's death as ac­
cidental misses the truth of that event by a country mile. We are 
quickly able to discern that Paul Dickson, urged on by Doc Stair's 
angry remark that anyone who could pull anything like Kendall's trick 
on Julie Gregg "ought not to be let live" (p. 32), had deliberately shot 
Kendall when they were out duck-hunting. We can discern further 
that Doc Stair as coroner took advantage of Paul's reputation as 
"cuckoo" (p. 27) and "a half-wit" to declare the death accidental be­
cause that declaration would better serve the cause of justice than the 
truth would. The dramatic irony—and part of the effect of the story— 
arises, as Brooks and Warren say in Understanding Fiction, from the 
fact that the biter is bitten19 and from the fact that Whitey is blind to 
the complicated "trick" played on Jim by Paul Dickson and Doc Stair. 
But the effect produced by the ending is more than ironic satisfaction, 
and to describe the way that effect comes about I need to introduce 
one last distinction, that between completeness and closure. 
Closure, as I use the term, refers to the way in which a narrative 
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signals its end, whereas completeness refers to the degree of resolu­
tion accompanying the closure. Closure need not be tied to the reso­
lution of instabilities and tensions but completeness always is. For 
example, in a narrative entitled "Diary of Disastrous December/' 
which has 31 chapters, each of which is headed by the date and which 
follow each other in chronological order, the very inscription of 31 
December at the head of the last chapter will be a strong signal of 
closure. Whether the narrative will have completeness will depend 
on how the instabilities and tensions are worked out in that (and of 
course previous) chapters. In a narrative in which a character sets out 
from home on a dangerous journey and returns at the end, the return 
itself will function as a sign of closure and the condition in which he 
returns will be a step toward completeness, indicating how the initial 
instability is resolved; the degree of completeness will depend upon 
whether and how the later instabilities have been resolved. In "Hair­
cut," Lardner provides closure by signaling the end of the customer's 
turn in the chair. He provides completeness by using Whitey's final 
words, including the signal of closure, to provide final resolution to 
the instabilities by altering the authorial audience's understanding of 
the resolution that has already been narrated. This altered understand­
ing is a result of Lardner using Whitey's final lines to convert the 
thematic dimension of Whitey's character into a thematic function. 
These lines create the second main consequence of the initial progres­
sion by tension as Lardner reemphasizes the tension between Whitey 
and the authorial audience and more subtly recalls his representative 
status: 
Personally I wouldn't leave a person shoot a gun in the same boat 
I was in unless I was sure they knew somethin' about guns. Jim 
was a sucker to leave a new beginner have his gun, let alone a half­
wit. It probably served Jim right, what he got. But still we miss him 
round here. He certainly was a card. 
Comb it wet or dry? (P. 33) 
This ending creates an effect more chilling than satisfying first be­
cause Whitey's judgment of Jim ("It probably served Jim right, what 
he got") is made for a reason that misses the mark as widely as his 
judgments about Jim's character. The chill gets deeper when we re­
flect that Whitey as representative spokesman can confidently report 
Kendall's death as accidental and blithely talk about missing the old 
card only because Doc Stair's declaration has been accepted by the 
townspeople. And they have accepted the judgment because, like 
Whitey, they believe that Paul Dickson is a half-wit, a belief based not 
on Paul's recent behavior but on his having been given that label years 
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ago. Whitey's final comments reveal that the whole sordid episode, 
begun with Kendall's pursuit and humiliation of Julie Gregg and 
ended by Paul Dickson's murder of Kendall, has transpired in front 
of the townspeople's eyes without their recognizing its sordidness. 
Because no one has been intellectually or morally sensitive enough to 
understand what happened in the case of Jim Kendall, it is not at all 
unlikely that a similar sequence of events could occur again. The 
insensitivity of the good-natured Whitey and by extension of the 
townsmen he represents is nicely underlined by the story's final sen­
tence, or rather by the swift and matter-of-fact transition from the 
account of Kendall's death to the business at hand: "Comb it wet or 
dry?" Like Browning in "My Last Duchess," Lardner is able to make 
the final signal in the progression contribute to both its closure and 
completeness, that is, both indicate the narrative's end and reinforce 
its final effect. From this point, extrapolations to the significance of 
the story for Lardner's view of both the viciousness and stupidity of 
small town life are rather straightforward. The more general point I 
want to emphasize is that Lardner uses both the initial movement by 
tension and its consequences for the characterization of Whitey to 
transform the progression of the whole from the tale of a trickster 
tricked to a tale emphasizing the chilling implications of that event. 
Indeed, Lardner's conversion of Whitey's thematic dimension into 
a thematic function affects the authorial audience's understanding of 
the resolution still further. Given that Lardner has encouraged us to 
establish a general pattern of inverting Whitey's judgments, we may 
initially conclude that our obtuse friend is right for the wrong reason 
when he says that Jim got what he deserved. Once we begin thinking 
about how Lardner is using Whitey to reveal ideas about the Ameri­
can small town, we will soon reflect enough to question whether Jim's 
punishment fits his crimes: despite Jim's cruelties, murder in cold 
blood seems an excessive punishment. Furthermore, Whitey's repre­
sentative obtuseness allows Lardner to leave murky the relation be­
tween Doc Stair's decision to call the death accidental and his own 
role as the agent, however unwitting, behind Paul's action: Is Doc 
simply protecting himself? Has he become another version of Kendall 
by playing upon the stupidity of the townspeople in his declaration 
that the death was accidental? Or is he a fit instrument of justice, 
someone who regrets what he said to Paul but also acknowledges, 
with Lardner's approval, that justice is better served through his lie 
than through putting Paul—and perhaps himself—on trial? Lardner's 
technique does not allow us to answer these questions with any con­
fidence, but this uncertainty adds to rather than detracts from the 
completeness of the story. The murkiness is appropriate because it 
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contributes further to the unsettling, chilling experience of the nar­
rative, especially the way its ending causes the authorial audience to 
reconsider its understanding of Whitey, Doc, Jim, Paul, Julie, and the 
town in which they live. Lardner's view of the viciousness and stu­
pidity of the small town is not accompanied by any easy judgments 
about its simplicity or transparency. 
This claim that the ambiguity about Doc's motives contributes to 
rather than detracts from the completeness of the story perhaps re­
quires further explanation. With the conversion of Whitey's thematic 
dimension into a function, the progression gives new importance to 
the thematic sphere in the story as a whole. Thus, when the ambigu­
ity about Doc contributes to our understanding of Lardner's view of 
small-town life it contributes to the completeness. If Doc Stair were 
the protagonist, if the progression centered on instabilities surround­
ing him and his motives, then this ambiguity would most likely be a 
sign of incompleteness: some major instability would not be resolved. 
In Lardner's story, however, the instabilities are resolved; it is the 
authorial audience's understanding of the resolution that is revised 
and completed in an appropriate way by our reflections on the re­
sidual ambiguity and Whitey's inability to resolve it. 
IV 
In addition to illustrating the interconnections between character and 
progression, this discussion of "Haircut" also suggests some guide­
lines for the next—and largest—step in this study. That step is to 
develop the theory of character from the framework sketched here 
through an examination of the range of relations among the mimetic, 
thematic, and synthetic components of character. Because progres­
sion and character are so closely interrelated, I can best encounter the 
variety of narratives necessary to explore that range by choosing a 
group of works whose characters collectively raise a multitude of 
questions about the interrelations of their components and whose 
progressions follow a variety of different principles. In analyzing 
these principles of progression as part of explaining the relations 
among the components of character, the study will adumbrate a 
theory of progression as well. Furthermore, since, as we have seen in 
the earlier discussion of Culler and Rader, questions about character 
and progression are inextricably tied to larger theoretical issues in the 
interpretation of narrative, my questions about specific characters 
and progressions need to be linked to more general theoretical ques­
tions about the interpretation of narrative. 
More specifically, I shall proceed by making a loose division of the 
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main problem of character into two parts and then conclude with a 
demonstration of how the solutions to the problem can be built upon 
as we extend the reader's role in the rhetorical transaction of narrative 
beyond appreciation into resistance. The first part will take as its 
dominant focus the mimetic-thematic relation, the second will more 
fully incorporate the synthetic. The division between these parts 
must be loose because, as the framework sketched above indicates, 
though the synthetic component can sometimes remain in the back­
ground of the work and its analysis, it is nevertheless always present. 
Furthermore, when in Part II I want to focus on the synthetic-
thematic and synthetic-mimetic relationship, the third component 
will necessarily exert its influence as well. 
I have chosen to begin with the mimetic-thematic relationship be­
cause it immediately connects this study to a central theoretical issue 
in the interpretation of narrative, one that clearly involves those who 
call themselves theorists and those who abhor that label: the practice 
of thematizing the particulars of the text. Thematizing has been both 
attacked and celebrated in recent years, and I shall reconsider its plea­
sures and problems by considering the relation between the mimetic 
and thematic components of Winston Smith's character in 1984 and 
of Elizabeth Bennet's in Pride and Prejudice in connection with Richard 
Levin's powerful neo-Aristotelean attack on thematizing. I shall argue 
that Levin offers a useful corrective to facile thematizing, but that his 
attack goes too far. In addition, I shall try to demonstrate that the 
relations between the mimetic and thematic components of Winston 
Smith and Elizabeth Bennet represent two frequent but distinct de­
velopments of these components. The study will turn next to the re­
lation betweeen the mimetic and thematic functions of John Marcher 
in "The Beast in the Jungle," examining these functions in connection 
with the celebration of thematizing offered by Robert Scholes in Tex­
tual Power. My analysis will focus especially on Scholes's twin claims 
that interpretation proper is thematizing and that the generalizing 
movement of thematizing ought to continue until one reaches the 
broadest cultural code one can find applicable to the text. I shall want 
to modify both claims as I try to show that the analysis of narrative 
progression complicates the notion that interpretation equals thema­
tizing and that in James' narrative the mimetic functions of the char­
acters do indicate that the generalizing movement of thematizing 
should stop before we reach the broadest code possible. 
In Part II, I shall consider three narratives that foreground the syn­
thetic component of character in different ways and to different de­
grees. These different kinds of foregrounding also induce further 
theoretical reflections about the concepts of progression and of audi­
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ence that I have introduced here and will employ throughout. In The 
French Lieutenant's Woman, the foregrounding of the synthetic occurs 
through Fowles's exploitation of the differences between the as­
sumptions that the narrative and authorial audiences make about 
their reading. In Great Expectations, the foregrounding occurs through 
Dickens's wonderfully inventive way with outlandish characters such 
as Wemmick. In If on a winter's night a traveler, the foregrounding oc­
curs through the text's extreme self-reflexiveness. 
In discussing Fowles's novel, I shall try to complete the considera­
tion of the mimetic-thematic relationship by accounting for the influ­
ence of the synthetic component of character upon it, while also 
investigating the relations among the audiences of narrative. In con­
sidering Great Expectations, I shall re-examine my concept of progres­
sion by comparing my ideas about textual dynamics with those of 
Peter Brooks in Reading for the Plot, who wants to "impose psychic 
functioning on textual functioning/' and demonstrates the results of 
that imposition with his own reading of Dickens's novel. Brooks's 
theory will require me to develop further the ideas about the relation 
between text and audience that underlie my rhetorical theory, and 
that are the foundation of this study's claim to offer a more adequate 
account of what Brooks in his subtitle calls "design and intention in 
narrative/' In examining If on a winter's night a traveler, I shall take up 
the question of audience once again, because Calvino's attempts alter­
nately to blur and emphasize the differences among real readers, 
narrative readers, and authorial readers indicate that even these dis­
tinctions among audiences may not be sufficient to account for the 
complexity of communication in some narratives, especially his. 
In Part III, I shall take up the problem of resisting characters (and 
authors), as I examine the relations among the components of Cath­
erine Barkley in Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms. I shall situate my 
discussion in the context of Judith Fetterley's feminist critique of 
Hemingway in The Resisting Reader,20 but it will draw upon virtually 
all of the principles that have been argued for and demonstrated in 
Parts I and II. That is, the discussion will reconsider both Fetterly's 
critique and any more positive view of Catherine by investigating all 
of Catherine's components and their role in the progression of the 
whole. Since the evaluation of Catherine must be connected with 
the evaluation of Frederic, and since that issue is connected with the 
evaluation of Hemingway's beliefs about the world, the discussion 
will ultimately address the problems inherent in that last kind of 
evaluation as well. 
By the end of Part III, the range of relations among the components 
of character and the varieties of narrative progression will have been 
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amply demonstrated; in addition, different kinds of responses to 
those narrative representations will have been illustrated and argued 
for. Yet I would make no claim that my nine sample texts represent 
all the possible relations among the components of character or 
the full variety of progressive principles. In the concluding chapter, 
therefore, I will sketch how the analysis might be extended to three 
especially interesting cases without undertaking a full-bore analysis 
of any. First, I shall consider the relations among the components of 
character in a nonfiction narrative such as The Armies of the Night, 
focusing specifically on how Mailer's (re-)creation of himself, his own 
"mimetic" portrait, is a consequence of the synthetic functions that 
he wants his character to perform. Second, in a discussion that will 
pick up on the principles I see underlying Dickens's use of Wemmick, 
I shall examine the functions of some minor characters in the multiple-
plot progression of Middlemarch. Third, I shall finish the analysis 
of character and progression by sketching an account of what hap­
pens in a work like Mrs. Dalloway where the progression is more lyric 
than narrative, where the movement is one of gradual revelation of 
a character yet is still something very different from a dramatic 
monologue. 
Finally, the conclusion will draw together the findings of this book 
and reconsider both the theory's predictive power and its flexibility for 
considering new cases, new possibilities of narrative communication. 
The point to make here is that in taking up questions both theoretical 
(about thematizing, progression, audience, ideology, evaluation) and 
practical (about protagonists and secondary characters, Jane Austen 
and Italo Calvino, Hemingway and Henry James, realism and meta­
fiction), this study does propose to survey a wide territory of narra­
tive theory. It will not offer a full view of every square mile, but it 
does seek to provide glasses that will enable the reader to discern 
both the broad outlines of that territory and some close-up views of 
numerous especially significant sites. 

The Mimetic-Thematic 
Relationship and the 
Thematizing of Narrative 

Character, Progression, and 
Thematism: The Cases of 1984 
and Pride and Prejudice 
The interpretive maneuver most widely practiced by contemporary 
critics can be summarized in a two-word slogan: "Always thema-
tize!"1 To follow the slogan as we begin to look at the relations among 
the components of character would of course be to give pride of place 
to the thematic function: the importance of thematizing derives from 
the assumption that a narrative achieves its significance from the 
ideational generalizations it leads one to. The same assumption leads 
one to conclude that the component of character contributing to those 
generalizations is the most important. More succinctly, if a fictional 
narrative can claim to work upon the world, then it must base that 
claim upon its ideational significance, much of which will be carried 
by the characters. 
Yet amid the widespread practice of thematic criticism, there 
continue to be occasional cogent protests against it, most often on 
the grounds that it is frequently reductive, that typically it moves 
one away from the richness of response authors and texts invite 
their audiences to have. The most forceful protesters have been neo-
Aristoteleans, and their alternative practice leads them to give pride 
of place to the mimetic function of character.2 For them, narratives 
are typically representations of actions involving human agents for 
the purpose of moving their audiences in a particular way. Such emo­
tional responses can also depend crucially on the ideational content 
of the work, but in the neo-Aristoteleans' view the ideational content 
is less often made central than the thematists would have one believe: 
a character is a represented person and the emotions we feel about 
that character are the emotions we feel about people in life. Although 
people may have representative significance, they typically cannot be 
adequately summed up by their representativeness. And the same 
goes for literary characters. 
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This disagreement provides a useful starting point for investigating 
the relation between the mimetic and thematic components of char­
acter because it indicates how the relation is connected both to ways 
of reading and to claims for the importance of literary narrative. Fur­
thermore, although adjudication itself matters less here than investi­
gating the relation between the mimetic and thematic components of 
character, the attempt to adjudicate will require me to make some 
careful discriminations about the connections among those compo­
nents of character and the general progression of a narrative. I shall 
eventually argue that in order to account for the complex relations of 
the mimetic and the thematic components of character the alterna­
tives presented by the thematists and the anti-thematists need to be 
transcended. This argument, however, cannot proceed simply by say­
ing that each side has a piece of the truth and that we need to synthe­
size those pieces. Instead, it will cause me to reexamine the nature of 
character and to complicate what I have said in the introduction about 
the relation between character and progression. I shall begin with an 
analysis of a work that both the thematists and the Aristoteleans 
would regard as dominated by theme: Orwell's 1984. After proposing 
an explanation of the relation between Winston Smith's functions and 
the progression of the narrative, I will take up the issues of the dis­
pute as they apply to Elizabeth Bennet's character in Pride and Preju­
dice, a novel about which the thematists and anti-thematists would 
disagree. 
II 
What Murray Sperber said in 1980 about the criticism of 1984 remains 
true today: despite all the attention Orwell's novel has received, its 
detailed structure has yet to be sufficiently analyzed.3 For this reason, 
my account of the progression will be fairly detailed. One of the strik­
ing features of that progression is that after Orwell introduces the first 
major instability in Chapter 1—Winston's thoughtcrime, his begin­
ning his diary—he does not significantly complicate that instability 
until the eighth and last chapter of Book One, when Winston returns 
to Mr. Charrington's shop, the place where he bought the diary. This 
feature is made all the more striking because, with the exception of 
the segments given over to the book of the brotherhood, the remainder 
of the narrative rather tightly follows the line begun with that crime 
and continued with Winston's developing relationships with Julia and 
O'Brien. Analyzing how the narrative progresses in Book One will 
also illuminate the relationship between Winston's mimetic and the­
matic functions. 
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Apart from the introduction of the first instability, the narrative in 
the first book progresses largely by the introduction and partial reso­
lution of a significant tension. "It was a bright, cold day in April and 
the clocks were striking thirteen/'4 This first sentence creates a gap 
between the narrative audience that already knows the year of the 
action and is already familiar with clocks striking thirteen and the 
authorial audience for whom these facts are either unknown or un­
familiar. Mark Crispin Miller's discussion of this first sentence5 points 
to the significance of April in the British literary tradition from Chau­
cer to Eliot, a significance which further emphasizes the peculiarity 
of the weather for the season. Since the authorial audience would be 
presumed to know that tradition while the narrative audience, lo­
cated in time after the Party's alteration of the past, would not, the 
mention of April further emphasizes the gap between the two audi­
ences. This gap also signals a tension of unequal knowledge between 
author and authorial audience: he and his narrator surrogate know all 
about this world but plunge into the narrative without orienting us. 
The tension is heightened as the first few paragraphs work in this gap 
between narrative and authorial audiences and make references to a 
poster of someone called Big Brother; a preparation for something 
called Hate Week; a telescreen; INGSOC; Thought Police; the Ninth 
Three-Year Plan; and the Ministry of Truth. Our reading is driven in 
part by a desire to reduce this tension. 
Of course the experience of beginning a narrative and being asked 
to read as if we shared knowledge that we do not actually possess is 
a common one. Such an experience does, I think, always produce a 
mild tension, but that tension is often quickly resolved. My claim 
about 1984 is that the initial defamiliarizations emphasize the tension 
(the difference between it and other narratives that carry the illusion 
of occurring in our world is a matter of degree) and that this tension 
is not—indeed cannot be—quickly resolved. This cognitive tension is 
both like and unlike the ethical tension that we saw in "Haircut." It 
functions to propel us forward in the narrative, but because of other 
signals we are given about Winston as a mimetic character, it orients 
us toward the acquisition of information that will influence our judg­
ments, expectations, desires, and attitudes about the characters and 
the instabilities they face. In general, cognitive tension functions in 
this way in narratives with a strong mimetic component. In narra­
tives like the classic detective story, where the mimetic component 
is restricted, cognitive tension can be the primary source of the 
progression. (Of course in such narratives, the cognitive tension 
does not manifest itself in a gap between authorial and narrative au­
diences but between both of them and the author.) Ethical tension is 
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typically a sign that the narrative has a strong mimetic component; it 
is itself one mechanism through which authors induce readers to 
form judgments, set up expectations, develop desires, adopt atti­
tudes, and so on. 
After introducing the major instability of Winston's thoughtcrime 
(an incident to which I shall return), Orwell's narrative progresses by 
reducing the tension: rather than immediately showing how the first 
thoughtcrime leads Winston into a related series of actions, Orwell 
shows us Winston going about his business in his world, occasionally 
punctuating the accompanying disclosures about that world by re­
turning to scenes of Winston writing in his diary. By the end of Book 
One, Orwell has reduced much—though not all—of the tension 
and simultaneously complicated our understanding of the major in­
stability. In addition, through his references to Julia and O'Brien he 
has laid the groundwork for further development of the instability. 
One of the major ways in which the progression by tension com­
plicates the initial instability is to affect our expectations about Win-
ston's success in eluding the Thought Police. By the end of Book One, 
we certainly still hope that he will, but we have strong reason to think 
that he will not. In addition, through maintaining the technique of 
the opening paragraphs and through representing Winston in numer­
ous contexts, Orwell has also revealed most of Winston's major attri­
butes. The narrative then returns to the progression by instability. 
More specifically, before Book One is over, Orwell shows us Win­
ston with his neighbors, Mrs. Parsons and her rabid children; Win­
ston submitting to the morning exercises (Physical Jerks) beamed over 
the telescreen; Winston working at the Ministry of Truth, where his 
job is to alter records, especially those contained in newspapers; Win­
ston undergoing the trials of eating lunch in the Ministry's cafeteria; 
Winston reflecting on the Party's control of the past through its han­
dling of the counterrevolutionaries Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford; 
Winston roaming about the proles' quarter of the city until he once 
again finds himself in Charrington's shop. Through these various 
scenes Winston frequently reflects on the social and political or­
ganization of his world as it impinges on—or indeed, determines 
and controls—the particular activity he is engaged in; occasionally, 
Orwell gives us Winston's thoughts about incidents in his own past 
life such as his vague memory of his mother sacrificing herself for 
him, and his unhappy marriage to Katherine, who despised sex but 
thought of procreation as their duty to the Party. 
The world revealed through these scenes and incidents is a curious 
mixture of efficiency and inefficiency, a world with sophisticated tech­
nology and a poor standard of living. Telescreens can both trans­
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mit and receive, and individuals can be watched vigilantly by the 
Thought Police, but elevators frequently don't work and food is 
barely palatable. Winston can rewrite newspaper articles and the his­
torical record can be swiftly altered, but the streets don't get cleaned, 
and decent medical care for such things as Winston's varicose ulcer 
seems to be nonexistent. Above all, Oceania in 1984 is a world domi­
nated by the Party and the social structure it has imposed on the 
province. The basic principle of this structure, we soon learn, is state 
control over the individual. The relatively poor standard of living sig­
nifies both one way of exerting control—it keeps the Party members 
extremely dependent—and one way the system is execrable. 
The telescreens, the enforced Physical Jerks, the ubiquity of Big 
Brother, the ritual of the Three Minutes Hate, the existence of the 
Spies and the Thought Police, the creation of Newspeak, the abolition 
of written laws without the abolition of punishments: all these Party 
innovations testify to its elaborate—and largely successful—efforts to 
control the lives of its members. Mrs. Parsons's fanatically loyal chil­
dren terrorize her. Winston's thought that his friend Syme, a dedi­
cated worker on the new edition of the Newspeak dictionary, will be 
vaporized simply because he understands the intended effects of the 
impoverished language points to the truth that, ironically, Syme 
has himself articulated: "Orthodoxy is unconsciousness." Winston's 
memories of his mother and his wife indicate how the Party has de­
stroyed the most intimate relationships: Winston thinks that the kind 
of sacrifice his mother made "had been tragic and sorrowful in a way 
that was no longer possible. Tragedy, he perceived, belonged to the 
ancient time, to a time when there were still privacy, love, and friend­
ship, and when the members of a family stood by one another with­
out needing to know the reason. . . . Today there were fear, hatred, 
and pain, but no dignity of emotion, no deep or complex sorrows" 
(p. 22). He was not able to develop any deep emotions in his own 
marriage because Katherine had been so unconsciously orthodox that 
she could not experience such emotions. Finally, Winston's excursion 
among the proles illustrates how the Party keeps them occupied with 
work on the one hand and bread and circuses on the other. 
The extent—and success—of the Party's control is sketched more 
fully in the information about Winston's job, in his remembrance of 
what happened to Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford, and in his at­
tempt to find somebody who can remember the time before the Party 
was in power. As we see Winston at work, we see how the Party 
controls history. Winston's remembrance of the three counterrevolu­
tionaries dramatizes the consequences of that effort: to control history 
is to control reality. Although Winston's photograph of the three 
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counterrevolutionaries is concrete evidence that the official version of 
their history is false, he could not do anything public with that evi­
dence. Furthermore, thinking back to his brief possession of the pho­
tograph, Winston muses that the "photograph might not even be 
evidence/' Finally, the impossibility of recapturing history is drama­
tized in Winston's futile attempt to get the old prole to answer his 
questions about the past. 
By the end of Book One, our knowledge of Winston's world is not 
complete, but the tension between Orwell and the authorial audience 
is greatly diminished: we know the kind of world we are reading 
about, and this knowledge has significant consequences for our un­
derstanding of the initial major instability and of Winston's character. 
We come to understand that to begin the diary is to rebel against 
the Party, not merely because the diary contains exclamations like 
"DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER!" but also because the act of writing 
is an act of individual consciousness and autonomy. Simply by sitting 
down to write, indeed, by contemplating that act, Winston is guilty 
of thoughtcrime; he is asserting his selfhood against the Party, which 
wants to deny that selfhood. The central issues of the whole narrative 
are gradually defined in the course of Book One: can Winston elude 
the Thought Police and go on writing the diary, and more important, 
can he have any sustained existence as an individual in this totalitarian 
society? As the form of the second question indicates, the progression 
of Book One leads us to read Winston thematically: he comes to rep­
resent the individual citizen, and what he does and what happens to 
him matters to us because of what these things imply about the pos­
sibility of individual freedom in totalitarian society. This movement 
of Book One gives thematic prominence to certain of Winston's attri­
butes, even as Orwell's handling of the point of view emphasizes his 
mimetic function. 
By the end of Book One, the most salient attributes of Winston's 
character to emerge are his name, his age, his habit of thinking by 
subconscious association, his intelligence, his concern with the past, 
his love of beauty, his hatred of the Party, and his optimism; further­
more, though Winston is distinguished from his associates by his in­
telligence and his resistance to the Party, he is not given any great 
powers of action—he is a man more ordinary than extraordinary. The 
first chapter of the novel, indeed its first three paragraphs, establish 
Winston's name and age—and as noted above in a somewhat differ­
ent way, they immediately signal to the authorial audience that his 
world, despite its similarities to our own, is a synthetic construct. Our 
awareness of the fictionality of the world naturally brings the syn­
thetic component of Winston's character into the foreground of the 
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narrative. This foregrounding combines with other aspects of Or-
well's presentation to emphasize some of Winston's thematic dimen­
sions. When we learn in the sixth paragraph that he lives in London, 
and when the later progression encourages us to regard him themati­
cally, his name and age take on further associations. Combining the 
extremely common British surname with the first name of England's 
greatest hero of the 1940s identifies him as what a typical male British 
citizen of 1984 would be—if there were still a Britain. Since he is 
thirty-nine, he was born in 1945, and, we can infer, was named for 
Churchill. The last name, though, emphasizes his ordinariness: this 
is not Winston Churchill, but Winston Smith. I shall return to the 
significance of this point after discussing the way Orwell handles the 
conclusion of the narrative. 
Later in the narrative, after Orwell reveals how the Party is de­
stroying the past, and especially after Winston becomes involved 
with Julia, his age takes on a thematic significance that further defines 
his representative status. His conversations with Julia indicate that 
the next generation simply cannot envision life without the Party. 
Having grown up with the Party as a fact of life, Julia takes it so much 
for granted that it constrains her ideas of rebellion; until she meets 
Winston, her goal in life is to manipulate the Party's system rather 
than overthrow it. She, for instance, pretends to be a rabid member 
of the Junior Anti-Sex League so that she can have a cover for her 
various sexual liaisons. Winston, in contrast, with his dim memories 
of life before the Party, can envision life without it. His response is to 
do whatever he can—keep his diary, get involved with Julia, attempt 
to join the Brotherhood—to resist the Party's repression of individu­
als. His optimism allows him to hope that such resistance may even­
tually lead to the Party's overthrow, even as his intelligence reminds 
him that such an outcome is unlikely. This disparity between Winston 
and Julia clearly marks him off as a member of the last group of citi­
zens to remember life without the Party, the last group that could use 
that connection to the past as a motive for rebellion. "Who controls 
the past controls the future." As the narrative progresses, Winston's 
name and age combine to make him a figure of "the last man in Eu­
rope," a phrase that Orwell considered using as the book's title.6 Con­
sequently, the stakes of the instabilities are raised: Winston's story is 
not just an exemplary case of what happens when the individual re­
bels against the totalitarian state but also an account of how the Party 
responds to one of its last apparently serious threats. 
Despite the elements of the opening chapter that foreground its 
synthetic status, and despite the movement of Book One that places 
Winston's actions into a broad thematic context, Orwell's initial treat­
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ment of Winston himself is directed toward emphasizing his mimetic 
function. Orwell's own statement about the book aptly describes the 
effect of the opening pages: "it is in a sense a fantasy but in the form 
of a naturalistic novel/'7 Orwell relies greatly upon the manipulation 
of point of view to establish Winston's mimetic function. Winston is 
consistently the focalizer in the narration; we see things as Winston 
sees them, though frequently the voice used to express Winston's vi­
sion is the narrator's.8 "Outside, even through the shut window pane, 
the world looked cold. Down in the street, little eddies of wind were 
whirling dust and torn papers into spirals" (pp. 3-4). It is Winston 
who is up at his window looking "down" at the "little eddies of 
wind," but it is the narrator who describes the wind in those terms. 
In addition to emphasizing the mimetic function of Winston's char­
acter, this technique has other important effects in the progression, 
but these can be better understood after we look at the progression in 
Book Two. 
At the end of Book One when Winston returns to Mr. Charring-
ton's shop, Orwell begins to shift the main principle of movement 
from the resolution of tension to the complication of instabilities. 
Winston builds on his initial "crime" of buying the diary by buying 
the hundred-year-old glass paperweight, and he begins to think 
about returning again and again to the shop, even about renting the 
upstairs room. Book Two opens with Julia's approach to him, and 
soon they are in love with each other and united against the Party. In 
addition, O'Brien makes his approach to Winston, and the lovers 
soon join the Brotherhood. Meanwhile Winston rents Charrington's 
upstairs room, and he and Julia begin meeting there. With each step, 
the magnitude of their rebellion and the exercise of their individual 
freedom (one equals the other) increase, and so of course does the 
danger that they will be captured. "We are the dead," they remind 
themselves without fully believing what they are saying. Having es­
tablished the overarching thematic background in Book One, Orwell 
here designs the trajectory of the main action around our mimetic 
interest in Winston and his struggle. And as Orwell confines us to 
Winston's vision through the point of view, he has us participate in 
the trajectory of Winston's own emotions in the main action: Like 
Winston, we not only take pleasure in his relationship with Julia and 
in his finding an apparently kindred spirit in O'Brien, but we also 
come to desire deeply the total overthrow of the Party. 
At the same time, from the information in Book One about the 
power of the Party, we develop a strong sense that this positive out­
come is not possible. When Winston and Julia are arrested by the 
Thought Police, we share his feeling that such an event was inevi­
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table, but our knowledge offers no solace for the disappointment we 
feel. Moreover, even the appropriate surprise of discovering Mr. 
Charrington to be a member of the Thought Police does not fully pre­
pare us for the new developments of the progression in Book Three, 
developments that are dependent in large part on Orwell's manage­
ment of the point of view and that in turn contribute to the em­
phasis on Winston's mimetic function. Book Three resolves the in­
stabilities by tracing the conversion of Winston's rebellion into his 
total defeat. Although such a resolution has been implicit in the nar­
rative from early on, Orwell is able to maximize its power by sud­
denly showing us that the tension between his knowledge of the 
world and ours has not been resolved as fully as we thought. In con­
sistently restricting us to Winston's vision, Orwell does not give his 
own authority to Winston's conclusions about the world; we need to 
recognize that those conclusions are always subject to later revision. 
In fact, it is because he handles the technique this way that Orwell 
can legitimately "surprise" us with the truth about Charrington and 
O'Brien. At the same time, Orwell counts on our erroneously accept­
ing some of Winston's conclusions. For example, in Chapter Two 
Orwell depicts Winston thinking about the ubiquity of Big Brother: 
"Even from the coin the eyes pursued you. On coins, on stamps, on 
the covers of books, on banners, on posters, and on the wrapping of 
a cigarette packet—everywhere. Always the eyes watching you and 
the voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating, in­
doors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed—no escape. Nothing 
was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull" 
(pp. 19-20). Although we are still clearly being given only Winston's 
vision here, we are inclined to share it and Orwell does nothing to 
alter that inclination. The inviolability of one's mind is one of the 
supposed truths of our world, Winston's thoughtcrime has not yet 
brought down any punishment on him, and the rhetoric of the pas­
sage makes the final sentence a mere concession. We are being told 
by both Winston and Orwell about the limited freedom the individual 
has; we accept what we are told, including what the passage regards 
as the single small exception. Although the rest of Book One tells us 
a great deal about Winston's world and about the power of the Party, 
it is not until the very end of the narrative that we learn that even 
those few cubic centimeters are not one's own. Indeed, the Party's 
power extends far enough to control not only what one does, not only 
what one thinks, but also what one feels. 
I shall return to discuss the resolution in some detail but even here 
we can recognize some important effects of the delayed resolution of 
the tension. In relieving so much of the tension in Book One, Orwell 
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gives us the illusion that we know the worst. When we learn that even 
our extensive knowledge of the Party's mechanisms of control has 
underestimated its power, our revulsion from such a totalitarian state 
becomes even greater—and so too does the effectiveness of the nar­
rative as a warning. In this way the tension is crucial to the mimetic 
(and emotional) effect of the ending, which in turn Orwell uses to 
reinforce the thematic point about the threat of totalitarianism. 
In general, Orwell's handling of Winston's character follows the 
pattern outlined here: he emphasizes Winston's mimetic function, in­
creases our involvement with his progression toward his fate as itself 
an emotionally affecting experience,9 and then ultimately subordi­
nates that function and our involvement to his communication of a 
larger thematic point. The relation between the mimetic and the the­
matic is fairly clear for such attributes as Winston's concern with the 
past and his love of beauty;10 perhaps the least obvious and most 
dramatic illustration of the general pattern occurs in what Orwell 
does with Winston's attribute of associative thinking, which is itself a 
significant part of his psychological portrait. Here Orwell immedi­
ately establishes this attribute as a significant mimetic trait, but he 
does not develop its full thematic significance until the final pages of 
the narrative. 
Winston's attribute of associative thinking is established simulta­
neously with the introduction of the first major instability. Winston's 
first diary entry describes his trip to the "flicks" the previous night. 
During the war films, which were depicting various people being shot 
or hit with bombs or otherwise violently obliterated to the great ap­
proval of most spectators, one proletarian started shouting her objec­
tions to the film. Winston breaks off his account after saying that the 
police turned her out; then we are told, "He did not know what had 
made him pour out this stream of rubbish. But the curious thing was 
that while he was doing so a totally different memory had clarified 
itself in his mind" (p. 8). That memory turns out to be a look from 
O'Brien during that morning's Two Minutes Hate, a look that Win­
ston interprets as a signal that O'Brien is on his side. Winston never 
figures out the connection between the two events, but Orwell ex­
pects his audience to recognize that the scene at the flicks clarifies the 
scene during the Two Minutes Hate because in each an individual acts 
in opposition to the hysterical mob surrounding him or her. Orwell 
never does anything else with Winston's instinctive connection be­
tween the two events; and consequently, the association becomes sig­
nificant largely for the way it adds a psychological complexity to Win-
ston's character. Furthermore, at this stage of the narrative, this im­
portant attribute does not have any thematic function. 
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As the narrative develops, Orwell places this attribute in a rather 
complex relationship with Winston's optimism. When Winston be­
gins his diary, he tells himself that he is thereby making himself one 
of the dead; but as I noted above, this admission does not become a 
conviction until he is actually captured. Instead, he goes on with his 
acts of rebellion, becoming more and more hopeful about the possibil­
ity of eventual success with each passing day. Yet Orwell shows us, 
through Winston's habits of associative thought, that in another part 
of himself Winston senses that his optimism is based upon a denial 
of certain perceptions. In Chapter 7 of Book One, for example, Win­
ston gazes at a portrait of Big Brother which forms the frontispiece of 
a children's history textbook: 'The hypnotic eyes gazed into his own. 
It was as though some huge force were pressing down upon you— 
something that penetrated inside your skull, battering against your 
brain, frightening you out of your beliefs, persuading you, almost, to 
deny the evidence of your senses" (p. 55). Then he consciously resists 
these conclusions as his optimism gains the upper hand: "But no! His 
courage seemed suddenly to stiffen of its own accord." And then: 
"The face of O'Brien, not called up by any obvious association had 
floated into his mind" (p.55). Although the vision of O'Brien comes 
hard upon the heels of his renewed courage, the narrator's comment 
about the absence of any obvious association directs the audience to 
supply that association: Winston subconsciously links O'Brien and 
Big Brother. 
In case we have lingering doubts, Orwell shows us at the end of 
the next chapter that the association can also move in the other di­
rection: Trying to think of O'Brien, whom he now regards as the 
eventual audience for his diary, Winston focuses on the memory of 
O'Brien's saying in a dream, "We shall meet in the place where there 
is no darkness." The nagging presence of the telescreen interferes 
with his thoughts, and then "The face of Big Brother swam into his 
mind, displacing that of O'Brien" (p. 70). This reinforced association 
of the two occurs in the last paragraph of Book One, and thus pro­
vides an ominous backdrop to the apparently positive developments 
of Book Two. Again, though, the general point is that Orwell is using 
the attributes to increase the psychological realism of his treatment of 
Winston and thereby to increase the extent of our emotional involve­
ment in his unfolding story. 
Before I turn to how Orwell makes the attribute of associative 
thinking function thematically, I need to expand on my earlier asser­
tion that this attribute is part of Orwell's attempt to create a realistic 
individual psychology for Winston—even as Orwell leaves it to us to 
piece together the workings of that psychology. Recall Winston's ini­
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tial thought after breaking off his first diary entry: "He did not know 
what had made him pour out this stream of rubbish" (p.8). Later in 
the narrative Orwell supplies us with the answer: in recounting the 
scenes where the mother in the movie vainly tries to protect her child 
who burrows into her and where the proletarian mother in turn tries 
to protect her children from having to watch such a movie, Winston 
is recalling his own mother's attempts to protect his sister—and more 
generally himself as well. The first time he sleeps after beginning the 
diary, he dreams of watching his mother and sister sink in the bottom 
of a ship while he is able to stay up and out in the light; later, when 
Julia brings chocolate to their first tryst, it stirs up "some memory 
which he could not pin down, but which was powerful and trou­
bling" (p.81). Still later, during one of his visits to the room above 
Charrington's shop with Julia, he dreams of his mother again and this 
dream allows him to pin down the earlier memory: it is a memory of 
the last time he saw his mother, and how on that occasion his own 
ravenous hunger drove him to take for himself his sister's lesser share 
of chocolate. What is most vivid in the memory is how Winston's 
mother embraced and tried to protect his sister, and how even after 
he snatched her chocolate, his mother went on trying to protect and 
comfort her. Winston draws a very significant moral at that point: "he 
did not suppose, from what he could remember of [his mother], that 
she had been an unusual woman, still less an intelligent one; and 
yet she had possessed a kind of nobility, a kind of purity, simply 
because the standards that she obeyed were private ones. Her feel­
ings were her own, and could not be altered from outside. . .  . If you 
love someone, you loved him, and when you had nothing else to 
give, you still gave him love. . . . The terrible thing that the Party had 
done was to persuade you that mere impulses, mere feeling were of 
no account, while at the same time robbing you of all power over the 
material world" (pp. 109-10). 
Yet the significance of Winston's dreams and memory for the nar­
rative are not exhausted in this moral, because they reach beyond 
these insights to affect our understanding of what happens in Book 
Three.11 The whole sequence—journal entry, dream, dim memory, 
second dream, clear memory—works like the associative thought 
processes to emphasize Winston's realistic psychology. The particular 
nature of the dreams and memories adds a significant dimension to 
our understanding of how and why Winston's betrayal of Julia breaks 
him. When, faced with imminent attack from the ravenous rats, Win­
ston shouts "Do it to Julia!" he violates something at the core of his 
values because it is at the core of his own existence: the feeling that 
he is alive because the woman who brought him into the world and 
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loved him had sacrificed herself for him. Both the power and the re­
pulsiveness of the Party are emphasized by our understanding that 
Winston had no choice but to act as he did. 
The ending of the narrative then takes these attributes of Winston's 
character that have been working to emphasize his mimetic func­
tion and converts them into thematic functions. In the last chapter, 
Winston has become a figure reminiscent of Jones, Aaronson, and 
Rutherford. In Chapter 7 of Book One, Orwell describes Winston's 
recollection of the day he saw the three of them in the Chestnut 
Tree Cafe. 
It was the lonely hour of fifteen. . . . The place was almost empty. 
A tinny music was trickling from the telescreen. The three men sat 
in their corner almost motionless, never speaking. Uncommanded, 
the waiter brought fresh glasses of gin. There was a chessboard on 
the table beside them, with the pieces set out, but no game started. 
And then, for perhaps half a minute in all, something happened to 
the telescreens. The tune that they were playing changed, and the 
tone of the music changed too. There came into it—but it was 
something hard to describe. It was a peculiar, cracked, braying, 
jeering note; in his mind Winston called it a yellow note. And then 
a voice from the telescreen was singing: 
"Under the spreading chestnut tree 
I sold you and you sold me 
There lie they, and here lie we 
Under the spreading chestnut tree." 
The three men never stirred. But when Winston glanced again 
at Rutherford's ruinous face, he saw that his eyes were full of tears. 
And for the first time he noticed, with a kind of inward shudder, 
and yet not knowing at what he shuddered, that both Aaronson 
and Rutherford had broken noses. (Pp. 52-53) 
In the last chapter, Winston sits in the same cafe, and again it is 
almost empty at "the lonely hour of fifteen." From time to time, an 
"unbidden" waiter comes and fills Winston's glass with gin, which 
has become "the element he swam in," while he fitfully plays a soli­
tary game of chess and listens to the telescreen. He recalls his last, 
cold, painful visit with Julia, a visit in which they confessed that they 
had betrayed each other. And then: 
Something changed in the music that trickled from the telescreen. 
A cracked and jeering note, a yellow note, came into it. And then— 
perhaps it was not happening, perhaps it was only a memory tak­
ing on the semblance of sound—a voice was singing: 
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"Under the spreading chestnut tree 
I sold you and you sold me—" 
The tears welled up in his eyes. 
(P. 195) 
The expected inferences are clear: the song is the Party's way of mock­
ing Winston for betraying Julia, just as it had been mocking Jones, 
Aaronson, and Rutherford for their own versions of mutual betrayal. 
More generally, what has happened to Winston in the Ministry of 
Love is just a variation on what always happens to thought-criminals. 
Winston has come to represent the inevitable failure of the individual 
to resist the totalitarian state. Nevertheless, at this point the instabili­
ties created by Winston's rebellion and the Party's response to it are 
not entirely resolved: the tears are a sign that he is still attached to his 
former attitudes, that he regrets his betrayal of Julia. If he were to die 
now, he would die hating Big Brother—and thus, by his own earlier 
definition, achieve some measure of victory. Orwell works toward the 
resolution of the instability by following the progress of Winston's 
thoughts. 
First, he gives us one more instance of Winston's associative 
thought process. Winston's thoughts of the alleged war in Africa— 
"He had the map of Africa behind his eyelids. The movement of the 
armies was a diagram: a black arrow tearing vertically southward, and 
a white arrow tearing horizontally eastward, across the tail of the 
first" (pp. 195-96)—trigger a subconscious association with a child­
hood memory. He thinks of an afternoon spent playing with his 
mother a game called Snakes and Ladders, a game in which the tid­
dlywinks move vertically and horizontally. "Soon he was wildly 
excited and shouting with laughter as the tiddlywinks climbed hope­
fully up the ladders and then came slithering down again. . . . His 
tiny sister, too young to understand what the game was about, had 
sat propped up against a bolster, laughing because the others were 
laughing. For a whole afternoon they had all been happy together, as 
in his earlier childhood/' Then Winston's training at the Ministry of 
Love takes over: "He pushed the picture out of his mind. It was a 
false memory" (p. 196). 
This reaction to the memory is sharply different from Winston's 
reactions to his previous memories. As we have seen, those lead him 
to reflect on the Party's elimination of the human bonds that develop 
in a social order that allows privacy, friendship, and love. His push­
ing the memory away signifies a very crucial step in his defeat: under 
the pressure of his training, he is betraying not only his own prior 
belief in the integrity of the past but also the bonds that were part of 
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his early private life and part of his identity. His rejection of the 
memory is also crucial because it represents his own conscious at­
tempt to control his subconscious. In presenting the memory, Orwell 
is reminding us that Winston's mind has worked in ways that were 
beyond his control. In presenting Winston's first memory of a happy 
time during this afternoon of his own dull unhappiness, Orwell is 
showing us again the power of Winston's subconscious. But when 
Winston reacts by denying the validity of the memory, his defeat is 
all but complete. 
The final steps come with the telescreen's announcement of Ocean-
ia's victory in Africa. In representing Winston's response here, Orwell 
indicates that Winston's memory is not so easily pushed away; in­
stead, it is perversely transformed and applied to Winston's present 
situation. Wildly excited in memory, he becomes wildly excited in the 
present: "in his mind he was running, swiftly running, he was with 
the crowds outside cheering himself deaf" (p. 197). Happy and con­
tent in memory, no longer at odds with his mother and sister, he 
becomes happy and content in the present, no longer at odds with 
the Party.12 
Ah, it was more than a Eurasian army that had perished! Much 
had changed in him since that first day in the Ministry of Love, but 
the final indispensable, healing change had never happened until 
this moment . . . sitting in a blissful dream, he was back in the 
Ministry of Love, with everything forgiven, his soul white as snow. 
He was in the public dock, confessing everything, implicating ev­
erybody. He was walking down the white-tiled corridor, with the 
feeling of walking in sunlight, and an armed guard at his back. The 
long-hoped-for bullet was entering his brain. (P. 197) 
He is ready for the last step of his transformation, the final per­
verse twist the Party's training produces on his specific memory and 
his general consciousness. 
He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to 
learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark mustache. 
O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile 
from the loving breast! . . . But it was all right, everything was all 
right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over him­
self. He loved Big Brother. (P. 197) 
This passage appropriately closes and completes the narrative be­
cause it not only signals the end of Winston's rebellion but also indi­
cates the extent of the Party's ability to control the individual. It is 
able to manipulate not just behavior, not just thoughts, but also emo­
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tions. It is even able to control the workings of the subconscious 
mind. In achieving this completion, the narrative transforms the the­
matic dimension accompanying Winston's trait of associative thinking 
into a major thematic function. That trait now exists not only to give 
Winston mimetic plausibility but also to demonstrate the extent of the 
totalitarian state's power. If it can effect such a transformation in a 
mind like Winston's that frequently operated in a way that was be­
yond his own conscious control, its power is enormous indeed. The 
narrative's warning about totalitarianism becomes even more urgent. 
Orwell's handling of vision and voice in the final pages sheds fur­
ther light on the relation between the mimetic and the thematic func­
tions of Winston's character there. Previously, as the narrative has 
presented the world of 1984 through Winston's vision, the authorial 
audience has been asked to share virtually all of Winston's evaluative 
comments. Here for the first time, our evaluations are diametrically 
opposed to his. Indeed, since we have been traveling with Winston 
so closely throughout the narrative, if Orwell had not been so insis­
tent on the state's control over the individual, we ourselves might 
have felt betrayed by Winston in this passage. Even within the final 
passage Orwell takes steps to block that response. In the sentence 
represented by the ellipsis above, the narrator leaves Winston's vision 
and describes him from the outside: ''Two gin-scented tears trickled 
down the sides of his nose" (p. 197). The outside view provides a 
comment on his internal elation; we see him not as triumphant but as 
pathetic. The emotions generated by our vision work to support our 
own opposition to the totalitarian system that reduced Winston to 
this state. Again, in short, Orwell develops the mimetic response and 
then subordinates it to his thematic purpose. 
This reading of the ending and the way it affects both the previous 
mimetic characterization of Winston and the indictment of totalitari­
anism suggest a further conclusion about Orwell's use of mimetic and 
thematic elements of Winston's character. At first glance, it may seem 
surprising that Orwell does not make Winston a man with greater 
powers of action. If he is to be a figure of the last man in Europe who 
succumbs to the power of the state, and if his losing struggle is to be 
as tragic as possible, then, we might argue, Orwell ought to have 
made him more formidable. Although I believe that such a strategy 
might have also been effective, I think that Orwell was constructing 
the narrative along different lines—and toward a different kind of 
effectiveness. For Orwell the greater power of the totalitarian state 
is finally a foregone conclusion. He builds some suspense about 
whether Winston can succeed in his rebellion by restricting us to 
Winston's point of view for most of the narrative and by not fully 
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resolving the tension about the nature of the totalitarian state until 
Book Three, but the greater emphasis in the narrative is on what the 
state does to the individual, common man. In this respect, Winston's 
mental life is of more significance than his powers of action. By show­
ing us what the state does to an individual with such a mental life, an 
individual who finally is not a serious threat to the Party, Orwell 
places the burden of his indictment precisely on the dangers that the 
totalitarian state poses for Everyman. 
In conclusion, the narrative progression of 1984 eventually gives 
the greatest weight to the thematic functions of Winston Smith's char­
acter, but the effects of those functions also depend crucially on 
Orwell's ability to make Winston function as an effective mimetic 
character. At the same time, the progression develops different the­
matic functions from different attributes: his age and his ordinariness 
make him a certain kind of representative figure; his love for the past 
is used to develop the thematic point about the connection between 
the Party's control of the individual and the Party's control of history; 
his associative thinking is used to develop the thematic point about 
the Party's control over the thoughts and feelings of the individual. 
Moreover, all these separate functions work together as part of the 
narrative's exploration of the threat of totalitarianism. In this respect, 
we might say that the separate functions eventually run together in a 
Grand Central Function as Winston becomes the embodiment of in­
dividual actions and desires that the totalitarian state seeks to crush. 
The narrative of 2984, in other words, presents one form that the 
mimetic-thematic relationship can take. More generally, it presents 
one remarkable example of how one component of character can be 
subordinated to another without that subordination restricting the 
component, for Orwell can only communicate the full thematic sig­
nificance of Winston's character through his extended development 
of his mimetic component. 
Il l 
The most immediately relevant part of these conclusions for the dis­
cussion of Pride and Prejudice is that the thematists would claim that 
they apply, mutatis mutandis, to Elizabeth Bennet. For them, Eliza­
beth is a character whose individuality is joined to a representative 
function, and their analyses seek to explain the precise nature and 
significance of that function. In order to understand why the neo-
Aristoteleans object to that practice, let us look at some thematic read­
ings of the novel and the case against such readings. 
In The Improvement of the Estate Alistair Duckworth sets forth a well­
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executed example of thematic reading. He argues that through her 
representation of Elizabeth Bennet's education Jane Austen commu­
nicates her vision of a "properly constituted society/'13 According to 
Duckworth, Austen insists that such a society "emerges only from 
the interaction of cultural discipline and individual commitment, and 
only when inherited forms receive the support of individual energy 
do they carry value. Conversely, however, . . . individual energy 
must be generated within social contexts, for, lacking social direction 
and control, it turns too easily to withdrawal from society, or to irre­
sponsibility and anarchy" (p. 132). Duckworth maintains that this 
dialectic between cultural discipline and individual energy is played 
out through Austen's representation of Darcy and Elizabeth respec­
tively. "Only when Elizabeth recognizes that individualism must find 
its social limits, and Darcy concedes that tradition without individual 
energy is empty form, can the novel reach its eminently satisfactory 
conclusion" (p. 118). Duckworth's reading focuses on how Elizabeth's 
recognition comes about, on how Darcy both possesses and learns to 
modify a "proper pride," and on how the same dialectic between in­
dividual energy and social control is at work in other elements of the 
novel, especially in the motif of laughter. For Duckworth, in short, 
though Austen is writing a comedy, what is important in the comedy 
is not the characters as people but the characters as ideas. Further­
more, his particular thematic view of Pride and Prejudice exemplifies a 
general thematic view of comedy, one that sees the genre as largely 
an affirmation of societal values as it depicts individuals becoming 
integrated into a social community. 
Susan Morgan's reading of Elizabeth's character provides a useful 
second look at thematism because Morgan explicitly sets her reading 
in opposition to Duckworth's. "To understand Pride and Prejudice in 
terms of some ideal blend of the individual and the social is to speak 
of finalities about a writer who herself chooses to speak of the pos­
sible, the continuous, the incomplete."14 More specifically, "if Mr. 
Darcy is to represent society and Elizabeth a rebellious individualism, 
how can we account for the fact that the first breach of society's rules 
is made by Mr. Darcy, when he insults Elizabeth within her hearing 
at the Meryton ball?" (p. 80). For Morgan the central issue of the 
novel is the relation between freedom and intelligence, or more par­
ticularly, involvement and perception, and this issue receives its full­
est expression through Austen's presentation of Elizabeth's character. 
Like her father, Elizabeth initially believes that "understanding, intel­
ligence, and perception depend on being independent of their ob­
jects" (p. 83), and she wants above all to be an intelligent observer. 
Yet the action of the novel shows Elizabeth learning that she is never 
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fully detached from but "always involved" with the objects of her 
perception (p. 84). Even after the essential lesson is learned through 
Darcy's letter, Elizabeth makes mistakes of perception and judgment— 
as in her decision not to expose Wickham—but "the difference is that 
Elizabeth no longer sees her world as a place of easily discovered folly 
from which in self-defense as much as in amusement she must stand 
apart if she is to see the truth. She has come to value the connections 
and particularities which inform truth and to understand the lesson of 
Hunsford that a lively intelligence is personal and engaged" (p. 104). 
With this new attitude, Elizabeth comes to discover her own af­
fection for Darcy, an affection which leads to her expression of grati­
tude for what he did on Lydia's—and her family's—behalf and from 
there to Darcy's second proposal. Morgan finds this story of a heroine 
giving up her freedom from being involved to be "most appropriately 
a love story" (p. 83), but, like Duckworth, Morgan clearly locates its 
value and the importance of its characters in the ideas they represent. 
Presented with this disagreement between Duckworth and Mor­
gan, Richard Levin would respond by saying "a pox on both your 
houses." Levin's attack on thematism occurs in New Readings vs. Old 
Plays, a book whose project is to examine "in some sort of rigorous 
way, the basic assumptions, techniques, and consequences" (p. ix) of 
three interpretive approaches to Renaissance drama—the ironic, the 
historical, and the thematic.15 Since he follows his plan of isolating 
assumptions, techniques, and consequences, his case against the­
matic readings of Renaissance drama also applies to such readings as 
Morgan's and Duckworth's- Because Levin's argument amplifies and 
updates such early attacks on thematism as Keast's and Crane's,16 it 
offers me the opportunity to examine some problems with both the­
matism and anti-thematism as they influence our understanding of a 
character such as Elizabeth Bennet. 
Levin's case against thematism derives much of its force from his 
implicit application of the neo-Aristotelean distinction between mi­
metic and didactic works to thematic criticism. The distinction divides 
all works into one of two general classes: those organized mimetically, 
that is, to represent characters in action for the sake of the emotions 
generated by that representation, and those organized thematically, 
that is, to represent characters in action for the sake of some idea­
tional purpose such as convincing the audience of the truth of some 
proposition or ridiculing objects external to the representation. In one 
respect, Levin's argument is that the thematists typically treat mimetic 
works as if they were didactic, though, as will be evident, he would 
find some of the methods of thematism inappropriate for many didac­
tic works as well. 
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The major flaw Levin finds in the thematic approach is contained 
in what he identifies as its major assumption: literary works repre­
senting characters and actions are not really about those characters 
and actions but rather about some abstract idea such as jealousy, 
irresolution, ambition, honor, appearance and reality, the individual 
and society, perception and involvement, and so on. The basic tech­
nique of thematic reading, employed by both Duckworth and Mor­
gan, and called the thematic leap by Levin, follows naturally from this 
assumption: "it consists of seizing upon some particular components 
of the drama and making them the representatives or exemplars of 
the general class, which then become the subject of the play and the 
critic's analysis" (p. 23). Duckworth and Morgan make the leap not 
from any single component alone but from character and incident 
considered together; in this respect, their critical reasoning is both 
more complex and more typical than Levin's description would sug­
gest. But his essential point remains unaffected by this modification. 
Levin argues that the procedure is flawed because it is arbitrary: 
the work itself does not provide a sufficient basis for the thematist to 
choose one general idea rather than numerous others, and thus the 
critic may leap from the particulars to a multitude of possible thematic 
platforms. The first problem that this arbitrary leap creates for the 
thematist is one of showing why his or her thematic interpretation 
should be preferred over others. Levin contends that a thematist has 
only two ways to solve the problem and both are unsatisfactory. A 
thematist can claim greater centrality for his reading by claiming ei­
ther that the chosen theme corresponds to more parts or aspects of 
the work than previous thematic interpretations—this is Morgan's 
strategy with Duckworth's reading—or that it encompasses the pre­
vious candidates for thematic center. The problem with the second 
strategy is that either the relation between abstractions cannot be so 
easily ordered (does the thematic pair freedom and intelligence en­
compass perception and involvement or vice versa or neither?) or the 
move up the ladder of abstraction has nowhere to stop. The problem 
with the first strategy is that it may well show some flaws in a rival 
reading without validating the proposed one. When Morgan "cor­
rects" Duckworth's reading, she gives the appearance of providing 
greater support for her own; but that support is finally insufficient 
because the central theme Morgan claims to find—the relation be­
tween perception and involvement—also exists at too great a distance 
from the particulars. Levin concludes this part of his case against the­
matism by asserting that when we examine the various themes pur­
ported to be central to any one work, "we will have to conclude that 
any or all or none of them could be considered central, which is 
47 Character, Progression, and Thematism 
equivalent to admitting that the concept of central theme has no real 
meaning here" (p. 41). 
Levin extends his objections to thematism by criticizing the typical 
way thematists build their positive case for their reading, i.e., their 
thematic analyses of structure. These analyses, Levin explains, come 
in "two basic varieties, which might be called the homogeneous and 
the dialectical" (p. 42). In the homogeneous account, which might be 
described as "the same damn thing over and over again," all the ele­
ments of a work—imagery, characters, incidents, plot, etc.—directly 
embody or mirror or encapsulate the central theme. In dialectical ac­
counts such as Duckworth's and Morgan's, the various parts of the 
work are regarded as heterogeneous and in interaction with each 
other, an interaction that, in the thematist's view, is designed to ex­
emplify the central idea. The dialectical account of structure itself 
takes two basic shapes, one schematic, the other sequential. In the 
schematic reading, exemplified by Duckworth, the basic opposition 
of two ideas is reflected at various levels and in various elements of 
the text—thus, for Duckworth, the motif of laughter participates in 
the dialectic between individual and society—and this opposition is 
consistently resolved in the same way. In the sequential reading, ex­
emplified by Morgan, the thematist assumes that the thematic struc­
ture has a "distinct temporal movement which corresponds to the 
play's line of action" (p. 49). The typical pattern here is for the critic 
to identify a basic conflict between two ideas and then to argue that 
the action of the work dramatizes and finally resolves the conflict. 
Levin identifies two main problems with the homogenizers: (1) in 
most cases these critics have to ride roughshod over differentiations 
which exist in the "literal structure" of the literary works; (2) the unity 
found by these critics is of the most general—and easy—sort: "it is 
like the unity of a heap of pennies, which may be called 'one' only in 
the sense that every object in the heap partakes of penniness; and it 
is a nominal unity because the number or arrangement of the pennies 
can be changed without affecting the oneness of the heap or its pen­
niness" (p. 46). 
The chief difficulty Levin finds with the dialectical accounts of 
structure is that they inevitably introduce distortion of the textual 
facts. His point in effect is that these readings take the "high priori" 
road, manipulating those facts to fit the conceptions rather than let­
ting the conceptions emerge, if possible, from the facts. The distortion 
is all but inevitable because the thematic assumption renders the lit­
eral facts relatively inconsequential. For the thematist "the particular 
facts of the play take on significance only as they 'symbolize' or 'em­
body' the one governing Idea floating above them that gives the play 
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its meaning" (p. 52). Morgan herself shows that Duckworth's the­
matic conception distorts details of Darcy's characterization. Levin, in 
turn, would point out that Morgan's thematic categories lead her to 
some distortions, or at least inconsistencies, the most obvious of 
which involve Elizabeth's attitudes toward Wickham. Morgan de­
clares that "because Austen depicts both Elizabeth's credence and her 
feelings in the familiar and suspect language of sentimental fiction we 
must conclude that Elizabeth no more seriously believes Wickham's 
tale than she believes she is in love with him" (p. 91). Later, however, 
Morgan argues that "the worst moment of Elizabeth's objectivity is 
her letter to Mrs. Gardiner telling of Wickham's defection to Miss 
King. Her sisters, she says, are more hurt than she for they 'are young 
in the ways of the world, and not yet open to the mortifying convic­
tion that handsome young men must have something to live on, as 
well as the plain.' It is a terrible sentence, terrible in its distance from 
her feelings, its self-satisfied realism, its 'way of the world' " (p. 98). 
Morgan herself, Levin would maintain, is manipulating Elizabeth's 
feelings to keep them traveling smoothly along her high priori the­
matic road. 
In concluding his attack, Levin observes that the chief disadvan­
tage of thematism is the very process of abstraction upon which it is 
based. The process is so disadvantageous because it requires the critic 
to operate at a considerable distance from the imaginative experience 
offered by the work and consequently to have little to say about that 
experience. Thus, instead of enabling us to enrich and refine our un­
derstanding of- our experience, thematism removes us from that ex­
perience and often distorts it. 
Levin's argument, even as presented in this truncated version, is 
damaging to the thematists: thematic leaping is methodologically un­
sound because it encounters so little resistance from textual gravity; 
because it is not adequately grounded in texts, it cannot make good 
its claims to offer insight into their structure. However, as Levin's 
own comments on the rivalry between thematic readings instruct us, 
the fact that thematic reading is unsound does not necessarily mean 
that his alternative—eliminating almost all talk of themes—will itself 
be satisfactory. Furthermore, in considering the limits of his alterna­
tive, we need to ask whether he has overdone his attack. 
Concerned as he is with criticizing other modes of analysis, Levin 
gives only a brief sketch of his positive neo-Aristotelean program. He 
does, however, offer a fuller sketch of his ideas about character as he 
considers a possible problem in his argument. In insisting so strongly 
that characters as possible people are part of the literal particulars of 
a work, Levin is vulnerable to the charge that he ignores the role of 
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general ideas in our experience of character. Aware of the risk, Levin 
openly maintains that characters can have or participate in what he 
refers to as a universal dimension. (I might note in passing that the 
reference is misleading since the universal, upon closer scrutiny, is 
usually a culture-bound phenomenon and sometimes a class-bound 
one.) "Although I have been arguing that the kind of play we are 
dealing with presents the particular actions of particular characters, 
those actions and characters must incorporate some more general 
component or we could not understand them, much less be moved 
by them. We could never 'recognize' Lear, for instance, if we could 
not relate his personal traits and thoughts and feelings to general 
ideas or categories, derived from our past experience (both real and 
vicarious), which we bring to the play—ideas of kingship, father­
hood, age, rage, love, and many other abstractions including even 
appearance and reality" (pp. 75-76). The trouble with the thematists, 
for Levin, is that they "reduce or assimilate the particulars to these 
general ideas." Or "in other words, they solve the problem of the 
relationship of the particular to the general in literature by sacrificing 
the former to the latter. But our actual response to these plays appears 
to be just the opposite—we use the general ideas to understand the 
particular actions and characters, which are the primary focus of our 
attention. For we do not see Lear as the representative of the ideas 
we bring to bear upon him; although we recognize him by means of 
these ideas, we at the same time recognize that he is not completely 
contained under them, that he is something unique in our experi­
ence" (p. 75). For Levin the universality of characters refers "not to 
the inclusiveness of the idea or class they represent but to the breadth 
of their appeal. . . . And this is not a function of the typicality of the 
characters, but of their richness, complexity, roundedness, complete­
ness, depth, uniqueness—all the terms we employ to distinguish a 
successfully individualized character from a class stereotype" (p. 76). 
This sketch has a certain appeal, but finally it also fails to do justice 
to the question of universality, and in that failure shows the constrict­
ing effect of the mimetic-didactic distinction. Levin's argument seems 
to exclude possibilities without even considering them, perhaps be­
cause the distinction does not allow them to be seen, or perhaps 
because to take these possibilities seriously would jeopardize the 
validity of the distinction. General ideas, Levin says, can be used to 
recognize a mimetic character like Lear, but then their work is fin­
ished. Indeed, if one believes in the mimetic-didactic distinction, 
their work must be finished; if their work continued, the general ideas 
would then be a significant part of the plot, and the movement of the 
work would have to be conceived as not just a movement of action 
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but also a movement of thought. If, however, we look at the problem 
of universality without any prior commitment to the mimetic-didactic 
distinction, we can remain open to the possibility that our experience 
of Lear may depend on Shakespeare's representation of his rich indi­
viduality, on our bringing ideas of kingship, fatherhood, age, rage, 
love, and so on to the play and also on the way the play makes active 
use of these ideas in its representation of the protagonist and then 
emphasizes them or downplays them in the progressive unfolding of 
his struggle. That Lear is a character who is more than the embodi­
ment of general ideas does not necessarily mean that he is not also 
such an embodiment. In short, Levin's belief in the mimetic-didactic 
distinction leads him to present an either/or choice when a both/and 
solution is more likely to be adequate. 
Perhaps even more troubling is that Levin's commitment to the dis­
tinction hinders him from making useful discriminations even among 
so-called mimetic works. It is possible that in some works the appeal 
of character may be based on the process of invoking and transcend­
ing general ideas that he describes, whereas in others it may be based 
on the process of invoking and staying with general ideas that I have 
described. Although Levin's case against thematism still remains per­
suasive, we need to recognize that if the thematists solve the problem 
of the relation between the general and the particular by sacrificing 
the particular to the general, Levin solves it by sacrificing the general 
to the particular- Indeed, the both/and approach to the problem of 
the general and particular as it applies to character seems more in 
keeping with the principles enunciated by the founding father of Lev-
in's critical school when he claimed that poetry was more philosophic 
than history because it would recount not what Alcibiades did and 
suffered but what such and such a man would do and suffer accord­
ing to the laws of probability and necessity. 
As we turn to consider what the both/and approach to character 
means for our understanding of Elizabeth Bennet's character, we 
ought to be wary of simply concluding that we need a reading of Pride 
and Prejudice that consists of equal parts thematism and mimesis. My 
turn away from that recipe and into the novel will follow the progres­
sion, giving a special emphasis this time to the movement generated 
by the opening chapter. 
IV 
That chapter introduces two different kinds of instabilities, one local, 
the other global. A local instability—in this case, Mr. Bennet's appar­
ent refusal to go call on Mr. Bingley—generates the narrative progres­
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sion for a scene or two and is then quickly resolved, while a global 
instability—in this case, Bingley's moving into the neighborhood— 
is one that gets complicated by later action. Each instability in this 
chapter has a significant effect on the authorial audience's expec­
tations about the ensuing narrative, but those effects can only be 
appreciated by looking both at their relation to each other and 
at the influence exerted by Austen's handling of the devices of 
disclosure—the narrator's commentary and the dialogue between the 
Bennets. 
The global instability is introduced in the third sentence of the 
chapter which is also the first line of dialogue, "My dear Mr. Ben-
net, . . . have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?" The fa­
mous first sentence—"It is a truth universally acknowledged that a 
single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife"— 
and its less famous but equally important follow-up—"However little 
known the views or feeling of such a man on his first entering a 
neighborhood, this truth is so firmly fixed in the minds of the sur­
rounding families that he is considered the rightful property of some 
one or other of their daughters"17—provide us with a general pattern 
of social attitudes and behavior, a particular instance of which we 
now infer that Mrs. Bennet will supply. The local instability, intro­
duced with Mr. Bennet's uncooperative reaction to his wife's news, is 
foregrounded in the chapter, but even as Austen takes us through the 
various thrusts and parries of the Bennets' conversation, she directs 
our attention beyond their drawing room toward the possibilities and 
questions raised by Bingley's arrival: What are his views upon settling 
at Netherfield? Does Elizabeth, whom Mr. Bennet singles out as his 
favorite, share either her mother's or her father's views toward the 
marriage market? How interested are the Bennet daughters in getting 
married? Just what difference will Bingley's presence make for the 
family and the neighborhood in general? And so on. 
This development of the global instability within the complication 
of the local one is a sign of Austen's characteristic narrative economy, 
but we need to ask what she gains by being economical in this way. 
The local instability is after all resolved swiftly and easily in the begin­
ning of the next chapter when the narrator tells us that Mr. Bennet 
was among the first to call on Bingley and had always intended to 
visit him. First, the humor with which the dialogue is conducted— 
and which is topped off by the resolution of the local instability— 
helps establish our expectations about the progression of the whole 
narrative. We are reading comedy with an edge here. The ironic first 
sentence is bright and sparkling but not entirely light. And this de­
scription applies as well to Mr. Bennet's voice in the dialogue, which 
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in part merges with the narrator's voice. While the edge is main­
tained, Mrs. Bennet's reactions to some of Mr. Bennet's speeches in­
dicate that although he is not making her happy, his opposition is not 
seriously threatening her welfare: When he jests that Mr. Bingley 
might like her better than her daughters, she replies, "My dear, you 
flatter me. I certainly have had my share of beauty, but I do not pre­
tend to be anything extraordinary now" (p. 2). And the resolution of 
the dialogue gives Mr. Bennet, with whom we have sided, the last 
word. Although we could not yet predict with full confidence that the 
global instability will always be treated within the boundaries of this 
particular comic context, the first chapter does make a substantial 
contribution to the stability of that context. 
Perhaps more important, by foregrounding the local instability, 
Austen is able to raise at the outset of the narrative important idea­
tional concerns that we then pay attention to as the narrative de­
velops. In fact, part of the edge in the comedy results from the 
introduction of these issues: the importance for a young woman in 
this society to be well-married, the openly acquisitive attitude toward 
single men displayed by a member of an established family. Austen 
also uses the way that the Bennets play out the positions taken in the 
opening ironic statement to affect our immediate judgments and our 
understanding of much that happens later. Mrs. Bennet of course re­
peats much of the language of the narrator's introduction—"a single 
man of large fortune;" "I am thinking of his marrying one of [our 
girls]"—and so comes to represent one of those who do not get the 
irony of the opening because she lives by the creed Austen is ironi­
cally undercutting. By having Mr. Bennet take the narrator's view of 
the marriage market, Austen can then use his brief phrase about Eliz­
abeth to arouse our expectations about her eventual importance in 
the global instability introduced in the chapter: when the surrogate 
for the narrative voice affectionately singles her out as more sensible 
than the others, we take greater notice of her.18 By the same logic of 
voices, Mrs. Bennet's denial of Elizabeth's superiority functions to 
confirm it.19 Finally, by presenting the global instability by means of 
the dialogue between this ill-matched couple, Austen makes a fur­
ther reflection on the values of Mrs. Bennet: The values and concerns 
of the majority in the marriage market begin at the bank and stop at 
the altar. Although we may get a marriage plot here, the narrative has 
no illusions about the inevitability of marital bliss. Thus, the first 
chapter begins a progression that is generated by the seemingly au­
tonomous acts of individual characters but that immediately impli­
cates those acts in an exploration of thematic issues. The precise 
relation of the mimetic and the thematic is of course not yet clear, but 
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the chapter gives a strong signal that both will be significant parts of 
the progression. 
The economical and subtle craft of the first chapter remains in evi­
dence throughout the rest of the narrative, but by the standards of 
modern narratives its general movement is fairly straightforward— 
and readily seen. Some basic instabilities of character and situation 
are introduced in the opening chapters; these instabilities are further 
complicated as the narrative progresses until a turning point is 
reached, and then the instabilities are resolved with the establishment 
of a new stable situation. But note that even this general description 
of the progression indicates an important difference from the move­
ment of 1984. Where the initial movement of Orwell's narrative is pro­
vided by the arousal and resolution of tensions, a movement that 
places the later action clearly within a broader thematic context, the 
movement here is generated through instability and consequently fol­
lows the mimetic and thematic interests without clearly subordinating 
one to the other. 
More concretely, Elizabeth's fortunes begin to fall almost as soon 
as she meets Darcy and has her pride injured by him (Vol. I, chapt. 
3); they continue to fall as she continues her misjudgments of his 
character and endorses Wickham's view of him; and finally, they hit 
bottom in the first proposal scene (the exact halfway point of the nar­
rative) in which she proudly refuses Darcy, accusing him of ruining 
Wickham's life and Jane's happiness. Elizabeth's fortunes begin to 
change after the proposal, when Darcy is able to alter her opinion of 
him through his letter explaining his conduct and, as we learn later, 
is also able to alter his arrogance; the reversal continues as her 
feelings for Darcy are further altered, first, by her visit to Pem­
berly, which brings renewed contact with Darcy and the discovery of 
his changed manner, and second, by her discovery of his role in 
Lydia's marriage to Wickham; then, Elizabeth reaches a state of final 
happiness—as defined by the novel—in her marriage to Darcy. 
Within this general pattern, Austen accomplishes three tasks that 
significantly affect the way we respond to the developing narrative: 
(1) she subordinates the initial global instability—Bingley's moving 
into Netherfield and becoming attracted to Jane Bennet—to a later 
one—Darcy accompanying Bingley and injuring Elizabeth's pride; 
consequently, the complication and resolution of that first instability 
contribute to the complication and resolution of the more central one 
involving Elizabeth and Darcy; (2) she reassures us that Elizabeth's 
fortunes will never be irrecoverably damaged; (3) she exploits the en­
suing gap between our perception of Elizabeth and her situation and 
her own perception of herself and situation. These last two steps al­
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low Austen to represent Elizabeth reflecting on the serious negative 
consequences of her rash judgments while never threatening our own 
sense that the consequences will not be disastrous. 
As my longer look at the first chapter indicates, the omissions in 
this description are enormous, but my purpose here is simply to offer 
a sketch of the progression that will provide a useful background for 
a closer look at the relation between the mimetic and thematic com­
ponents of Elizabeth's character. As we look at her character, we shall 
be required to consider the progression more closely. 
Elizabeth's character is composed of these main attributes: she is 
the twenty-year-old daughter of a gentleman and of a woman whose 
father was in trade, a twenty-year-old who possesses (1) a greater 
degree of independence from the norms governing the marriage mar­
ket, including a greater independence from the influence of rank and 
social prestige, than anyone else in her social sphere; (2) "more quick­
ness of observation" than all her sisters and "less pliancy of temper" 
than Jane (p. 9); (3) "a lively, playful disposition which delights in 
anything ridiculous" (p. 7); (4) a strong pride in her own abilities; and 
(5) a capacity to be honest with herself about her own faults. To this 
list of frequently noted attributes, I would add two less often com­
mented upon: a capacity for feeling emotions of all kinds that exceeds 
what any other character has; and a tendency to give immediate voice 
to her emotions. We see these linked attributes throughout the nar­
rative. They appear, for example, in the ardor with which she meets 
Wickham's account of Darcy's injuries to him, and in the agitation she 
feels after reading Darcy's letter, but they are probably most evident 
on three occasions: (1) in her response to Charlotte's news that she is 
to marry Mr. Collins: "Engaged to Mr. Collins! my dear Charlotte— 
impossible!" (p. 87); (2) during the first proposal in her angry re­
sponse to Darcy's haughtiness; and (3) in her surprising outpouring 
of her grief to Darcy after she learns of Lydia's flight with Wickham. 
These attributes also exist as mimetic traits that coalesce to make 
Elizabeth not just a plausible person but also one of the most lovable 
characters in English fiction: the independence and the pride give 
free rein to the quickness of observation and the playful disposition, 
even as her honesty and her capacity for feeling show us that she is 
more than just light and bright and sparkling. When one adds to this 
combination of traits the fact that she acts effectively in a world where 
most of the real power is wielded by men, one has a good under­
standing of her appeal. Yet this is not the whole story of her character. 
For just as the foregrounded mimetic interests of the novel's first 
chapter are located within some larger thematic concerns so also do 
most of Elizabeth's mimetic traits simultaneously perform thematic 
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functions. And these thematic functions do much to determine the 
complex effect produced by the progression of the whole novel. 
Elizabeth's independence from the norms of the marriage market 
is most clearly seen for the first time in her refusal of Mr. Collins's 
proposal, despite the importunities of her mother and the possible 
solution it offers to the problem of the Bennet estate being entailed to 
him. Because Collins himself is such an odd mixture of pride, obse­
quiousness, and bad judgment, the thematic significance of Eliza-
beth's independence does not begin to appear until Charlotte accepts 
his proposal. Once Charlotte's acceptance shows us what even a 
highly sensible, perceptive, and intelligent woman would do when 
facing the prospect of spinsterhood in this provincial society, and 
once that acceptance makes Elizabeth feel that their friendship has 
been permanently altered, Elizabeth's stand for independence be­
comes not just a natural choice for any woman but a choice for a 
certain kind of woman. Elizabeth's independence, clearly endorsed 
by Austen even as she treats Charlotte with sympathy and under­
standing, comes to represent one kind of admirable stance toward the 
marriage market—one that rejects the views of a Mrs. Bennet and a 
Charlotte, and instead insists on dealing in the market on one's own 
terms rather than on those of the men or of the society in general. 
Where Winston Smith's thematic function evolved from his status 
as a representative person of a certain age, value-system, and abil­
ity, Elizabeth here becomes a possible person who embodies an ab­
stract idea. 
The thematic function of Elizabeth's independence is then a very 
important part of the first proposal scene. With Charlotte's action as 
a backdrop to this scene, which occurs in her house, and with Darcy's 
expectation that she could not possibly refuse him, we come to ap­
preciate how rare and admirable an act it is for a woman of Elizabeth's 
age and social position to reject an offer of marriage from a gentleman 
of Darcy's income and social consequence. To be sure, Elizabeth is not 
thinking of these things at the moment of her refusal—she is too an­
gry with Darcy's manner of expressing himself, too prejudiced against 
him even to consider his offer tempting. But "she is not insensible to 
the compliment of such a man's affection" (p. 131), and we remain 
aware of this thematic background. Indeed, I think that the presence 
of this thematic function here helps explain why Elizabeth, in spite of 
her seriously prejudiced view of Darcy, nevertheless remains essen­
tially admirable in the scene. She is wrong in her judgments of him, 
wrong because her wounded pride has made her eager to believe 
Wickham's slander and ready to give Darcy all the blame for Jane's 
disappointed hopes about Bingley; yet, even apart from Darcy's un­
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attractive haughtiness, Elizabeth's distinctive strength overshadows 
these misjudgments. 
Since the principle underlying Austen's use of Charlotte will be one 
that we will return to in the discussion of Wemmick in Chapter 4 and 
of Fred Vincy and Mary Garth in the conclusion, it is worth a further 
look. Except in the mechanical sense of allowing Austen to bring Eliz­
abeth and Darcy within the same social circle after Bingley's departure 
from Longbourn, Charlotte's decision to marry Collins does not di­
rectly affect the complication of the instabilities between Elizabeth 
and Darcy. Its more significant contribution to the progression is to 
alter the authorial audience's understanding of those instabilities, an 
alteration that emphasizes the thematic component of Elizabeth's 
mimetically motivated action. In short, Charlotte's decision is a cru­
cial part of the progression, even though it does not directly affect 
the outcome of the main action. Austen's use of Charlotte here 
thus illustrates what we might call the Principle of Indirect Affective 
Relevance. 
The narrative brings the thematic function of Elizabeth's indepen­
dence to the foreground when Lady Catherine comes to Longbourn 
to order Elizabeth to give up any idea of marrying Darcy. Elizabeth's 
ability to stand up to Lady Catherine—indeed, to get the better of 
her—is impressive without being surprising, and at first the scene 
appears to be merely giving us the pleasure of watching Elizabeth 
overmatch Lady Catherine while reinforcing the point about her 
admirable independence. But with Austen's characteristic blend of 
narrative economy and appropriateness, the scene becomes a step 
toward the engagement of Darcy and Elizabeth after Lady Catherine 
informs Darcy of the "perverseness and assurance" (p. 253) with 
which Elizabeth responded to her attempted persuasion. Because 
Elizabeth's trait of independence thus becomes one means by which 
she achieves her happiness, the thematic function resulting from this 
trait is further developed. Austen asks us not only to admire this kind 
of woman but also to believe that such a woman may in fact achieve 
a fate commensurate with what she deserves. 
The first conclusion we may draw, then, is that Austen's represen­
tation of Elizabeth as a consistently mimetic character is fused with 
her use of that character in exploring and exemplifying thematic is­
sues. We not only bring general ideas to this work and its characters, 
but, contrary to what Levin claims, the work itself takes up some of 
those ideas and develops them in its progressive unfolding of the 
characters in action. The second conclusion we may draw is that this 
recognition provides a superior account of the problem of the "uni­
versal" than either Levin's or the thematists'. The representative 
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component of literature is a result neither of the direct correlation 
between particulars and general ideas nor of rich individuality alone 
but rather of characters whose mimetic and thematic dimensions both 
get converted into functions. Elizabeth, then, can be both a represen­
tative of the idea of individual independence and a possible person, 
without either function restricting the other. 
This conclusion may draw further validity from a third one which 
can be quickly seen by a brief consideration of the thematic functions 
resulting from almost any one of Elizabeth's other attributes. Take, 
for example, her pride in her own abilities. Even novice thematists 
will be be able to tell us that Elizabeth serves to exemplify both the 
strengths and weaknesses of pride. On the one hand, the pride en­
ables her to maintain her independence, but, on the other, it is the 
source of most of her misjudgments in the narrative: she is willing to 
believe Wickham because Darcy has injured her pride; then once set 
on the track of believing in his villainy she has too much pride in her 
own judgment to question her belief until she is given the severe jolt 
of Darcy's letter. This rather obvious thematic function together with 
the presence of the function of Elizabeth's independence and the 
functions of her other attributes shows that Elizabeth's mimetic and 
thematic functions have a complex relationship—or at least one no­
ticeably different from that between Winston Smith's mimetic and 
thematic functions. In Elizabeth's case, the thematic functions do not 
combine into a single function or even into a hierarchy of functions 
supporting one central point, but instead are rather disparate. 
The concept of a central theme for this novel is a misleading one 
not because all the themes one may claim to find in it are the result of 
arbitrary leaping from particulars to generalities but because the pro­
gression of the novel generates a multiplicity of diverse themes, 
which move in and out of the foreground of the narrative at different 
points in the progression. As for so-called universality, the "richness'' 
of a character that Levin appeals to as a sign that such universality is 
a function of mimetic individuality can now be reconceived as equally 
the product of multiple thematic functions. 
This conclusion indicates that the mimetic-didactic distinction is far 
too rigid to account for the complexity of effects generated by a nar­
rative such as Pride and Prejudice. Indeed, given that Pride and Prejudice 
is a virtual paradigm case of what the neo-Aristoteleans call an "ac­
tion" as distinct from an "apologue" (the terms are from Sheldon 
Sacks)20 such as 1984, my analysis suggests that the concept of the 
action needs to be revised. For Sacks, the thematic material of an ac­
tion was important for the way it affected our involvement in the mi­
metic illusion offered by the narrative, but it was only the apologue 
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that made thematic assertions for their own sake. My argument is that 
the thematic material of a so-called action like Pride and Prejudice 
can be made important for its own sake, whenever the progression 
converts the thematic dimensions of the characters into thematic 
functions—in other words, in most narratives. As the brief compari­
son of Elizabeth's functions with Winston's suggests, this revision 
does not completely collapse the distinction between action and apo­
logue because it is only in the apologue that the thematic assertions 
will coalesce into a central one or at least into a clear hierarchy. The 
revision, however, does make the gulf between the two forms much 
narrower than Sacks originally described it.21 
More concretely, the multiple thematic functions of Elizabeth are 
so much a part of the progression that to see them as working only to 
influence what the neo-Aristoteleans call our "expectations and de­
sires" about Elizabeth and Darcy is to offer an inadequate account of 
the progression of the novel. That progression is not just one of action 
but also one of thought. To be sure, the progression of thought does 
increase the power of the emotions we feel about Elizabeth and 
Darcy, but the thematic functions of Elizabeth's character play such a 
large role in our understanding of the significance of her union with 
Darcy that they merge with our interest in the characters as people. 
Consequently, the union of Darcy and Elizabeth is a union of people 
and an affirmation of ideas and issues that each, especially Elizabeth, 
has come to represent. 
To do further justice to the complexity of the progression and of 
Austen's treatment of Elizabeth, I want to explore one more element 
of the relation between the mimetic and thematic components of her 
character. Consider Elizabeth's linked attributes of feeling deeply and 
reacting quickly, especially as they reveal themselves in the scenes 
where they are most dramatically exhibited, her outburst to Charlotte, 
her angry response to Darcy's first proposal, and her almost instinc­
tive revelation to him of the news of Lydia's disgrace. Although the 
first scene has a limited function in the narrative, serving primarily to 
reinforce the difference between Elizabeth's and Charlotte's attitudes 
toward the marriage market, the other two have very large functions, 
bringing about significant changes in Darcy's character and Lydia's 
situation. However, I believe that the ways in which these two scenes 
function in the progression do not result in a conversion of this di­
mension of Elizabeth's character into a thematic function. 
This claim may be somewhat surprising since in both cases Eliza-
beth's spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings eventually aids in 
bringing about her final happiness. Darcy not only hears her ac­
cusations about her pride but comes to acknowledge their justice; 
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he not only seeks to give her immediate relief in her sorrow over 
Lydia but he acts to make the best of the bad situation, which in turn 
earns her gratitude, deepens her affection, and ultimately leads to the 
second, successful proposal. But unlike the case of Elizabeth's inde­
pendence and her scene with Lady Catherine, the narrative does not 
do anything to give the credit, as it were, to Elizabeth's deep feelings 
and frank expressions; it works instead to make us see that it is Darcy 
who is responsible for his self-improvement and for the salvaging of 
Lydia's respectability. In other words, Elizabeth's reactions in these' 
scenes provide the occasions for significant changes or the revelation 
of such changes in Darcy's character.22 One way to understand the 
lack of any significant thematic function of these deep feelings is to 
reflect that had Darcy been different, had he been what Elizabeth 
thought he was, her outbursts would have simply driven him and 
Elizabeth further and further apart. 
This discussion also illustrates further the differences between a 
dimension and a function. Certainly part of Elizabeth's attraction for 
Darcy (and for us) is this twin capacity for feeling deeply and speak­
ing quickly, and to that extent her attribute can be seen as participating 
in the thematic sphere—behind such attraction must be some author­
ial recommendation. But just as Browning gives the Duke of Ferrara 
attributes that cause us to take a negative attitude toward him without 
making it a purpose of the poem to alter our feelings about people 
with those attributes, so too Austen gives Elizabeth these positive 
attributes without developing them into thematic points about feeling 
and reacting. In both cases, the authors seem to take our response for 
granted. If this analysis is accurate, then, in the terms I have been 
using, Austen gives Elizabeth an attribute that gets converted by the 
progression into a significant element of her mimetic function but that 
does not get converted into a thematic function. Consequently, a sig­
nificant part of our experience of Elizabeth's character remains chiefly 
in the mimetic sphere—a realization that gives special force to the 
statement that just as she is more than a possible person she is also 
more than a vehicle for carrying ideas. Furthermore, this point also 
reinforces my initial claim that an adequate account of character in 
this novel cannot be derived from a recipe calling for equal parts the­
matism and neo-Aristoteleanism.23 
To what extent do this account of the novel's progression and the 
counterargument to Levin's anti-thematism weaken the case against 
Duckworth and Morgan? In one sense, not at all. Their thematic analy­
ses still appear to be reductive and selective and to invite distortion 
of textual particulars. But the charge that their procedure is completely 
arbitrary needs to be withdrawn. What each critic has done, in effect, 
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is to take one or two attributes of Elizabeth's character—for Duck-
worth, her relative independence from the influence of social prestige 
and her inferior social status; for Morgan, her lively, playful disposi­
tion and her quickness of observation—to suggest ways that these at­
tributes combine with other elements of the work to get converted into 
thematic functions, and to argue that the novel is structured around 
them. It is the last step in their procedure that involves the thematic 
leap and that causes all the problems: the novel cannot be adequately 
described as structured by Austen's exploration of these ideas. Since, 
however, the first steps have a "literal" connection to Austen's rep­
resentation of Elizabeth, we can, I think, understand much of the 
appeal and continued vogue of thematic criticism for Pride and Preju-
dice—and, by extension, for numerous other narratives. 
One of the points that the argument so far has kept returning to is the 
crucial role of narrative progression in the developing relationship of 
a character's mimetic and thematic functions. In order to extend our 
consideration of the variations on that relationship, I will turn in the 
next chapter to a narrative whose progression is very different from 
Orwell's and Austen's: "The Beast in the Jungle." As I consider 
James's novella, I shall also take up some further problems associated 
with reading and interpreting the thematic function of character, 
problems that will require further reflection on different ways of 
marching under the critical banner, "Always thematize!" 
The Thematic Function and 
Interpreting by Cultural 
Codes: The Case of 
"The Beast in the Jungle" 
i 
In Textual Power, Robert Scholes offers an account of thematizing that 
provides an instructive contrast to the one I have developed in the 
preceding chapter, because the two accounts raise the question of 
when the generalizing movement of thematizing should appropri­
ately stop. As I noted in the introduction, and as my discussions 
of Browning, Lardner, Orwell, and Austen implicitly indicate, my 
approach to character and progression leads its practitioner to be 
concerned with drawing a circle around the thematic functions of 
characters, with being able to say not only "these are the appropriate 
generalizations, and these are not" but also "just this much general­
izing and no more." Scholes represents a perhaps more widely held 
view—in any case, he presents himself as describing current in­
stiutional practices. Scholes not only enlists under the banner of 
thematizing but becomes a gung-ho recruiting officer: "interpretation 
proper," he asserts "is the thematizing of a text."1 Furthermore, since 
for him thematizing is the practice of generalizing from textual partic­
ulars to cultural codes, the habit of broadening the thematic range of 
such particulars is to be cultivated: in this way, the text's connection 
to multiple—and more widely encompassing—codes is revealed, and 
in that revelation the interpreter will also uncover the grail of contem­
porary criticism—the ideology of the text.2 
Scholes illustrates his method with Interchapter VII from Heming-
way's In Our Time: 
While the bombardment was knocking the trench to pieces at Fos-
salta, he lay very flat and sweated and prayed oh jesus christ get 
me out of here. Dear jesus please get me out. Christ please please 
please christ. If you'll only keep me from getting killed I'll do any­
thing you say. I believe in you and Til tell every one in the world 
that you are the only one that matters. Please please dear jesus. 
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The shelling moved further up the line. We went to work on the 
trench and in the morning the sun came up and the day was hot 
and muggy and cheerful and quiet. The next night back at Mestre 
he did not tell the girl he went upstairs with at the Villa Rossa 
about Jesus. And he never told anybody. 
Scholes works by finding oppositions in the text—trench against Villa 
Rossa; Jesus against the girl—and then connecting these opposi­
ions to 
the larger cultural entities of which they may be seen as instances. 
Trench and Villa are tokens of the greater cultural types, War and 
Love, whose iconography has been charted through countless im­
ages of Mars and Venus, and been embodied in countless literary 
characters. What is important in connecting Interchapter VII to this 
great cultural code or topos is that Hemingway has brought the 
icon down into the muck as far as he can. Venus is a hooker and 
Mars is a boy blubbering at the bottom of a trench. (P. 34) 
Scholes's thematic interpretation (a phrase, we might note in passing, 
which would strike him as a redundancy) continues for another page 
and we will look at its principles in detail later, but for our present 
purposes the point is clear: the generalizing move of thematizing 
reaches its end only after one reaches a cultural code that is both basic 
and broad. 
With this view of thematizing and its implicit challenge to what I 
have said so far as a backdrop, I want to turn to James's "The Beast in 
the Jungle/' a narrative which, I shall argue, goes very far in the re­
striction of the thematic function of its protagonist. I shall then take 
up the challenge Scholes offers and the broader question that chal­
lenge presents: when does thematizing appropriately stop? The an­
swer to that question, I shall argue, depends less on any abstract 
rule than on the particular relation between the mimetic and the­
matic functions of character established by the progression of indi­
vidual works. 
II 
James's treatment of John Marcher is a natural focus for questions 
about the relation between the mimetic and thematic functions of 
character because that treatment poses in an especially suggestive 
way the problem of the relation between character as individual and 
character as embodiment of an idea. On the one hand, Marcher and 
what happens to him are, if not unique, then at least highly unusual, 
but on the other hand, he seems to represent an attitude toward 
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life—waiting for it to happen—that makes him a very representative 
figure. To understand the relations between these components more 
fully, it will again be useful to start by examining the progression of 
the narrative.3 I will give special emphasis to four points of the no­
vella: section I, where Marcher becomes reacquainted with May Bar-
tram; section II, where Marcher discovers that May's knowledge of 
his special fate exceeds his own; section IV, where Marcher fails to 
understand May's offer and thus misses the chance to escape his fate; 
and section VI, where Marcher learns the truth about his life. 
One of the most striking features of the tale is the narrowness of 
James's focus: Marcher and May are the only characters given any 
substantial attention, and despite the fact that the narrative traces the 
lives of Marcher and May from their thirties until their deaths, James 
gives them each only a few attributes. Section I of the narrative, re­
counted primarily but not exclusively with Marcher as the center of 
consciousness, begins with a sentence that establishes a tension be­
tween the narrator and the authorial audience: "What determined the 
speech that startled him in the course of their encounter scarcely mat­
ters, being probably but some words spoken by himself quite without 
intention—spoken as they lingered and slowly moved together after 
their renewal of acquaintance."4 The sentence raises numerous ques­
tions: not only about who "they" and "him" are and what the speech 
was, but also why he was startled, what the significance of his being 
startled is, and whether it has any connection with the renewal of 
their acquaintance. The startled response suggests an instability, but 
the dominant effect of the sentence is to establish the tension. James, 
of course, quickly resolves this tension as he moves the narrative back 
a few hours and recounts the meeting of Marcher and May at Weath­
erend that led to the "speech that startled him." Given that quick 
resolution, we might well wonder why James begins with this local 
tension. 
This beginning allows James not only to employ the dramatic 
method that he favors but also to guide our interest, our suspense in 
that drama in a rather pointed way. Unlike Marcher, we do not worry 
that the ensuing "sketch of a fresh start" (p. 67) with May will fail to 
develop into a larger picture. We wonder instead just what the nature 
of the particular startling utterance will be. This orientation to the 
"sketch" heightens our interest in both the previous acquaintance 
and present meeting of Marcher and May: as we learn about the less-
than-startling past and somewhat bumbling present, we invest both 
with more significance because we regard them as a prelude to the 
startling speech. Furthermore, although this opening sentence leaves 
us willing to accept Marcher's interpretation that the cause of the star­
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tling speech is unimportant, we are also alerted to look for that cause. 
Thus, when May "saves the situation" (p. 67), a number of effects 
are created. First, Marcher's egoism is highlighted: the cause of the 
speech that startled him is not as he supposes in something he said 
but rather in May's own decision to "suppl[y] the link" (p. 67). March-
er's egoism on this occasion also suggests the reason why he told May 
his secret ten years before and why he then forgot that he did. Re­
gardless of whether the egoism fully explains this behavior, the be­
havior itself further emphasizes the trait. This awareness in turn 
complicates the instabilities of the situation brought about by May's 
eventual promise to "watch with" Marcher. 
The first global instability established at this point in the narrative 
is whether anything will happen to Marcher: will he be right about 
his expectation of the "coming catastrophe," and if so, what will that 
catastrophe be? The second instability raised at this point stems from 
May's involvement in Marcher's sense of his fate: what difference will 
her decision to wait make for Marcher and what difference will it 
make for her? Indeed, this instability is given further importance in 
the narrative by the simple fact that James chooses to begin at this 
juncture. We are not being told the whole of Marcher's life but rather 
that part of it that began with May's decision to wait with him. Like 
Marcher's egoism, this element of the narrative contributes to the 
third major instability: what will be the progress of the relationship 
between Marcher and May? This instability takes on even greater in­
terest in light of Marcher's dismissal of May's suggestion that the 
grand fate he envisions for himself is to fall in love. Considering the 
three instabilities all at once, we can see that as James brings Marcher 
and May together he establishes—and begins to intertwine—two di­
rections for the narrative movement: outward from May and Marcher 
to the "coming catastrophe" and inward to the relationship between 
Marcher and May itself. 
Section II adds a new instability to the progression, one that inter­
acts with the previous instabilities to tighten the intertwining of the 
inward and outward directions of the narrative. In addition, James's 
technique introduces a significant tension into the narrative, one that 
is not fully resolved until its final paragraphs. At the end of the first 
section, May had asked Marcher whether he was afraid of what was 
in store for him—indeed she had asked him three times before he 
answered that he didn't know but that she could tell him herself if 
she watched with him. At the end of this section, May can answer 
her question: "You're not afraid." Her continuation of her thought, 
however, signifies that she now has a new relation to Marcher's im­
pending fate even as it complicates both Marcher's and the audience's 
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relation to it. "But it i s n ' t . .  . the end of our watch. That is, it isn't the 
end of yours. You've everything still to see." Marcher correctly infers 
that she has already seen something he has not. "You know some­
thing I don't." "You know what's to happen" (p. 88). "You know, and 
you're afraid to tell me. It's so bad that you're afraid I'll find out." 
May, for her part, has the last word in the scene: "You'll never find 
out" (p. 89). 
This conversation complicates the progression in numerous ways-. 
First, it gives a new twist to Marcher's obsession: not only does he 
wait now, he eagerly wants to know what May knows—and this de­
sire will continue to drive him even after her death. Second, the con­
versation alters Marcher and May's relationship: although in one 
respect she continues as Marcher's subordinate, supportive watcher, 
in another sense she has become his superior. She is now in a posi­
tion to use or not use her superior knowledge as she deems best. It is 
from that position that she gives the narrative its next major devel­
opment in section IV. Third, the conversation creates a tension of un­
equal knowledge between the narrator and the authorial audience. 
The narrator does leave Marcher's vision in section II, but what he 
tells us about May and what he shows of her consciousness is hardly 
full disclosure: 
So, while they grew older together, she did watch with him, and 
so she let this association give shape and colour to her own exis­
tence. Beneath her forms as well detachment had learned to sit and 
behaviour had become for her, in the social sense, a false account 
of herself. There was but one account of her that would have been 
true all the while, and that she could give, directly, to nobody, least 
of all to John Marcher. Her whole attitude was a virtual statement 
but the perception of that only seemed destined to take its place 
for him as one of the many things necessarily crowded out of his 
consciousness. (Pp. 82-83) 
Although we may suspect that the content of her virtual statement 
concerns her feelings about Marcher, we cannot yet be entirely sure 
what those feelings are. Furthermore, even if we knew for sure what 
they were, we would not know what May—and the narrator—know 
about Marcher's coming fate. But this minimal disclosure does remind 
us that we could—if the narrator once again exercised the option of 
entering May's consciousness, this time to show her reflecting on her 
knowledge. We read on in part to find out what May knows and to 
discover whether Marcher himself will ever find out. Thus, at the end 
of section II, we find Marcher still looking outward toward the beast, 
May now looking only at Marcher himself, and ourselves looking in 
both directions but with a greater interest and concern for the relation 
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between the outward and the inward. What will May's knowledge, 
whatever it is, mean for their relationship? Section IV provides the 
answer, as it also resolves some of the tension and further compli­
cates the instabilities. 
Pressed by Marcher to tell him what she knows, May tries to use 
that knowledge to have him avert his peculiar fate. Afraid that he has 
been mistaken, worried that he will have been "sold" (p. 97), Marcher 
seeks reassurance: "I haven't lived with a vain imagination, in the 
most besotted illusion? I haven't waited but to see the door shut in 
my face?" (p. 105). May at first provides that reassurance and then 
attempts to alter his perception of their situation, by in effect getting 
him to stop looking outward toward the beast and to start looking 
inward at the two of them and especially at her as someone other than 
a fellow-watcher. 
"However the case stands that isn't the truth. Whatever the reality, 
it is a reality. The door isn't shut. The door's open." 
"Then something's to come?" 
She waited once again, always with her cold, sweet eyes on him. 
"It's never too late." She had, with her gliding step, diminished the 
distance between them, and she stood nearer to him, close to him, 
a minute, as if still full of the unspoken. . .  . It had become sud­
denly, from her movement and attitude, beautiful and vivid to him 
that she had something more to give him; her wasted face deli­
cately shone with it, and it glittered, almost as with the white luster 
of silver, in her expression. . . . [T]hey continued for some minutes 
silent, her face shining at him, her contact imponderably pressing, 
and his stare all kind, but all expectant. The end, none the less, 
was that what he had expected failed to sound. Something else 
took place instead, which seemed to consist at first in the mere 
closing of her eyes. She gave way at the same instant to a slow, fine 
shudder, and though he remained staring . . . she turned off and 
regained her chair. It was the end of what she had been intending, 
but it left him thinking only of that. (Pp. 105-6) 
When May tells him, upon leaving the room a few minutes later in 
the company of her nurse, that what has happened was "what was 
to" (p. 107), we can recognize that Marcher's failure even to see her 
offer—to move his eyes inward, as it were—constitutes the springing 
of the Beast. Yet we still do not know everything that May and the 
narrator seem to know. She is acting out of some hope here, not out 
of confident knowledge that he will fail to see what she means. Just 
as some but not all of the tension is removed, so too some but not all 
of the instabilities are resolved. The narrative has now given answers 
to two of the three major questions raised at the end of the first sec­
67 Thematic Function and Interpreting by Cultural Codes 
tion. Marcher has been both right and wrong in his expectation of 
some catastrophe: there is no Beast external to him but there is one of 
his own making that causes him to miss his chance for a life beyond 
his waiting and looking outward. May's decision to wait with Marcher 
has given him his chance to escape his fate, but he has been too blind 
to see it. It has given her something to live for but it has also exacted 
a great toll upon her—she has loved without return and she has been 
unable even to get Marcher to see the extent of that love. 
In effect, the outward-facing instability has now been subsumed 
by the inward-facing one. With May's death shortly after this scene, 
Marcher faces new thoughts about his relationship to her: "how few 
were the rights, as they were called in such cases, that he had to put 
forward, and how odd it might even seem that their intimacy 
shouldn't have given him more of them. The stupidest fourth cousin 
had more, even though she had been nothing in such a person's life" 
(p. 114). At this point, however, he still looks outward and only in­
directly moves toward clarifying his "rights" toward, his understand­
ing of, and his feeling for May, as he tries to discover what she knew 
that he did not. He comes to accept the idea that the Beast had 
sprung, and devotes himself to discovering what it was and how it 
affected him. 
The remaining instabilities and tensions are simultaneously re­
solved in section VI, when Marcher, through his observation of the 
true mourner, is finally able to see outside himself, and thus articulate 
for himself his failure with life in general and May in particular. 
Marcher and the authorial audience now finally come to know what 
May knew and had indirectly tried to tell him: "he had been the man 
of his time, the man, to whom nothing on earth was to have hap­
pened" (p. 125); "the escape would have been to love her" (p. 126). 
The insight does bring new knowledge to Marcher, but the knowl­
edge comes too late to enable him to change the established pattern 
of his whole life: 
This horror of waking—this was knowledge, knowledge under 
the breath of which the very tears in his eyes seemed to freeze. 
Through them, none the less, he tried to fix it and hold it; he kept 
it there before him so that he might feel the pain. That at least, 
belated and bitter, had something of the taste of life. But the bitter­
ness suddenly sickened him, and it was as if, horribly, he saw, in 
the truth, in the cruelty of his image, what had been appointed 
and done. He saw the Jungle of his life and saw the lurking Beast; 
then, while he looked, perceived it, as by a stir of the air, rise, huge 
and hideous, for the leap that was to settle him. His eye dark-
ened—it was close; and, instinctively turning, in his hallucination, 
to avoid it, he flung himself, on his face, on the tomb.(Pp. 126-27) 
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This ending provides the appropriate final twist to Marcher's story 
because the hallucination reenacts the Beast's springing in his life— 
the Beast is not external but of his own making—and because March-
er's reaction to it is in keeping with his life. Just as he is not capable 
of maintaining the feelings evoked by his "horror of waking," he is 
not capable of dealing with the hallucination. He turns, as he has 
always been turning since the day at Weatherend on which the nar­
rative opened, to May. But this time his turning ends with a parody 
of an embrace as he flings himself face down on her tomb. 
Although James's portrait of Marcher is restricted to just a few sa­
lient attributes, he does give us a sufficiently deep and coherent por­
trait for Marcher to have a significant mimetic function. In addition 
to his obsession with being singled out and his virtually boundless 
egoism, his main attributes are an active imagination and a desire to 
discover the truth of things.5 The obsession and egoism are apparent 
on every page, the imagination shows itself in the very first section 
as Marcher is able to penetrate "to a kind of truth [about May] that 
the others were too stupid for" (p. 63), and the desire for the truth is 
evident in the quest he commits himself to after May's death. What is 
striking, however, about these attributes is that they all serve March-
er's obsession with being singled out: the obsession is made possible 
by the egoism and the imagination, and it takes much of its direction 
in the narrative after section two from his desire to know the truth— 
indeed, after May's death it is what enables him to go on living. 
If this account is accurate, then we have here an analogue in the 
mimetic component to what we saw in the thematic component of 
Winston Smith in 1984. Just as the different thematic functions of 
Winston's character contribute to one central thematic point of the 
narrative, so too do the different traits of Marcher contribute to a cen­
tral trait of his character—his obsession with being singled out. In 
this respect, Marcher is different from the Duke of Ferrara, Winston, 
Whitey the barber, and Elizabeth Bennet: all five characters have a 
recognizable mimetic function and thus appear to be coherent selves, 
but only Marcher can be adequately described by reference to one 
central trait. More generally, he is rare among protagonists of realistic 
fiction in that his mimetic component can be adequately described in 
a single statement: he is the man who fails to live by waiting for life 
to come to him. 
Viewing Marcher's mimetic component this way allows us to sup­
plement Wayne Booth's explanation of one very striking feature of the 
narrative.6 Booth argues that James's handling of the center of con­
sciousness narration allows him both to make Marcher's egoism plain 
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and, by having the reader travel with Marcher, to generate sympathy 
for him. Now we can also say that the response is a result of James's 
ability to make the egoism subordinate to the more central matter of 
the obsession, a trait which does not preclude sympathy the way ego­
ism does. Thus, even as the authorial audience remains acutely aware 
of Marcher's deficiencies, we remain at least partly sympathetic to 
him throughout the narrative, and find the suffering brought on by 
his final illumination to be moving in a way that we associate with 
tragedy.7 
What happens in the mimetic sphere is mirrored in the thematic 
sphere: this obsession is the only attribute that the progression con­
verts into a function—demonstrating the regrettable consequences of 
waiting for life to come to you. The thematic dimensions correspond­
ing to the attributes of egoism, imagination, and desire for truth, like 
Elizabeth's attributes of feeling deeply and speaking quickly and like 
all the Duke of Ferrara's attributes, are not individually crucial in any 
of the turns taken by the progression. Instead, although James takes 
a negative attitude toward Marcher's egoism and a positive attitude 
toward the imagination and the desire for truth, he always gives us 
these attributes in the service of the obsession, and consequently, that 
attribute is always crucial to the progression, as we can see by reflect­
ing again on those points of the narrative we examined most closely. 
When May agrees to wait with him, Marcher in effect looks past her 
and outward toward the Beast. When May's knowledge outstrips his,, 
he can still think only of what his fate will be. When May makes her 
offer, he cannot recognize it, because he cannot understand how she 
can be referring to anything but the outward-looking instability, and 
of course he cannot understand that because he is obsessed. When 
Marcher experiences his illumination, he is in. effect first realizing that 
he has been obsessed and then realizing the consequences of that 
obsession. 
If this analysis is accurate, then James has effected what I believe 
is a rare fusion of the mimetic and thematic functions of the protago­
nist. Not only is neither function subordinated to the other but the 
line between them, becomes blurred: to be Marcher is to be this ob­
sessed man and to be this obsessed man is to fail to live. The relation 
between the mimetic and thematic functions here is different from 
that relation in the case of Elizabeth Ben.net, precisely because of the 
narrowness of James's portrait. Although our concern with Elizabeth 
as a possible person merges with our concern for the ideas she comes 
to represent, the very multiplicity of her traits and thematic functions 
works against the degree-—and finally, the kind—of fusion we have 
here. Elizabeth's thematic functions do not fully define her character, 
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and her mimetic component is not just the other side of any single 
thematic function. By making Marcher a character with a central trait, 
by orchestrating the progression around the influence of that trait on 
Marcher's actions, and by guiding our judgments of those actions, 
James makes the mimetic and thematic functions of the character vir­
tually interchangeable. 
The one aspect of the synthetic component that becomes promi­
nent in the narrative supports this fusion, though it does so by rein­
forcing the thematic function. Like Austen in Pride and Prejudice, 
James seeks to keep the synthetic components of his characters in the 
background—with one exception: he expects the authorial audience 
to recognize the way that their names call attention to their con­
structed status, a recognition that emphasizes the thematic function 
of the characters even as it encapsulates their mimetic portraits. 
"May" connotes both the sense of possibility and the sense of new 
life in the spring, both of which the inexorably marching Marcher 
misses, and thus, in effect dooms himself to live at winter's end. To 
be Marcher is to be obsessed with the next season and therefore per­
petually dormant. 
Another way of expressing the point about Marcher's mimetic and 
thematic functions is to notice the consequences of the narrative's 
resolution for the two functions. During Marcher's moments of illu­
mination, the narrative reaches its mimetic high point, and every­
thing that happens is perfectly consonant with Marcher's mimetic 
function: his imagination and desire for truth, acted upon by the true 
mourner's ravaged look, enable him finally to look inward, to under­
stand and articulate for himself how egoistic he has been, how he has 
consequently deluded himself, how May had lived while he has failed 
to and how he has missed the opportunity she offered. Indeed, his 
truthful review of his life is so painful that it leads his imagination 
finally to the horrible hallucination of the springing of the Beast, 
whom he is appropriately unable to face. At the same time, the scene 
effectively concludes the development of Marcher's thematic function 
for, as noted above, it is only here that the authorial audience's knowl­
edge of Marcher catches up with May's and the narrator's. Conse­
quently, when he articulates for himself what his life has been, 
Marcher also finishes articulating its meaning for us: "It was the 
truth, vivid and monstrous, that all the while he had waited the wait 
itself was his portion" (p. 125). Finally, the closing action of the nar­
rative, the imagined springing of the Beast and Marcher's failure to 
meet it, dramatically enacts the consequences of a life that has been 
missed. In short, the resolution scene simultaneously brings the two 
functions to their high points, as the strokes developing one also 
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serve to develop the other. Again the result is the fusion of the 
functions. 
Ill 
In order to appreciate the differences between Scholes's view of the­
matizing and the one underlying my discussion so far, we should at 
least sketch some of the things that Scholes's principles would lead 
him to say about James's narrative. The principles are revealed in 
Scholes's four-step process of interpretation, a process that he sum­
marizes as the production of text-upon-text.8 "The first things to look 
for are repetitions and oppositions that emerge at the obvious or 
manifest level of the text" (p. 32). Then, "the next step is the crucial 
one. To accomplish it we must ask what these oppositions 'represent/ 
or as our institutional vocabulary usually phrases it, what they 'sym­
bolize' " (p. 33); in other words, this step "involves connecting the 
singular oppositions of the text to the generalized oppositions that 
structure our cultural system of values" (p. 33). Third, "the act of 
interpretation involves both making the cultural connection (seeing 
the resemblance [between the text and the general cultural code it 
participates in]) and understanding the unique quality of this particu­
lar version of the larger instance (that is, noting the difference)" 
(p. 34). Fourth, to reach the "ultimate interpretation" we "must move 
from noting the cultural codes invoked to understanding the attitude 
taken toward those codes by the maker of this text" (p. 34). 
The central opposition in "The Beast" is that between Marcher and 
May, and the force of the opposition becomes clearer if we give more 
attention to their names than I have done above. The May/Marcher 
opposition contains others: woman/man; spring/winter; possibility/ 
predetermination; life/death. The central repetition of the narrative is 
the springing of the Beast, and this repetition yields further opposi­
tions within the similarity of Marcher's creation of the Beast: reality/ 
illusion; ignorance/knowledge; spring/fall; escape/doom; life/death. 
Furthermore, the oppositions of the characters can be mapped on to 
the oppositions of the repetition: May represents reality, knowledge, 
and escape (as well as spring and life), while Marcher represents il­
lusion, ignorance, and doom (as well as fall, winter, and death). 
These oppositions, not surprisingly, link the story with numerous 
general cultural codes. The opposition between appearance and re­
ality links the story with a general code about the opposition between 
the truth about one's self and one's romantic perception of oneself. 
The opposition between escape (or possibility) and predetermination 
(or doom) links the story with a general Western theological code 
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about the opposition between free will and predestination. The op­
positions between escape (or possibility) and predetermination (or 
doom) and between life and death link the story with a cultural code 
about the full life versus the empty one. For the sake of clarity, I will 
pursue only this last link in steps three and four, but I will return to 
the issue of multiple codes after the illustration. 
In our own day we quickly encapsulate the values of the code 
about the full life by invoking—and keeping current—an expression 
such as "it is better to have loved and lost than never to have loved 
at all" (the sneaky appeal of the cynical popular advice, "if you 
can't be with the one you love, love the one you're with," derives in 
large measure from its carrying along some values of this code). In 
nineteenth-century literature, the code is probably given its most 
forceful expression in Tennyson's "Ulysses" (1842): 
I will drink 
Life to the lees. All times I have enjoyed 
Greatly, have suffered greatly, both with those 
That loved me and a l o n e ; . . .  . 
(11. 6-9) 
How dull it is to pause, to make an end, 
To rust unburnished, not to shine in use! 
As though to breathe were life. Life piled on life 
Were all too little . . .  . 
(11. 23-26) 
Though much is taken, much abides; and though 
We are not now that strength which in old days 
Moved heaven and earth, that which we are, we are: 
One equal temper of heroic hearts, 
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will 
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. 
(11. 65-70) 
James himself gives direct expression to his own belief in the values 
of this code when in The Ambassadors, a work published in the same 
year as "The Beast," he creates Strether's famous injunction to little 
Billham: "Live all you can: it's a mistake not to. It doesn't so much 
matter what you do in particular so long as you have your life. If you 
haven't had that what have you had?"9 In his Preface to the New York 
Edition, James underlines the importance he placed upon this value 
by identifying Strether's speech to Billham as the germ of the whole 
novel. In the terms of this code, Marcher is a severely reduced, in­
verted version of Ulysses, an unwily version of the Homeric original 
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seeking false adventures among the leisured upper-class. Rather than 
drinking life to the lees, this genteel warrior idly waits for it to be 
served to him; when he does finally experience "something of the 
taste of life/' its "bitterness . . . sickened him" (p. 126); his peculiar 
striving then leads him to find something illusory and, when he finds 
it, he yields. May, by contrast, is a Penelope transforming herself into 
a more genuine Ulysses, because in her waiting she lives. She has 
suffered greatly, both with him she loved and alone; she has finally 
had to yield before finding what she has been seeking, but she has 
remained strong in will throughout her watching with Marcher. 
James's attitude toward Marcher is made plain through the very 
inversion of the ideal represented by Ulysses, through Marcher's 
being a negative example of what Strether tells Billham. At the same 
time, the sympathy James nevertheless generates for Marcher sug­
gests that James may have been worried that his own choice to spend 
so many hours of his life writing may have been a choice for the 
empty rather than the full life.10 
Scholes no doubt could execute the method more elegantly, and if 
comprehensiveness rather than contrast were my goal, I would at­
tempt to carry out its last two steps for other textual oppositions as 
well. But I believe that this application has done its necessary job of 
illustrating the important difference between his broad thematizing 
and my more restricted kind. Before discussing that difference fur­
ther, I should explain why the difference between his multiple the­
matic generalizations and my single one does not offer grounds for 
significant debate, while the difference in the degree of generaliza­
tion does. The difference between the multiple and the single arises 
largely out of our different projects: Scholes wants to interpret the 
whole text, and he believes that all interpretation is thematizing, so 
he is concerned with all the ways that the text invites thematizing. I 
want to understand the thematic function of the protagonist, and so 
my discussion of thematizing is more narrow, less concerned with the 
all the sources of thematic assertion in narrative. I do of course claim 
to speak of the whole by speaking of progression, and in that way I 
can acknowledge the existence and the relative importance of the­
matic assertions arising out of other elements of the text. In other 
words, I would not claim that the only theme in the whole narrative 
is the one associated with Marcher's thematic function—May has the­
matic functions as well, and the action itself, as Michael Coulson Ber­
thold points out, does play upon the theme of "too late."11 My claim 
instead is that the progression puts Marcher's thematic function at the 
center of the whole text. The thematic functions of May's character 
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(e.g., representing a life of active commitment) are subordinated by 
the progression to Marcher's, and the idea of "too late" is a natural 
corollary of Marcher's thematic function. 
In general, my extended attention to the thematic functions of 
characters is not meant to imply that the attributes of characters and 
the roles they play in narrative progression are the only sources of a 
narrative's thematic statements. Such statements can arise out of the 
action itself—if, for example, all characters regardless of their attri­
butes meet the same fate, then the implied thematic statement about 
the kind of world in which they live is not carried by the characters 
themselves. Thematic statements can also arise independently of 
character and action, as in the narrative commentary of, say, Tom 
Jones or Vanity Fair, where the narrator not only does the usual job of 
reinforcing the thematic points made by character and action but goes 
beyond them to independent assertions. At the same time, of course, 
the extended attention I give to the thematic functions of character is 
meant to recognize that character is typically a very important source 
of a narrative's thematic component. I shall return to the issue of mul­
tiple thematic assertions after I examine my differences with Scholes 
over the appropriate methods of thematic generalizing. 
Despite the ultimate differences between Scholes's semiotic frame­
work and my rhetorical one, those frameworks share enough for our 
differences over the degree of thematic generalization to be genuine 
disagreements. Both frameworks want to account for what Scholes 
calls reading, interpretation, and criticism, for, that is, a first-order un­
derstanding of the text, a second-order understanding of the claims 
on the reader the text makes, and an evaluation of those claims.12 
More succinctly, both frameworks are concerned with the way texts 
work on readers and the way readers may exercise power over texts. 
What we have are two sometimes converging, sometimes diverging 
ways of achieving these common goals. We can therefore examine 
which of the two diverging ways is more likely to lead to those goals. 
What, then, would be the objection to interpreting Interchapter VII 
as a story of Mars and Venus brought down in the muck, or to seeing 
Marcher as an inverted Ulysses among the leisured class? Note that 
Levin's arguments against thematic leaping do not have the same 
force when applied to Scholes's method, because that method does 
not claim that the text is really only about the themes of the general 
cultural code: it insists instead on accounting for the particulars of the 
text as a unique version of a pattern found in the general cultural 
code. Note further that the distortions Levin finds inevitable with the­
matizing are not readily apparent here. Scholes's approach does not 
restrict him to finding only a "central theme," and the various token­
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type fits between the individual story or character and the general 
cultural codes are plausible, if not invariably compelling. Without is­
suing a critical interdiction on interpreting texts in light of such cul­
tural codes, on what grounds can one object? 
The ground I choose is that provided by the consequences of read­
ing for progression. Most generally, my objection is that readings that 
follow Scholes's principles typically lose precision and comprehen­
siveness as they gain generality. This loss results from both the 
method itself and its purpose of relating the text to the most general 
cultural codes. Let us look at the methodological issues first. To as­
sume that the path to interpretation is to be found by dividing the 
text's forest of particulars into pairs of oppositions is to assume that 
the second-order understanding is not closely related to the first—or 
in other words, it is to assume that the experience of reading, of fol­
lowing the progression, has little to do with interpretation. Conse­
quently, the dynamics resulting from the temporal process of reading 
do not figure in interpretation, and in that way the method fails to be 
comprehensive: though one cannot point to them in the same way 
one can point to say, a character's name, the dynamics of a text's 
movement are as much a part of it as the binary oppositions Scholes 
makes central. Both are elements that must be inferred from the literal 
surface of the text. 
The second and third methodological problems of Scholes's system 
are also related to its neglect of progression as an influence on inter­
pretation. His system precludes the possibility that there can be con­
nections between paired textual elements other than the oppositional 
or repetitive; and it invites the equation of textual elements that are 
not given equal weight in the text. All three problems are evident in 
his interpretation of Interchapter VII of In Our Time. We have already 
seen that Scholes works by finding oppositions in the text—trench 
against Villa Rossa; Jesus against the girl—and then connecting these 
oppositions to such large cultural types as Mars and Venus. More 
particularly, Scholes says that he would keep a class discussion of the 
interchapter going until "some of the following features emerged: 
that the story takes place in two locations, trench and Villa Rossa; that 
the soldier in the trench promises Jesus, in prayer, that he will tell 
about him, and that he breaks that promise first at the Villa Rossa and 
then for ever after" (p. 33). Furthermore, the thematic oppositions in 
the story are built upon the basic opposition between trench and 
Villa. In each place, we are told or can infer that the soldier "lay very 
flat and sweated/' In each place, we are told or can infer that he 
speaks in "intimate, personal terms" to someone—Jesus first and 
then the girl (p. 33). From here, as we have seen, Scholes connects 
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the oppositions to broader cultural codes about love and war, Mars 
and Venus, sacred and profane love. 
If, however, we look at the progression of the interchapter, the text 
does not divide so neatly into two equal and oppositional halves ac­
cording to the difference in the setting. The first sentence describing 
the bombardment and the soldier's anxiety introduces the major in­
stability. "While the bombardment was knocking the trench to pieces 
at Fossalta, he lay very flat and sweated and prayed oh jesus christ 
get me out of here/7 His making the promise to Jesus adds a new 
instability because the promise under such pressure raises a question 
about its fulfillment. Then, immediately after this complication, the 
first instability is removed: "I believe in you and I'll tell every one in 
the world that you are the only one that matters. Please please dear 
jesus. The shelling moved up the line." We are left then with the 
instability of the promise. 
So far this analysis is not incompatible with anything that Scholes 
has said. From this point, however, the analyses diverge significantly. 
Concerned with opposition rather than progression, Scholes breaks 
the story sharply in two, concludes that the soldier "breaks the prom­
ise first at the Villa Rossa," and in effect assigns no function to the 
sentence describing the day between the shelling and the trip to the 
Villa Rossa ("We went to work on the trench and in the morning 
the sun came up and the day was hot and muggy and cheerful and 
quiet"). His only comment about it is that the shift to the "we" is a 
significant alteration of the point of view that may move one from 
reading to interpretation. In reading for progression, this shift and 
the whole sentence are very significant because together they signal 
the beginning of the resolution. Since the soldier has promised to tell 
"everyone," since he spends the next day in the trench not alone but 
as part of a "we," and since the day is "hot and muggy and cheerful 
and quiet/' the sentence not only emphasizes the absence of the shell­
ing but also reveals that the soldier fails to fufill his promise. Thus, 
the promise and the breaking of the promise both occur in the trench; 
the neatness of the oppositions that Scholes's interpretation is built 
upon comes at the expense of the textual details. Furthermore, the 
adjective "cheerful" emphasizes the soldier's radically different psy­
chological state; the day is hot and muggy but he is not lying down 
and sweating and praying with all the anxiety of someone who is in 
fear of losing his life. Yesterday's experience does not touch today's 
mood, just as yesterday's promise does not affect today's behavior. 
Once we understand this last description of the soldier in the 
trench as the beginning of the resolution, we are better able to un­
derstand the relation between trench and Villa Rossa. It is not, as 
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Scholes's reading would have it, that the soldier goes there and breaks 
his promise; instead he goes there because he has already broken his 
promise. Indeed, the very speed with which he has forgotten the 
promise causes us to reflect back on the fear that induced it and rec­
ognize it to be as prominent as the promise itself. The shift of setting 
from trench to Villa Rossa works as a very powerful way to signal 
how far (both physically and spiritually) and how quickly ("the next 
night") the soldier has traveled since experiencing that fear and re­
sponding with his prayer-promise. Thus, the villa is not put in direct 
opposition to the trench but is made to function as a very telling 
marker of the soldier's distance from the events of two days ago. Once 
the instability has been resolved to this extent, the last sentence can 
effectively provide both completeness and closure; the authorial au­
dience is very willing to believe "he never told anybody." 
I want to stress here that although I am reading for progression 
while Scholes reads for oppositions, and thus use different categories 
of analysis, both of us claim to base the validity of our findings on 
their ability to account for the whole text. Consequently, Scholes him­
self would have to acknowledge that his neglect of the sentence about 
the day after the shelling seriously damages his case. The problem is 
not just that he does not account for it, but also that he cannot account 
for it without disrupting the neatness of the oppositions upon which 
his whole interpretation is based. 
The fourth problem with Scholes's system arises less from its meth­
odological procedures than from its purpose of getting at the general 
cultural code. This problem, in other words, has less to do with his 
neglect of progression and more to do with his treatment of character. 
Because Scholes wants to get to those cultural codes and because he 
assumes that interpretation proper is thematizing, the model privi­
leges the propositional elements of the narrative and subordinates or 
ignores the emotional, affective element. Regarding the soldier as 
Mars, the traitless prostitute as Venus ("Venus is a hooker, and Mars 
is a boy blubbering at the bottom of a trench" [p. 34]), Marcher as an 
inverted Ulysses, May as Penelope-becoming-Ulysses, and so on is a 
kind of thematizing that foregrounds the synthetic component at the 
expense of the mimetic for the purpose of making the greatest claims 
for the thematic. In a sense, this thematizing makes all narrative as­
pire to the condition of allegory. 
Again part of the difficulty with this procedure is that it creates too 
wide a gulf between reading and interpretation. Just as the system 
denies the importance of the temporal dynamics of the text, so too 
it denies the importance of the mimetic involvement many texts 
offer us. And again to interpret mimetically developed characters 
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through the lenses of the general cultural codes that Scholes so favors 
is to fail to do justice to their complexity. The token will correspond 
to the type but not in every respect. When we regard Marcher as an 
inverted Ulysses, for example, we do not account for his repeated 
failed attempts to combat his own self-centeredness in his relations 
with May. When we regard the soldier as Mars blubbering at the bot­
tom of a trench, we lose sight of the understated portrayal of his quick 
shift from fear to callousness that is the main source of the story's 
effect. 
My point here is not that the soldier has no thematic function. On 
the contrary, the very broad strokes of his characterization indicate 
that he is a representative rather than individualized figure. Heming­
way uses his representativeness to offer a study in the psychology of 
the infantryman, a study which invites thematic generalizing but also 
restricts the degree and kind of that generalizing. Hemingway's typi­
cal understated style means that much of the effect is carried by the 
inferences we are required to make as we register, first, the soldier's 
fear and his flight to religion, then his apparent indifference to those 
very intense feelings. The nuances of the progression indicate that the 
thematic point is neither "there are no atheists in foxholes," nor "fox­
hole conversions don't take," but something more like "war in the 
trenches alternately induces both extreme fear and extreme callous­
ness toward the person you were while you were afraid." 
More generally, the point here is that the mimetic function of char­
acters will act as a kind of weight which resists the high-flying gen­
eralizing that Scholes prizes so greatly. The question of where to stop 
in the generalization of the thematic function is answered for every 
narrative by the way in which the progression guides the interaction 
of the mimetic and the thematic functions of character. There are of 
course narratives that restrict the mimetic function in order to de­
velop the thematic and to invite broad generalization (we call many 
of these narratives allegories). Frequently, however, the progression 
will develop mimetic and thematic functions simultaneously, and if I 
am right about "The Beast in the Jungle," it may occasionally even 
fuse them, but to the extent that it asks us to take the mimetic func­
tion seriously, the progression will work against the allegorizing im­
plicit in Scholes's system. We can see Marcher as equally mimetic and 
thematic, but it is hard to take him seriously as a mimetic character 
when we are told that he is really a version of Ulysses. 
This position does not mean that Scholes's interpretations are 
worthless or unhelpful. It does, however, mean that they are more 
limited than Scholes thinks. It also means that the link through char­
acter to the general cultural codes ought to be considered as an ex­
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trapolation of the thematic function proceeding by analogy rather 
than as an interpretation uncovering the basic codes of the text. If the 
text were working by those codes in the way that Scholes claims, the 
fit between type and token would be tighter, and the mimetic func­
tion would not have any significant force. Marcher may be like an 
inverted Ulysses, but to delete the preposition is to delete that part of 
the progression that insists he is a possible person. The analogies 
between the thematic functions of the characters and the general cul­
tural types and codes they resemble can be highly illuminating, as I 
think they are in Scholes's discussion of Interchapter VII, but such 
illumination should not blind us to their status as analogies rather 
than identities. 

II Incorporating the Synthetic 
Function: Reexamining 
Audiences and Progression 

The Functions of Character and 
the Relations of Audiences in 
The French Lieutenant's Woman 
The two chapters of Part I have presented a case for the importance 
of thematizing character and knowing where to stop in that thematiz­
ing (where the progression tells one to). At the same time, its specific 
analyses of 1984, Pride and Prejudice, and 'The Beast in the Jungle" 
have uncovered three different relationships between the mimetic 
and thematic functions of character: subordination of one to the 
other, equality along parallel tracks of interest, and fusion. This 
chapter will attempt to complete the investigation into the mimetic-
thematic relationship and to move the inquiry into its consideration 
of the interactions among the three components of character by fo­
cusing on the mimetic-thematic relationship in a narrative where the 
synthetic component is at least an occasionally foregrounded feature 
of the text. In other words, my question here is what kind of mimetic-
thematic relationships will develop when the synthetic component of 
character moves out of the background of the narrative. Although this 
one case may not be representative of all, John Fowles's The French 
Lieutenant's Woman raises this question more provocatively than any 
other narrative I can think of. Furthermore, Fowles's manner of incor­
porating the synthetic component into his narrative will require a 
closer examination of the concepts of—and the relations between— 
the authorial and narrative audiences than I have yet undertaken. 
II 
The most striking feature of Fowles's treatment of his characters is his 
failure—or better, refusal—to give Sarah Woodruff, whom the nar­
rator once ironically refers to as the "protagonist/' a fully developed 
mimetic function.1 This refusal is striking not only because of Sarah's 
importance in the narrative but also because Fowles takes pains to 
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develop the mimetic functions of the other major characters, espe­
cially Charles Smithson. Fowles's refusal is itself complexly incorpo­
rated into the progression of the narrative through the narrator's 
statement of principles in the famous Chapter 13. Because the narra­
tor claims to respect the autonomy of his characters and because 
Sarah would reject a chapter devoted to revealing her thoughts, 
Fowles himself seems to escape the obligation to give us an inside 
view of her, an escape that allows him eventually to write his double 
ending.2 But before we examine the crucial role of Chapter 13 in the 
progression and in the development of the functions of character, it 
will be helpful to sketch the general movement of the whole narra­
tive, and then to look more closely at its initiating moments in the 
first two chapters. 
The general trajectory of the narrative follows a path that results 
from the conflicting forces of Ernestina, Sarah, and Sam interacting 
with the conflicting values and beliefs of Charles. This path is finally 
one of growth and development for Charles—but that is not the 
whole story of the narrative. The major instabilities of the narrative 
center on Charles, but Fowles's narrative manner gives rise to some 
significant tensions that juxtapose the authorial audience's interest in 
Charles with other issues about the status of the narrative itself. Let 
us look at the instabilities first. When the action begins Charles is 
engaged to Ernestina, who is only slightly different from the conven­
tional Victorian woman he has avoided marrying for much of his 
adult life. His encounters with Sarah emphasize his dissatisfaction 
with his situation and complicate the instabilities surrounding his 
engagement—and indeed, those surrounding the future course of his 
life as a young adult who has been born and bred a gentleman but 
now finds the social order changing. Fowles presents his attraction to 
Sarah as a function of his vague unease about his engagement to 
Ernestina and of Sarah herself, who through her appeals to his 
sympathy, her unconventional behavior, and indeed, her profound 
mystery, eventually leads him to reject the general judgment of her 
as a madwoman and to envision sharing his life with her. In ways 
that I will discuss later, Charles's choice for Sarah over Ernestina be­
comes thematized as a choice for the modern age over the Victorian, 
a choice for freedom over duty, and a choice that Fowles asks his 
audience to endorse. 
Once Charles makes that choice most of the significant instabilities 
of the narrative are resolved. Nevertheless, the resolution is different 
for the authorial audience than it is for our protagonist. In a typical 
pattern for him, Charles misjudges the relation between his choosing 
and his getting what he chooses. Concerned with his own problems, 
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he does not pay sufficient attention to the aspirations of Sam, who 
does not deliver the written proposal, since its acceptance would 
mean the end of his hopes for funds to open his own clothing store. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that Sarah would have accepted Charles's 
proposal anyway. Charles lives with the consequences of his choice 
for Sarah over Ernestina without looking back, although he never 
abandons hope that he will find her again—and again his constancy 
about his choice is a sign of his growth. When Charles does find Sarah 
through the intercession of Sam at the very end of the narrative, 
Fowles offers two versions of Sarah's response to his renewed pro­
posal. In both she puts him through a difficult interview; in the first, 
she eventually accepts him and in the second she does not. The dou­
bleness of the ending is one sign that Charles's growth is not the 
whole story of the narrative, and Chapter 13 is another. To see how 
Chapter 13 develops a potentiality in the initial narrative situation 
and, thus, adds a significant new tension to the narrative, let us con­
sider how Fowles leads up to it. 
The narrative begins at a leisurely pace as the first chapter does not 
introduce any instability until its last paragraph, when it also compli­
cates the mild tension established by the opening paragraphs. Fowles 
begins by using the narrator to describe the setting—the Cobb at 
Lyme Regis—and an unnamed couple walking upon the Cobb. This 
initial narration also implicitly defines the narrator's temporal relation 
to the scene he is describing and thereby establishes the tension; con­
sider, for example, this commentary on the Cobb: 
Primitive yet clean, elephantine but delicate; as full of subtle curves 
and volumes as a Henry Moore or a Michelangelo; and pure, clean, 
salt, a paragon of mass. I exaggerate? Perhaps, but I can be put to 
the test, for the Cobb has changed very little since the year of 
which I write; though the town of Lyme has, and the test is not fair 
if you look back towards land.3 
At the end of the next paragraph, the narrator again refers to the 
temporal distance between the time of the action and the time of the 
narration: "No house lay visibly then or, beyond a brief misery of 
beach huts, lies today in that direction" (p. 10). The reference to 
Henry Moore indicates his twentieth-century perspective, and then 
the reference to "today," without any marking of a difference be­
tween the time of narration and the time of publication (1969), indi­
cates that Fowles is placing the time of narration as the late 1960s, 
roughly one hundred years later than the March 1867 date given in 
the first paragraph as the time of the action.4 Establishing this tem­
poral distance influences the audience to align itself with the narrator 
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as "we" all look back at the characters. In addition, establishing this 
distance predisposes us to direct our attention to their thematic com­
ponents: aware of the distance between ourselves and the characters, 
we look for the ways in which they represent their age. When, as I 
shall discuss below, the narrator describes the couple walking on the 
Cobb according to how their appearance identifies them as people of 
their age, our predisposition toward the thematic becomes an active 
disposition. 
At the same time, the whole manner of narration here establishes 
a slight tension between Fowles and the authorial audience. This 
audience, which knows the conventions of both nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century narration, recognizes the twentieth-century novel­
ist adopting the nineteenth-century conventions and wonders why. 
As the narrator directs attention to the scene before him, this tension 
does not drive the narrative the way that, say, the tension between 
Lardner's Whitey and the authorial audience does; instead it remains 
in the background, something that needs to be resolved eventually, 
something that could be drawn upon later, but nothing that needs to 
be resolved—or even complicated—immediately. 
Other elements of the narrator's treatment in Chapter 1 reinforce 
the authorial audience's interest in the representative status of the 
characters. The narrator takes up a distant spatial location and de­
scribes the couple from the perspective of a "local spy" with a tele­
scope (p. 10). Looking through that lens, the authorial and narrative 
audiences focus primarily on the clothes and hair style of the couple. 
The woman is dressed in the latest fashion of the day, "while the 
taller man, impeccably dressed in a light gray, with his top hat held 
in his free hand, had severely reduced his dundrearies, which the 
arbiters of the best English male fashion had declared a shade vulgar— 
that is, risible to the foreigner—a year or two previously" (p. 11). 
These details of the character's appearance identify him as a member 
of a certain class—the conventionally fashionable well-to-do. At the 
same time, the reference to dundrearies reinforces the point that he 
is a citizen—and a decidedly British one—of another age, because it 
indicates an attention to an element of male appearance that in our 
age we all but ignore. 
The impression of the man as conventionally fashionable is rein­
forced by the immediately preceding description of his companion: 
she is part of the incipient "revolt against the crinoline and the large 
bonnet," wearing "a magenta skirt of almost daring narrowness— 
and shortness" as well as a "'pork-pie' hat with a delicate tuft of egret 
plumes at the side—a millinery style that the resident ladies of Lyme 
would not dare to wear for another year" (p. 11). Again the details 
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indicate that the wearer is a member of the upper class. The elabora­
tion of the last detail also identifies the woman—and by extension, 
the man as well—as noteworthy because she is unusual—more dar­
ing, more advanced than the other residents of Lyme. (A subsidiary 
effect of the detail is to provide a retrospective "justification" of the 
narrator's adopting the perspective of the local spy.) 
Although the perspective keeps us at a distance from the charac­
ters, we now see them as set off from their surroundings and begin 
to wonder what they are doing in Lyme. But Fowles immediately com­
plicates this reaction by introducing another character who is not only 
set off from the surroundings but is also defined as unfathomable: 
But where the telescopist would have been at sea himself was 
with the other figure on that somber, curving mole. It stood right 
at the seawardmost end, apparently leaning against an old cannon 
barrel upended as a bollard. Its clothes were black. The wind 
moved them, but the figure stood motionless, staring, staring out 
to sea, more like a living memorial to the drowned, a figure from 
myth, than any proper fragment of the petty provincial day. (P. 11) 
The nuances of the description highlight the mystery of the figure. 
The pronominal reference does not allow us to tell whether this char­
acter is male or female, but "it" is defined in implicit opposition to 
both members of the well-to-do couple. They are walking; "it" is mo­
tionless. They are together; it is alone. The woman's clothes are 
marked by the brilliant, strident quality of their colors; its are black. 
The couple represent a city fashion in a country environment; it is a 
figure from myth set down in the provinces. 
The introduction of this character is also a simultaneous complica­
tion of the tension and an introduction of an instability. When the 
telescopist is hypothetically put at sea, so too are we, and we read 
on in part to return to terra firma. Given the nature of the complica­
tion here, we wonder to what extent the initial tension surrounding 
Fowles's adoption of the techniques of nineteenth-century narration 
is connected to his handling of this mysterious figure. Moreover, 
when the figure is juxtaposed to the couple, who in turn are juxta­
posed to the residents of Lyme, we sense a rupture in the leisurely 
presentation of the narrative; and we wonder what the presence of 
the mysterious figure will mean for the couple in particular and Lyme 
in general. 
This initial movement is given a strong push by the events of the 
next chapter, in which the narrator assumes a spatial location just 
over the shoulder of the couple, and reports their conversation. This 
dialogue introduces many of the major issues of the narrative—we 
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learn that Charles and Ernestina are engaged, that Charles is a gentle­
man by birth, Ernestina the daughter of a rich merchant; that Charles 
believes in Darwin's theory of evolution, that his future father-in-law 
does not. We also see that their talk is characterized by a kind of 
formal banter, in which they play conventional roles. Despite Ernes-
tina's attempts to protest against what Charles says or to undercut it 
with her wit, he is clearly the superior partner. Like their clothes, 
their talk appears to be conventionally fashionable, a Victorian ver­
sion of what we would today call "cutesy." By giving us this closer 
look at the couple, by letting them speak in their own voices, however 
conventional, Fowles is also beginning to bring the mimetic compo­
nent of the narrative more into the foreground. This movement is 
accelerated with the interaction between Charles and the figure. 
After Charles finally notices the figure, his questions to Ernestina 
produce the first version of her story: she is known as "Tragedy" or 
the French Lieutenant's Woman, because she gave herself to the 
French Lieutenant and then was abandoned. Now she haunts the 
Cobb, waiting for his return. Because Ernestina, a conventional out­
sider who speaks about Sarah reluctantly, tells this tale, it does not 
carry much authority. As a result, the tension aroused by the last 
paragraph of Chapter 1 is partly alleviated, but not eliminated, and in 
fact, our interest in "Tragedy" and her story increases. This effect is 
reinforced by the further complication of the instability that occurs 
when Charles, exercising his sense of his superiority to both Ernes-
tina and the now identified figure, steps forward to her and expresses 
concern. 
She turned to look at him—or, as it seemed to Charles, through 
him. It was not so much what was positively in that face which 
remained with him after that first meeting, but all that was not 
expected; for theirs was an age when the favored feminine look 
was the demure, the obedient, the shy. Charles felt immediately as 
if he had trespassed; as if the Cobb belonged to that face, and not 
to the Ancient Borough of Lyme. It was not a pretty face, like 
Ernestina's. It was certainly not a beautiful face, by any period's 
standard or taste. But it was an unforgettable face, and a tragic 
face. . . . 
Again and again, afterwards, Charles thought of that look as a 
lance; and to think so is of course not merely to describe an object 
but the effect it has. He felt himself in that brief instant an unjust 
enemy; both pierced and deservedly diminished.(Pp. 16-17) 
Sarah's look not only upsets Charles's easy assumptions about his 
superiority to her but also reverses the implicit power relationship he 
had assumed to be in force. The description of the look emphasizes the 
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way in which it indicates that Sarah is not a woman of her age. In this 
respect, the look defines Sarah both mimetically and thematically— 
she has this power and it signifies her status as the anti-Victorian 
woman. Thus, even as Charles feels diminished by the look, even as 
the egocentrism implicit in his assumption of superiority is dealt a 
blow, he also comes for the first time face to face with an alternative 
to the conventional life he is drifting toward by being engaged to Er­
nestina. The effect of the lance on his relationship with Ernestina is 
immediately felt, because Charles does not tell Ernestina anything 
about the look, but covers up: "I wish you hadn't told me the sordid 
facts. That's the trouble with provincial life. Everyone knows every­
one and there is no mystery. No romance." The words become ironic 
in retrospect but even immediately they emphasize the instabilities 
between Charles and Ernestina. 
Between Chapters 2 and 13, the progression establishes Charles as 
the protagonist, as it defines instabilities in his relationships with 
himself, Ernestina, Sam, and Sarah. The following passage from the 
beginning of Chapter 3 is a good example of Fowles's method. 
His thoughts were too vague to be described. But they compre­
hended mysterious elements; a sentiment of obscure defeat not in 
any way related to the incident on the Cobb, but to certain trivial 
things he had said at Aunt Tranter's lunch, to certain characteristic 
evasions he had made; to whether his interest in paleontology was 
a sufficient use for his natural abilities; to whether Ernestina would 
ever really understand him as well as he understood her, to a general 
sentiment of dislocated purpose originating perhaps in no more— 
as he finally concluded—than the threat of a long and now wet 
afternoon. (P. 18, emphasis mine) 
The vision here is Charles's while the voice is the narrator's, a tech­
nique that allows Fowles to let the audience see more about Charles 
than he sees about himself. We see that his obscure sense of defeat is 
connected with Sarah's look, though the same egocentrism that leads 
him to his invidious comparison between his understanding of Ernes-
tina and hers of him will not yet allow him to admit it. At the same 
time, the nontrivial "trivial things" he had said also point to that sen­
timent of defeat. Charles is a man who is not at home with himself, a 
man who is especially vulnerable to the apparent alternative Sarah 
seems to offer. 
As the progression develops, Charles's representative status is de­
fined more clearly, even as his mimetic portrait is sketched more fully. 
He is a Victorian gentleman of a particular generation, one poised 
between the High Victorian era and the beginning of the modern age. 
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On the one hand, for example, Charles has beliefs and assumptions 
that indicate his unthinking allegiance to his class and its privileges. 
He has an almost instinctive belief in his own superiority. He as­
sumes that a man in his position would naturally have a servant like 
Sam, and he believes that getting one's income in trade is inferior to 
getting one's income through an inheritance. On the other hand, he 
is also partly what he thinks he is: a forward-looking man who is not 
bound by old beliefs and assumptions. We see this side of him, for 
example, in his agnosticism, in his rejection of the Tories, and in his 
enthusiastic acceptance of Darwin's theory of evolution. His fondness 
for paleontology, his desire to hunt for fossils, nicely captures the 
contradictions of his character, which in turn are the contradictions 
that come with living on the cusp of a historical transition. On the 
one hand, paleontology is his modern substitute for his uncle's riding 
to hounds, and it is consistent with his interest in Darwin. On the 
other hand, his dilettantish pursuit of fossils ties him fruitlessly to the 
past even as it feeds his own self-satisfied sense of himself and his 
class as the surviving fittest. 
Fowles gives us no comparable portrait of Sarah, though she has 
many mimetic dimensions, most of which define her according to her 
difference from Ernestina—and indeed, from Charles as well. Part of 
that difference is a difference in class; a victim of the divisions still 
very much in force in Victorian England, Sarah had been educated 
beyond her own lower class but had not been able to escape it. More 
particularly, Sarah has a firm, deep voice, she combines understand­
ing with emotion, she has imagination and intelligence as well as the 
unconventional self-confidence to value her own intellect as the equal 
of Charles's. Furthermore, she has the ability to see through people 
and judge them accurately—she was born, the narrator says, "with a 
computer in her heart" (p. 61). But above all, she has a deep commit­
ment, as we and Charles slowly learn, to her independence, to her 
freedom from the constricting codes of Victorian culture. On the the­
matic level most of these traits combine to make her represent a New 
Woman, but on the mimetic level she never ceases to be an enigma 
for Charles and the authorial audience: the tension established at the 
end of the first chapter is never wholly resolved. 
The authorial audience enters Chapter 13, then, mimetically in­
volved in Charles's situation—his vague dissatisfaction in his entan­
glement with Ernestina, his growing interest in Sarah—even as we 
typically view that mimetic situation through thematic lenses, view 
it, that is, as the playing out of some representative shift in Victorian 
society. In addition to the devices already mentioned that encourage 
this view, the narrator tells us at the end of Chapter 10, after Charles's 
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first, inadvertent meeting with Sarah in the Undercliff that "in those 
brief poised seconds above the waiting sea, in that luminous evening 
silence broken only by the waves' quiet wash, the whole Victorian 
Age was lost" (p. 81). 
Chapter 13 receives an even greater emphasis in the progression 
because Fowles appears to be setting it up to resolve some tension by 
revealing Sarah's inner life, by completing her mimetic portrait, and 
thus perhaps to shed more light, albeit indirectly, on the narrator's 
claim at the end of Chapter 10. The sequence of the narration until 13 
has been following a rough pattern in which Fowles presents the 
characters in action and then a bit later gives background information 
along with an inside view of those characters. He follows the pattern 
for Charles, Ernestina, Sam, and Mrs. Poulteney. This strategy is 
largely responsible for the way in which the authorial audience moves 
easily from mimetic involvement to thematic understanding. When 
Fowles ends Chapter 12 with the questions, "Who is Sarah? Out of 
what shadows does she come?" he is poised to follow the pattern 
for her. 
Instead he finally builds on the initial mild tension established by 
the discrepancy between his situation as a twentieth-century novelist 
and his adoption of the conventions of nineteenth-century narration. 
In a sense, this complication is also partly a resolution because Chap­
ter 13 moves the whole narrative manner from the nineteenth-century 
mode into the self-reflexive modern mode. The resolution is not com­
plete, however, because at this stage the authorial audience cannot 
discern the reasons for the shifts in narrative mode. Furthermore, the 
step toward resolution between author and authorial audience is ac­
companied by a new tension between the narrator and the authorial 
audience. In order to understand how this tension is developed, we 
need to combine a look at Fowles's moves in the chapter with some 
reflections on the concepts of narrative and authorial audiences. 
Ill 
When Rabinowitz makes his case that in order to participate in the 
rhetorical transactions offered by narratives the flesh-and-blood au­
dience must enter two other audiences, the authorial and the narra­
tive, he focuses primarily on the different knowledge that members 
of each audience are presumed to have.5 As we have already seen, 
one major difference between the narrative and authorial audiences 
for all the texts we have examined so far is that the narrative audience 
remains unaware of the synthetic component of character while the 
authorial audience always has that awareness. We have also seen how 
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Orwell establishes some initial tension by assuming from the outset 
that the narrative audience is already familiar with the world of Oce­
ania ("It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking 
thirteen"), and how James occasionally assumes that his narrative au­
dience knows things that the authorial audience does not. What 
Fowles does in Chapter 13 is, in a sense, to exploit some fundamental 
differences among the assumptions of the two audiences, a strategy 
that leads to considerable distance between them—and that also 
brings the synthetic component of his characters into the foreground 
of the narrative. His strategy here is distinctive because the assump­
tions he draws upon are not assumptions about what the respective 
audiences know of the world he is depicting, but rather are assump­
tions about what each knows of reading. 
Fowles's specific moves are to foil the expectations established by 
his previous pattern and to break the mimetic illusion which he has 
been developing so far, by having the narrator confess that he is not 
writing biography or history but fiction: "I do not know. This story I 
am writing is all imagination. These characters I create never existed 
outside my own mind" (p. 104). At first glance Fowles may seem to 
be speaking directly to the authorial audience; the passage appears to 
be one in which he is taking his audience into his confidence and 
explaining his craft. The confessional mode continues later as the nar­
rating voice tells the audience that all novelists write because 
we wish to create worlds as real as, but other than, the world that 
is. Or was. This is why we cannot plan. We know a world is an 
organism, not a machine. We also know that a genuinely created 
world must be independent of its creator. . . . 
To be free myself, I must give [Charles], and Tina, and Sarah, 
even the abominable Mrs. Poulteney, their freedoms as well. 
There is only one good definition of God: the freedom that allows 
other freedoms to exist. And I must conform to that definition. 
(Pp. 105-6) 
Thus, despite his intention to devote Chapter 13 to the "unfolding of 
Sarah's true state of mind," "I find myself suddenly like a man in the 
sharp spring night, watching from the lawn beneath that dim upper 
window of Marlborough House. I know in the context of my book's 
reality that Sarah would never have brushed away her tears and 
leaned down and delivered a chapter of revelation. She would in­
stantly have turned, had she seen me there just as the old moon rose, 
and disappeared into the interior shadows" (p. 105). 
Upon further reflection, however, the initial appearance of these 
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passages as confessions from Fowles to the authorial audience cannot 
be sustained. Since the authorial audience takes as a first principle of 
its reading the idea that the whole narrative is itself a synthetic con­
struction, it comes to regard this chapter as just one move in that 
larger construction. And it comes to recognize that, rather than 
being spontaneously confessional, the chapter is carefully calculated. 
Whether Fowles actually rejected his original plan for the chapter is a 
moot point; what matters to the authorial audience is that he does not 
reject the current plan to have the narrator tell us that he has rejected 
an earlier one. In other words, the authorial audience views this "con­
fession" by the narrator as a move in the author's construction of the 
whole. Thus, we can identify the voice of the chapter as belonging to 
the narrator, not Fowles, and we can recognize a significant distance 
between those two figures that also corresponds to the distance be­
tween the narrative and authorial audiences. Reading without the 
first principle that everything is constructed, the narrative audience 
takes the narrator at his word, and therefore reads on in the expecta­
tion that the narrative will continue to develop in this unplanned, 
organic way. The authorial audience, meanwhile, will seek to uncover 
what synthetic purposes the signs of the allegedly unplanned devel­
opment are actually serving. 
In this respect, the chapter begins to take advantage of the peculiar 
narrative manner Fowles has adopted. The narrative audience contin­
ues to read as if it is in the company of a reliable nineteenth-century 
narrator, albeit one who is forthcoming about the limits of his omni­
science, while the authorial audience recognizes that the communi­
cation from Fowles behind this narrator's back is precisely what 
makes the narration characteristic of the modern age. Another way of 
describing the relationships here is to say that the chapter establishes 
a significant tension between the narrator and the authorial audience 
but no new tensions between author and authorial audience or be­
tween narrator and narrative audience. The presence of the tension 
along the authorial audience-narrator axis and the lack of such ten­
sion along the narrative audience-narrator axis is a sign of the dis­
tance between the two audiences. 
One of the behind-the-back passes of Chapter 13 is Fowles's main­
tenance of the mystery of Sarah, and thus the maintenance of the old 
tension between author and authorial audience. The narrator's ex­
tended commentary on the necessity of respecting his characters' au­
tonomy is a smoke screen behind which Fowles escapes the task of 
completing her mimetic development. The full consequences of this 
artful dodge are not yet apparent to the authorial audience but it is 
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clearly a significant part of the progression. A move with a more im­
mediate effect is the way in which the narrator's discussion fore­
grounds the synthetic component of the characters. 
When Charles left Sarah on her cliff edge, I ordered him to walk 
straight back to Lyme Regis. But he did not; he gratuitously turned 
and went down to the Dairy. 
Oh, but you say, come on—what I really mean is that the idea 
crossed my mind as I wrote that it might be more clever to have 
him stop and drink milk . . . and meet Sarah again. That is cer­
tainly one explanation of what happened; but I can only report— 
and I am the most reliable witness—that the idea seemed to me to 
come clearly from Charles, not myself. It is not only that he has 
begun to gain an autonomy; I must respect it, and disrespect all 
my quasi-divine plans for him, if I wish him to be real. (Pp. 105-6) 
This whole discussion calls attention to the novelist's role in con­
structing his characters and their actions. Fowles's apparent denial of 
his own power is of course an exertion of that power, one that only 
barely masks its own display. The logic that governs the other confes­
sional passages is at work here: Charles may (or may not) have sug­
gested his own action, but Fowles, not Charles, is responsible for this 
discussion of Charles as character. The result is that the narrator's 
claim about the autonomy of the characters functions as a signal from 
the author that those characters are constructs. 
This signal functions to emphasize further that despite the genuine 
mimetic interests of the progression, this narrative is finally more 
concerned with the thematic sphere. By reminding us that the char­
acters are constructed, the passage impels us to look for the reasons 
of their construction in their representativeness. Those reasons are 
still not entirely clear. In the last part of Chapter 13, the tension be­
tween narrator and authorial audience drops away as the narrative 
resumes ("I report only the outward facts") and Fowles and the nar­
rator move closer together, but the tension generated here remains 
available for further exploitation. In Chapters 14 through 55, the pro­
gression keeps a consistent focus on the instabilities, on the unfolding 
of Charles's slow evolution toward his choice for Sarah. Indeed, the 
authorial audience's mimetic interest is developed to the greatest ex­
tent in this long section of the book. Then in Chapter 55, Fowles once 
again draws upon the tension of Chapter 13. Having taken both au­
diences through Charles's choice for Sarah and his discovery of her 
flight, the narrator addresses himself to the question of the ending. 
Now the question I am asking, as I stare at Charles, is . .  . what 
the devil am I going to do with you? . . . the conventions of Vic­
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torian fiction allow, allowed no place for the open, the inconclusive 
ending; and I preached earlier of the freedom characters must be 
given. My problem is simple—what Charles wants is clear? It is 
indeed. But what the protagonist wants is not so clear; and I am 
not at all sure where she is at the moment. Of course if these two 
were fragments of real life, instead of figments of my imagination, 
the issue to the dilemma is obvious: the one want combats the 
other want, and fails or succeeds, as the actuality may be. Fiction 
usually pretends to conform to the reality: the writer puts the con­
flicting wants into the ring and then describes the fight—but in 
fact fixes the fight, letting that want he himself favors win. And we 
judge writers of fiction both by the skill they show in fixing the 
fights (in other words, in persuading us that they were not fixed) 
and by the kind of fighter they fix in favor of: the good one, the 
tragic one, the evil one, the funny one and so on. (P. 417) 
In his case, the narrator maintains, fixing the fight one way or the 
other is beside the point: the argument for fight-fixing is that it lets 
the reader know what the writer thinks of the world around him, but 
since he is now dealing with a world that is a century in the past, the 
argument does not apply. Therefore, he will take both sides in the 
fight and determine which side to present as the final one by flipping 
a coin. 
The only significant difference between Chapters 13 and 55 in the 
relations among author, narrator, and their respective audiences is 
that in 55 the narrator's presence on the train with Charles more 
clearly emphasizes his own status as an authorial construct. The nar­
rative audience again takes the narrator at his word, while the au­
thorial audience recognizes that Fowles is fixing the fight by having 
the narrator claim that he cannot fix it. (Fowles acts like Browning's 
Duke here: "to fix the fight would be some stooping and I choose 
never to stoop/') He is, however, fixing it so that it will have two 
outcomes. The argument over which ending is better fails to see how 
Fowles has fixed the fight. The question is not whether one ending is 
better, but rather how Fowles has constructed the narrative so that 
completeness can be achieved only by his offering a choice of closures 
(even if as members of the narrative audience we are inclined to fol­
low the narrator's injunction to choose one over the other). Why, in 
other words, would this narrative have closure but not completeness 
if Fowles gave the authorial audience only one ending?6 
In order to answer that question we need to reflect more on the 
consequences of Chapters 13 and 55 for the rest of the narrative. Like 
13, 55 refuses the task of revealing Sarah's character more fully— 
indeed, Fowles flaunts the narrator's inability to tell us more about 
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her—and like 13, its foregrounding of the synthetic status of the 
whole narrative displaces some of our mimetic interest onto the the­
matic functions of the characters. In addition to seeking the reasons 
why he would want these effects, we need to ask why he should try 
to accomplish them in these ways. We can best answer the first ques­
tion about reasons, I think, by noting its connection with one of the 
striking features of the crucial event of the progression—and one 
of the mimetic high points of the narrative: Charles's and Sarah's 
lovemaking. 
Their mouths met with a wild violence that shocked both; made 
her avert her lips. He covered her cheeks, her eyes, with kisses. 
His hand at last touched that hair, caressed it, felt the small head 
through its softness, as the thin-clad body was felt against his arms 
and breast. Suddenly he buried his face in her neck. 
"We must not . . . we must not . . . this is madness." 
But her arms came round him and pressed his head closer. He 
did not move. He felt borne on wings of fire, hurtling, but in such 
tender air, like a child at last let free from school, a prisoner in 
a green field, a hawk rising. He raised his head and looked at 
her: an almost savage fierceness. Then they kissed again. . . . He 
strained that body into his, straining his mouth upon hers, with 
all the hunger of a long frustration—not merely sexual, for a 
whole ungovernable torrent of things banned, romance, adventure, 
sin, madness, animality, all these coursed wildly through him. 
(Pp. 359-60) 
The scene ends with the narrator's revealing remark about the inten­
sity of Charles's desire: "Precisely ninety seconds had passed since 
he had left her to look into the bedroom" (p. 361). What is striking 
about the scene is that Charles's passion for Sarah is far out of pro­
portion to his knowledge of her. This fact is soon brought home to 
him as he notices the blood on his shirt, and realizes that she had lied 
to him about giving herself to the French Lieutenant. Charles's in­
tense passion, we realize, has less to do with Sarah herself than with 
what she represents; he loves his idea of Sarah even more than he 
loves Sarah herself. And his idea of her is very much like ours: al­
though he would not call her a New Woman, he sees her as a contrast 
to Ernestina, duty, and a constricted way of life; her mystery is such 
that he is not entirely sure what kind of alternative she represents, 
but the mystery too is very much a part of her attraction. The lan­
guage of the scene itself emphasizes Charles's sense of freedom in 
possessing Sarah, and the passion he exhibits is in large measure a 
passion for that freedom: "he felt borne on wings of fire, hurtling, but 
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in such tender air, like a child at last let free from school, a prisoner 
in a green field, a hawk rising. . .  . He strained that body into his . .  . 
with all the hunger of a long frustration—not merely sexual, for a 
whole ungovernable torrent of things banned, romance, adventure, 
sin, madness, animality." 
Had Fowles given us a full mimetic portrait of Sarah, we would be 
even more disturbed by Charles's behavior here—despite his feeling 
of being borne in tender air, and despite Sarah's willingness to give 
herself, we would more painfully register the violence of those ninety 
seconds. At the same time, the very surprise of the revelation that 
Sarah is a virgin, that she has more to her history than she has let 
Charles know undercuts the sense of possession that his sexual act 
otherwise implies. Because of this reassertion of Sarah's superiority 
and because we have been consistently turned away from the full 
mimetic view of Sarah, we focus less on her than on Charles and his 
reactions and we see him in part in his representativeness.7 Thus, as 
the narrative technique gives us Charles's vision in the scene, we 
adopt it as Fowles's as well and reposition the strong mimetic force of 
the scene within its symbolic, thematic importance. 
Fowles's pattern of engaging us mimetically and then directing that 
engagement to thematic issues is continued in his representation of 
Charles's debate with himself in the chapel. Charles's intense per­
sonal crisis is resolved very clearly in thematic terms: he chooses the 
freedom that Sarah values and represents over the duty that Ernes-
tina represents. The choice becomes plain in his dialogue with him­
self: "You know your choice. You stay in prison, what your time 
calls duty, honor, self-respect, and you are comfortably safe. Or 
you are free and crucified" (p. 373). And then shortly after, while 
Charles stares at the crucifix, the choice is transformed further: Sarah 
"seemed there beside him, as it were awaiting the marriage service; 
yet with another end in view. For a moment he could not seize 
it—and then it came. To uncrucify!" (p. 374). Freedom, life with Sa­
rah, represents a possibility of escaping the constricting hold of the 
past and opening oneself to the opportunities of the present and fu­
ture. Charles's emancipation from the past is not complete here: his 
final thoughts are of having Sarah on his arm as he tours Europe. 
Nevertheless, in this sequence of scenes at Exeter, Fowles conclu­
sively establishes Charles's choice for Sarah as a choice for the modern 
age over the Victorian. The rest of the narrative shows Charles living 
with the consequences of that choice, learning that "escape is not one 
act" (p. 373) and in the final scenes with Sarah learning more about 
what freedom for both of them means. 
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IV 
This analysis of these scenes has important implications for our un­
derstanding of the relation between character and progression in the 
whole narrative, as well as for the relation between the mimetic and 
thematic functions of character. Although the mimetic portrait of 
Charles is a crucial means for engaging our emotions in the narrative, 
Fowles is ultimately less concerned with the mimetic functions of his 
characters than any of the authors we have seen so far, including 
Orwell. His narrative is neither an action of the kind we examined in 
Pride and Prejudice nor a thesis novel of the kind we examined in 1984, 
but is rather an explanation of a historical shift that works by showing 
how individuals participated in—or were caught by—that shift from 
the Victorian age to the modern. He takes three characters on the 
cusp of the shift—Charles, Ernestina, and Sarah—indicates that the 
two women represent very different degrees and kinds of change— 
Ernestina is the emblem of the new middle class, while Sarah is 
a twentieth-century liberated woman—and puts the representative 
Victorian gentleman in the position of having to choose between 
them. He slowly works out the steps by which the choice is made and 
then shows that the new age is not to be created by a single choice. 
The narrator enunciates the principle behind the narrative explana­
tion by quoting Marx on the book's last page: life is "the actions of men 
(and women) in pursuit of their ends" (p. 480). Fowles focuses on rep­
resentative men and women pursuing their ends and shows how they 
participated in—and helped contribute to—a major historical and 
cultural shift. 
In this kind of narrative, the thematic functions of the characters 
are developed differently from the way they are in 1984, the other 
example we have seen where the thematic component is most impor­
tant. The progression does not build from individual attributes to 
multiple thematic functions but rather takes the attributes in the ag­
gregate and emphasizes the representative quality of that collectivity. 
Charles's belief in his natural superiority to others, for example, does 
not participate in any developing statement against that attitude but 
rather signifies one of the ways in which he is representative of his 
class. One of the things he learns after he makes his choice is to give 
up this assumption. Furthermore, because the work is a narrative ex­
planation, the thematic functions are best seen after the narrative is 
complete. In 1984, Winston's concern for the past gets converted into 
a thematic function as early as Book One when we see how the Party 
wants to control the past. In The French Lieutenant's Woman we are, as 
I have repeatedly noted, consistently repositioning our mimetic en­
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gagement into a broader thematic context, and the full meaning of the 
thematic sphere is not developed until the end of the narrative: it is 
only when the instabilities and tensions of the progression have been 
resolved that we can adequately understand the representative story 
being told. 
Before I turn to the questions of why Fowles accomplishes the ef­
fects of chapters 13 and 55 through the narrator's self-conscious com­
mentary and of how they prepare the way for the double ending as 
the appropriate resolution, it will be useful to indicate how this hy­
pothesis accounts for other elements of the narrative. Much of the 
existing criticism on the book focuses on the narrative's concern with 
Darwin's theory of evolution and with Fowles's characteristic concern 
with existentialism.8 This hypothesis locates both of those elements 
within the larger structure of the progression. The concern with Dar-
win's theory is incorporated in part to signal Fowles's belief in the 
significance of the shift—a new development in the human species 
occurred in the move from the Victorian age to the modern—and 
thus also as a way of understanding that shift. Sarah and Ernestina 
are both "mutations" of the conventional Victorian lady, but Sarah 
represents a far greater advance; Charles shows signs of making a 
successful adaptation to new conditions, and thus becomes a forerun­
ner of what the modern successful man will be. Fowles's concern with 
existential freedom is incorporated into the value structure of the nar­
rative, as the chapel scene makes the essence of Charles's adaptation 
his choice for this value. In addition, the hypothesis would account 
for Sam's role in the narrative as representing another way in which 
Charles is on the cusp of the shift, but a way which makes Charles's 
situation more difficult and qualifies the extent of his vision in the 
chapel, the extent of his adaptation. Charles fails to recognize how 
his own desire for change has its counterpart in Sam's and so must 
face the consequences of that failure when he discovers Sam's be­
trayal. The chapters after Sarah's flight and before the final encounter 
show that Charles is able to do so. 
If this account of the progression and its consequences for charac­
ter is accurate, then it points to a larger rationale for Fowles's handling 
of the narration, including the intrusions of Chapters 13 and 55 and 
the use of the double ending. With the exception of these two chap­
ters and Chapter 61, which sets up the second ending, Fowles has the 
narrator both adopt the conventions of nineteenth-century omni­
science and frequently remind his audience of his temporal location 
in the late 1960s. Clearly Fowles adopts the conventions of omni­
science in order to make his depiction of the Victorian age more pow­
erful, more in keeping with the age itself. If, however, he were to 
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adopt those conventions wholesale, he would unselfconsciously give 
his audience full access to the thoughts of the major characters and 
he would conclude the narrative by fixing those characters in a single 
fate. To do that would be to belie in his method what he affirms in the 
narrative: the freedom that he prizes as the sign of the modern age 
would be lost for both the characters and the audience; our guide to 
both ages would not himself seem to be a creature of the modern age 
that he continually locates himself within. The solution to this di­
lemma provided by the narrator's intrusions in Chapters 13 and 55 
and by the double ending has consequences for our further un­
derstanding of the functions of character in The French Lieutenant's 
Woman. 
The solution is not of course one that genuinely allows the charac­
ters or the audience freedom; once Fowles commits himself to writing 
a narrative explanation, he commits himself to "controlling" his char­
acters and persuading his audience. Instead the solution depends on 
his exploiting the distance between the narrative and authorial audi­
ences in Chapters 13 and 55. As noted above, when we read these 
chapters, we accept the narrator's statements as members of the nar­
rative audience and reject them as members of the authorial. We need 
to take one further step as members of the authorial audience and 
incorporate our acceptance on the narrative level into our under­
standing of the whole communication from Fowles. That step is to 
recognize the narrative statements of Chapters 13 and 55 as part of a 
challenge that Fowles sets himself, a challenge to create and sustain 
for the narrative audience two related illusions. The first illusion is 
that his narrative is in fact following the principles of freedom that it 
recommends; the second is that by creating the first he is transform­
ing his apparent nineteenth-century narrative method into a decid­
edly modern one. As members of the authorial audience, we need to 
recognize the illusion, the steps by which it is sustained, and the 
transformation of method that ensues. If we judge that those steps 
are artfully concealed from the narrative audience even as they alter 
our own fuller perception of the narrative, then Fowles will have met 
his challenge. In other words, if we take this extra step, the tension 
between the authorial audience and the narrator can be "resolved," 
though not in the usual sense of bringing one's beliefs into line with 
the other's. It can be resolved by the authorial audience's growing 
awareness of how Fowles is using this narrator to help the narrative 
conform to the ideas it is endorsing. 
The key step in creating the illusion is the artful dodge of Chapter 
13, where the narrator's endorsement of freedom for characters acts 
as a screen behind which Fowles escapes the task of giving Sarah full 
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mimetic life. As the narrative audience endorses many of its own pre­
existing beliefs, it endorses the narrative's refusal to give an account 
of Sarah's motives. At the same time, it foregrounds for the authorial 
audience the synthetic nature of Sarah's character and by extension 
of all the characters. Both the narrative audience's endorsement and 
the authorial audience's awareness in turn make possible the non-
fixed fixed ending. The narrative audience can accept both Sarah's 
rejection and Sarah's acceptance of Charles because she has not been 
given enough of a mimetic function to make us certain that she would 
act one way rather than the other (though many of us may have our 
own convictions on this point). The authorial audience can accept the 
double ending because it grows out of the prior insistence on the syn­
thetic nature of the characters—once we accept them as constructs 
then we can very readily accept them doing many things at the bid­
ding of their maker, including of course agreeing to marry or to part 
forever. 
With these considerations in mind, we can also see that the tension 
of unequal knowledge between author and authorial audience about 
Sarah's mimetic function ought not be resolved. In effect, this tension 
gets subsumed under the issue of whether Fowles can sustain the 
illusion of freedom for the narrative audience. Since it can only be 
sustained if Sarah remains mimetically incomplete, then the authorial 
audience is willing to let her remain that way. These considerations 
also explain why the completeness of the narrative requires a choice 
between closures: the status of the narrative itself as a product of the 
new age it is announcing requires such a completion. 
At the same time, we need to be aware that Fowles's handling of 
Charles also makes both endings possible. After his choice in the 
chapel, Charles does learn that escape is not one act, but the extent 
of his own growth is not entirely clear. Just as he leaves the chapel 
with an image of freedom ("Sarah on his arm in the Uffizi" [p. 377]) 
that emphasizes he has not thrown off all the shackles of his age, 
so he exhibits other signs of those shackles throughout the later 
parts of the narrative. The most dramatic evidence of these is his 
shock at thinking of Sarah living among the Pre-Raphaelites. Conse­
quently, just as both audiences do not know for sure whether Sarah 
would choose him, both can readily imagine each possible ending for 
Charles. 
Yet these doubts and possibilities do not touch much that is deter­
minately resolved in both endings. By choosing Sarah in the chapel 
and then not looking back, Charles resolves the major instability of 
his own life, as he comes to terms both with the past and his future. 
Furthermore, since his idea of Sarah has been as important—or even 
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more important—than Sarah herself and since he has grown by fol­
lowing his impulse toward that idea, the difference between the two 
endings, though real, is not all that significant. It is not, for example, 
equal to the difference between two endings of Pride and Prejudice in 
one of which Elizabeth and Darcy are united and in the other of 
which they are not. Thus, Fowles has erected another smoke screen 
with Chapter 55: the fight-fixing that goes on in the double ending is 
far less crucial than the fight-fixing that has already gone on in the 
chapel scene. In this way, Fowles works a characteristically twentieth-
century narrative subterfuge on his audiences. 
Nevertheless, as members of the authorial audience we need to see 
that the order of the two endings is not as arbitrary as the narrator's 
coin-flip would have the narrative audience believe. In the second 
ending, Charles takes another step along the path to the modern age 
because he finds some strength after the rejection, something upon 
which to build as he faces the now uncertain future with the certainty 
that Sarah will never share it with him. Once we have seen Charles 
take such a step, we could not go back to an ending in which he stops 
short of it. In this respect, given the emphases of the narrative on the 
shift toward the modern age, the second ending not only must be 
second, but it will also probably be preferred by most readers. But 
there is nothing in the narrative that requires Charles to take this last 
step or renders Sarah's acceptance of his proposal in the first ending, 
an acceptance which she makes in her characteristically enigmatic 
way through Lalage, inconsistent with what has gone before. 
The double ending, finally, is also appropriate for the narrative be­
cause it removes us once again from our mimetic involvement with 
the characters and focuses some of our attention on the twentieth-
century method of narration. It also reminds us of the synthetic ele­
ments of the characters and thereby reinforces for the last time their 
importance as representative figures. Consequently, the final empha­
sis of the narrative is not on the individual characters but on the his­
tory in which they participate. 
V 
All this analysis raises one final question about the relation between 
the narrative and authorial audiences. This account of the two audi­
ences maintains that there is a considerable distance between them in 
Chapters 13, 55, 60, and 61, and much less distance during the other 
chapters. The narrative audience accepts the illusion of the sponta­
neously developing, unfixed narrative and so remains focused on the 
mimetic components of the characters throughout (for the narrative 
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audience the issue of Sarah's motivation remains an unresolved prob­
lem in the narrative). The authorial audience, on the other hand, 
sometimes accepts the illusion and sometimes—in 13, 55, 60, and 
61—sees behind it to the synthetic component of the characters and 
the narrative as a whole. Can Fowles really have it both ways? Can 
the authorial audience be asked both to develop the emotional re­
sponses to characters that go along with the development of the mi­
metic component and then move away from those responses when 
the foregrounding of the synthetic increases our distance from the 
mimesis? 
In one sense, these questions boil down to another one: how flex­
ible is the authorial audience? Or, to put it another way, how able is 
the authorial audience to move from reading mimetically to reading 
thematically-synthetically? I do think that there are limits on the jerks 
and jolts an author can legitimately put his audience through, but I 
do not think that Fowles violates those limits here. If at the end of 
"Haircut," Whitey started reflecting on his own role as Lardner's nar­
rator, or if at the end of Pride and Prejudice Austen's narrator an­
nounced that she was not going to tell us about the aftermath of 
Elizabeth and Darcy's engagement because it was time to admit that 
these characters were really only her puppets, then the implicit rhe­
torical contracts of these narratives would be violated. The authorial 
audience would have been asked to invest a kind of commitment and 
feeling for the greater part of the narrative that was then undermined 
or even mocked by the ending. 
Fowles takes several steps to avoid that kind of jarring effect on his 
audience. First, establishing the initial tension through the narrative 
manner of the opening chapter puts the authorial audience on notice 
to begin thinking about the synthetic construction of the whole nar­
rative. Second, the emphasis on the representative quality of the 
characters even as the authorial audience develops expectations and 
desires about their fates keeps the thematic import—and implicitly 
the synthetic component—of the characters as an important element 
of the narrative. Third, the foregrounding of the synthetic in Chapter 
13 occurs early enough for the authorial audience to incorporate the 
tensions it produces into their developing response to the narrative. 
It complicates the authorial audience's reactions on the mimetic level 
and to some extent qualifies our subsequent mimetic involvement. 
Fowles's challenge, in part, is to reengage the authorial audience 
on the mimetic level sufficiently to make us care about Charles's 
choice not only for what it means thematically but also for Charles 
himself. The novel's popular success is indirect but eloquent testi­
mony to his ability to meet that challenge. From this perspective, we 
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can also see Chapter 55 as a necessary intrusion after the point oi 
greatest mimetic intensity—the events at Exeter and their conse­
quences in Charles's last trip to Lyme to break his engagement—tc 
move the authorial audience back to the importance of the thematic 
issues of the novel—and the way they are reflected in the synthetic. 
If this analysis has merit, then it suggests that authorial audience; 
can be veritable Olympic gymnasts in their flexibility at shifting leveL 
of reading, provided that the author's program is orchestrated skill 
fully enough to make those shifts function coherently within the nar 
rative as a whole. The alternative hypothesis, that Fowles is asking 
too much of his audience in requiring us to change our commitment 
from the mimetic to the synthetic (and then to the thematic) spheres 
has the advantage of emphasizing the way in which the authorial an< 
narrative audiences do merge for long stretches of Fowles's book, bu 
it has the greater disadvantage of strait) acketing the authorial aud: 
ence by presuming that it does not pay attention to the initial tensio 
and that the only way it can resume reading mimetically after Chaj 
ter 13 is to forget the effects of that chapter. Its great disadvantage, i 
short, is to presume that the authorial audience cannot simultan* 
ously be aware of the three components of the characters and of th 
narrative as a whole. My claim is that developing such an awarenej 
is essentially what it means to be in Fowles's audience here, and th; 
Fowles provides the mechanisms for that awareness to develop. 
VI 
The issues raised in these opening three chapters about thematizir 
in interpretation and about the different ways characters can functic 
thematically will remain with us as we broaden our focus in the ne 
two chapters and look harder at the synthetic component of charact 
and its relation to the mimetic and thematic components. To son 
extent, however, these issues will move to the background as othe 
become more pressing. Consequently, it will be helpful to emphasi 
some of the conclusions of the study to this point. 
1. Although thematizing is a fundamental part of interpretation, 
is only a part. To pay attention only to the thematic ends of any of t 
narratives we have looked at, including 1984 and The French Lieutt 
ant's Woman, would be to do a partial analysis at best and would like 
lead to significant distortions as well. 
2. Different narratives require different kinds of thematizing. T 
clearest difference here is that between the way the thematic fui 
tions of the protagonists work in Pride and Prejudice and The Fret 
Lieutenant's Woman. In Austen's narrative individual attributes are cc 
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verted by the progression into different thematic functions, whereas 
in Fowles's the progression works on the representative quality of the 
aggregate of attributes. 
3. The progression, and especially the way it makes use of the mi­
metic function, determines the point at which the generalizing move 
of thematism should stop. In this respect, the lack of a full mimetic 
function for Sarah actually invites broader thematic generalizations 
about her than the mimetic function of, say, Marcher, invites about 
him, and I believe that the narrative leaves some room for such 
generalizations—for example, we can take quite seriously the narra-
tor's reference to her as the Sphinx. At the same time, the progres-
sion's dominant concern with the shift from the Victorian age to the 
modern requires us to treat the reference as a metaphorical rather 
than literal one. 
4. The foregrounding of the synthetic component of character fre­
quently introduces a significant difference between the narrative and 
authorial audiences. This difference typically means that the progres­
sion will be complicated by some tension between the narrator and 
the authorial audience, and the author may use that tension to dis­
place our interest from the mimetic to the thematic component of 
character. 
5. There are no hard-and-fast rules about the way that progressions 
may develop. Instabilities can be introduced immediately as in Pride 
and Prejudice or more leisurely as in The French Lieutenant's Woman. 
Progression may be generated for a time by the arousal and resolution 
of tension as in 1984 and then switch to movement by instability. 
Atlernatively, progression may intermittently be complicated, as it is 
in The French Lieutenant's Woman, by the development of tensions. The 
corollary of this finding is that there are no hard-and-fast rules about 
how or when mimetic and thematic dimensions of a character will be 
converted into functions. All such questions deserve the answer, it 
depends on the particular progression. 
6. What all these previous conclusions suggest is that the devel­
opment of this rhetorical theory is not so much the development of 
conclusions about the necessary connections among the components 
of character as it is the establishment and illustration of categories and 
principles that allow us to discover the functions of character within 
any one work. This point is clearly one that I must return to before 
the progression of this argument can be complete. 
In addition to working toward these conclusions, I have implicitly 
been arguing for the importance of conceiving progression as I do, 
and of course in the previous chapter I have argued that this concep­
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tion has a greater explanatory power than Scholes's method of read­
ing by oppositions. As I turn in the next chapter to take up the 
interaction among the mimetic, thematic, and synthetic roles of a sec­
ondary character, I shall also take up an alternative model for analyz­
ing progression: the psychoanalytically based one offered by Peter 
Brooks in Reading for the Plot. Just as this chapter has required me to 
expand on the concepts of audience I have been employing so far, a 
consideration of Brooks's model will require me to expand on the con­
cept of progression I have been using. The specific focus of my dis­
cussion will be Dickens's Wemmick in Great Expectations, a narrative 
that Brooks himself discusses at length. 
Progression and the Synthetic 
Secondary Character: 
The Case of John Wemmick 
i 
As noted in the introduction, my approach to the analyis of narrative 
progression claims to be an advance over other discussions of plot 
and structure because it pays attention to the temporal dynamics of 
the authorial audience's experience of narrative. In the discussions of 
thematizing so far, I have been illustrating that conception of progres­
sion, and as particular occasions such as the discussion of Scholes 
have allowed, I have been taking small steps to substantiate the intro­
ductory claim. I turn now to focus explicitly on the concept of pro­
gression and its explanatory power. I will compare the ideas about 
progression, both implicit and explicit, that I have drawn upon to this 
point, with the ideas about "reading for the plot" advanced by Peter 
Brooks in his attempt to account for the dynamics of narrative.1 
Brooks's model provides a good test of my own not only because it is 
the most powerful model recently advanced but also because, like 
mine, it wants to consider how the reader's experience is directed by 
the text.2 Rather than being a rhetorically based theory, however, it is 
a psychoanalytically based one. 
I will compare the models for analyzing narrative dynamics in con­
nection with Dickens's Great Expectations, a narrative that Brooks also 
analyzes and that raises questions about the synthetic component of 
character—especially through Dickens's use of Wemmick. Indeed, 
Wemmick provides us with an occasion to consider the potentially 
problematic relationships among the three functions of character, be­
cause his outlandish mimesis foregrounds his synthetic status and 
has consequences for both our sense of Dickens's thematic intentions 
and our own understanding of Pip's mimetic function. Moreover, the 
variety of Wemmick's functions also illustrates some important gen­
eral principles of progression that are highlighted by the comparison 
with Brooks's model. 
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Brooks offers an initial definition of plot that coincides with much 
of my own definition of progression, especially in its twin emphases 
on the temporality and centrality of plot: "Plot . .  . is not a matter of 
typology or of fixed structures, but rather a structuring operation 
peculiar to those messages that are developed through temporal suc­
cession, the instrumental logic of a specific mode of human under­
standing. Plot . .  . is the logic and dynamic of narrative, and narrative 
itself is a form of understanding and explanation" (p. 10). From this 
definition, Brooks sets out to develop a model for discussing the ex­
periential dynamics of reading for the plot, a model that he labels an 
"erotics of art" (p. 36). As I examine that model and its application to 
Dickens's novel, I shall argue that despite Brooks's success in moving 
beyond the essentially static conceptions of structure proposed by 
other narratologists, he nevertheless fails to offer an adequate theory 
of reading for the plot. 
As noted briefly above, Brooks departs from much previous psy­
choanalytic criticism by focusing not on the unconscious of the au­
thor, reader, or characters, but rather on the psychodynamics of the 
text: he wants, in his words, to "superimpose psychic functioning on 
textual functioning" in order to discover "something about how tex­
tual dynamics work and something about their psychic equivalences" 
(p. 90). His method privileges psychoanalysis as the way to explain 
how texts operate, but the method also respects textual functioning: 
in reading Brooks, one typically feels that narrative structure is being 
illuminated rather than made to lie on a bed fashioned by Procrustes 
for Freud. 
Brooks begins with narrative, not psychoanalysis, and comments 
on the paradox of endings. The end always acts in some influential 
way on everything that precedes it, since the ending is what the be­
ginning and the middle are preparing us for. Furthermore, "it is at 
the end—for Barthes as for Aristotle—that recognition brings illumi­
nation, which then can shed its retrospective light" (p. 92). Thus, 
if in the beginning stands desire, and this shows itself ultimately 
to be desire for the end, between beginning and end stands a mid­
dle that we feel to be necessary . . . but whose processes, of trans­
formation and working-through, remain obscure. Here it is that 
Freud's most ambitious investigation of ends in relation to begin­
nings may be of help, and may contribute to a properly dynamic 
model of plot. (P. 96) 
That most ambitious investigation is Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and 
Brooks focuses first on what help it might be in thinking about repe­
tition in narrative. "Narrative always makes the implicit claim to be 
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in a state of repetition, as a going over again of a ground already 
covered: a sjuzet repeating a fabula, as the detective retraces the tracks 
of the criminal" (p. 97). In addition, repetition is the stock in trade of 
literary discourse: "rhyme, alliteration, assonance, meter, refrain, all 
the mnemonic elements of literature and indeed most of its tropes are 
in some manner repetitions that take us back in the text, that allow 
the ear, the eye, the mind to make connections, conscious or uncon­
scious, between different textual moments, to see past and present as 
related and as establishing a future that will be noticeable as some 
variation in the pattern" (p. 99). In Freud's text, repetition is first in­
troduced as a compulsion directed toward the assertion of mastery, 
as in the fort-da game, and then it becomes a compulsion directed at 
"binding" the instinctual drive for immediate gratification. Thus, 
Freud views repetition as making possible both the attainment of 
mastery and the postponement of gratification. 
Similarly, Brooks argues, repetition in narrative functions as a 
"binding of textual energies that allows them to be mastered by put­
ting them into serviceable form, usable 'bundles/ within the ener­
getic economy of the narrative;" "repetition, repeat, recall, symmetry, 
all these journeys back in the text, returns to and returns of . .  . allow 
us to bind one textual moment to another in terms of similarity or 
substitution rather than mere contiguity" (p. 101). In this respect, 
repetition is a key to our mastery over—and hence, pleasure in—the 
text; at the same time it will frequently involve postponement of that 
pleasure. "As the word 'binding' itself suggests, these formalizations 
[i.e., elements of the text that cause us to recognize sameness in dif­
ference] and the recognitions they provoke may in some sense be 
painful: they create a delay, a postponement in the discharge of en­
ergy, a turning back from immediate pleasure, to ensure that the ul­
timate pleasurable discharge will be more complete" (pp. 101-2). 
Brooks next follows Freud through his examination of the relation 
between the repetition compulsion and the instinctual drives, and his 
conclusion that instincts are not drives toward change but toward sta­
bility, or indeed, toward the restoration of an earlier state of things. 
This conclusion in turn leads to the concept of the death instinct, a 
concept that stresses not just an organism's drive toward death but 
also its drive to follow the path to death in its own way. Brooks sum­
marizes the point this way: " 'the organism wishes to die only in its 
own fashion/ " and therefore, it will "struggle against events (dan­
gers) that would help it to achieve its goal too rapidly—by a kind of 
short circuit" (p. 102). Repetition in narrative, then, says Brooks, 
works first to allow the operation of the death instinct, the drive to­
ward the end as it is manifest in the text's attempt to return to an 
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earlier state. But repetition also works to "retard the pleasure princi-
ple's search for the gratification of discharge" which will occur when 
the end is reached. Thus, if we begin in an initiation of tension that 
seeks its own release and generates a desire for the end, the middle 
must be the place where the narrative seeks that end in the appropri­
ate way, avoiding short-circuit even as it inexorably moves toward a 
return to the quiescent state before the beginning. The middle is a 
kind of detour between two states of quiescence at either end of the 
narrative. 
Brooks offers the following succinct summary of his model. 
[Plot] structures ends (death, quiescence, nonnarratability) against 
beginnings (Eros, stimulation into tension, the desire of narrative) 
in a manner that necessitates the middle as detour, as struggle to­
ward the end under the compulsion of imposed delay, as ara­
besque in the dilatory space of the text. The model proposes that 
we five in order to die, hence that the intentionality of plot lies in 
its orientation toward the end even while the end must be achieved 
only through detour. This re-establishes the necessary distance be­
tween beginning and end, maintained through the play of those 
drives that connect them yet prevent the one collapsing back into 
the other. . . . Crucial to the space of this play are the repeti­
tions serving to bind the energy of the text so as to make its final 
discharge more effective. In fictional plots, these bindings are a 
system of repetitions which are returns to and returns of, con­
founding the movement forward to the end with a movement back 
to origins, reversing meaning within forward-moving time, serv­
ing to formalize the system of textual energies, offering the plea­
surable possibility (or illusion) of "meaning" wrested from "life." 
(Pp. 107-8) 
Brooks's model is, I think, very attractive. It not only focuses 
on the temporal, experiential dimension of reading, but also offers 
strong accounts of beginnings, middles, and ends. It offers a sensible 
account of the beginning as the introduction of some tension which 
produces desire for resolution; a suggestive analysis of the paradoxi­
cal drives of the middle, toward both continuation and closure; and a 
powerful account of the end as the dominant position of the narra­
tive, one which exercises control over both the beginning and the 
middle. As in his definition of plot, there is considerable overlap here 
with my discussions of the introduction of instabilities and tensions, 
their complication in the middle, and their resolution at the end. At 
the same time, his discussion indicates that there are significant dis­
agreements between us. 
I l  l Progression and the Synthetic Secondary Character 
II 
First, my conception of progression does not give so much domi­
nance to the ending. Where Brooks sees the beginning and the 
middle as determined by the end, I see the three parts as more mu­
tually determinative. When we read for the progression, we experi­
ence the ending as determined by the beginning and the middle, even 
as it has the potential, in providing both completeness and closure, 
to transform the experience of reading the beginning and the middle. 
This difference about the relation between the three stages of narra­
tive is related to a larger difference based on a principle that I have 
been working with only implicitly to this point. This principle begins 
to emerge when we ask if there is anything beyond beginning, mid­
dle, and end that determines all three, or perhaps better, determines 
the way in which they are mutually determinative of each other. Can 
we extend our rhetorical (as distinct from our biographical or socioh­
istorical) analysis and explain why a particular beginning is chosen or 
why one out of many possible paths through the middle of the nar­
rative is taken or why a particular kind of resolution might be better 
than another one? Answering these questions depends on our deve­
loping some working hypothesis of an overall design, some principle 
of a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts. 
Austen's choice to begin Pride and Prejudice with the conversation 
between the Bennets not only has significant consequences for the 
middle and the end but is itself a consequence of a larger design, the 
development of a comic action that incorporates the narrator's norms 
and judgments about the marriage market as part of the comic satis­
faction to be associated with the ending. Perhaps even more telling 
are Austen's choices in the middle. To have Darcy's first proposal oc­
cur at Rosings, a setting permeated by the values of Lady Catherine, 
Collins, and to a lesser extent of Charlotte; to have Elizabeth drawn 
to Darcy first through the intersection of his letter and her own sense 
of justice, then through what she sees and hears at Pemberly, and 
then finally through her own gratitude for his intercession in the 
Lydia-Wickham affair; to have the second proposal come about in part 
through the meddling of Lady Catherine: all these turns of the pro­
gression, which could have been managed in other ways, are in some 
nontrivial sense determined by the overall design. All these turns not 
only work to complicate and resolve the instabilities along the track 
established in the first half of the narrative but they also develop the 
nuances of the narrator's norms and thus significantly define the kind 
of satisfaction offered by the final resolution. 
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Similarly, although Fowles might have ended The French Lieuten-
ant's Woman in many ways—Charles and Sarah might have been re­
united and sent to an uncertain future in America—the ending is 
determined not just by what the beginning and middle allow but also 
by what the principle of design revealed in those parts allows. Given 
that design of explaining the shift from the Victorian Age to the mod­
ern, his ending, with its choice of closures, is more appropriate than 
the one suggested above. The reasoning may appear circular here but 
the circularity is more apparent than real. The notion of the whole is, 
to be sure, developed from reading the parts, but since developing 
that notion is always part of reading for the progression—since our 
sense of the whole is itself always in motion—it is also always corri­
gible. When we read the first chapter of Pride and Prejudice, we make 
inferences about the whole of which it is a part, and our sense of that 
whole does influence our reading of new parts. But as the analyses of 
the ending of "Haircut" and of Chapter 13 of The French Lieutenant's 
Woman indicate, the new parts are also capable of radically reshaping 
our sense of the whole.3 
Perhaps the most useful way to illustrate the differences between 
Brooks's model and mine is to consider the different ways they would 
deal with the relations between beginning, middle, and end in works 
with flawed endings. Within Brooks's system there are two ways an 
ending can go wrong: it can come too soon, and thus short-circuit 
the working out of the desires aroused by the beginning and the mid­
dle; or it can unbind textual material that has been bound by the 
pattern of repetitions and thus fail to leave the reader in a state of 
quiescence. 
In my terms, the first kind of flaw would be the production of an 
arbitrary resolution, one in which an author substitutes the impera­
tive to provide a resolution for the greater imperative to work out the 
possibilities for resolution inherent in the introduction and compli­
cation of instabilities and tensions. The second kind would be the 
reintroduction of—or the failure to resolve—instabilities of the begin­
ning or middle. Although I would be more concerned than Brooks 
with relating these flaws to some conception of a developing whole 
for each specific case, the differences between the models at this point 
are as much terminological as they are conceptual. A close look at the 
problems raised by a case such as the Phelps farm episode at the end 
of Huckleberry Finn will indicate that Brooks's two explanations of how 
endings can go wrong are insufficient. This conclusion in turn sug­
gests that his model does not do full justice to the ways that endings 
can relate to beginnings and middles. 
The trouble with the Phelps farm episode is certainly not one of 
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short-circuit; the whole business is unduly protracted. In part, how­
ever, the trouble may be that as Twain tries to bind some early textual 
material through the return of Tom Sawyer, he unbinds some material 
about Huck's relation to Jim that has been apparently bound for good 
in Huck's decision to go to hell: The intuitive sense of Jim's humanity 
that resides behind Huck's decision does not lead him to resist some 
of Tom Sawyer's inhumane plans for Jim in the Evasion. Yet the whole 
problem with the ending is more complicated than that, as a look at 
the tasks Twain sets for himself in the narrative makes clear. 
In brief, Twain's narrative progresses by intertwining the two logi­
cally independent stories of Jim's quest for freedom and Huck's more 
intuitive, reactive attempt to find his niche in the world (calling 
Huck's efforts a "quest" would overstate his sense of direction) by 
working out his relationship to his society. The dominant focus, of 
course, is on Huck, and we see him in the beginning unable to enter 
fully into the world of Miss Watson and the Widow Douglas, or that 
of Tom Sawyer and his romantic fancies, or that of his Pap. Life 
on the raft with Jim presents a refuge from the larger world and its 
problems, but that life is itself provisional and unstable as both the 
steamboat and the King and the Duke dramatically prove. Twain nev­
ertheless gives his audience enough of their undisrupted life to show 
the developing bond between the white boy and the black man. He 
then uses the shore episodes both to portray Huck's intuitive educa­
tion in the hypocrisy and corruption of "sivilization" and to make his 
audience even more aware of those features. That development in 
turn makes the decision to go to hell a kind of resolution to Huck's 
hitherto unstable situation: he decides he must live outside the pro­
fessed morality of his society, even if it means suffering the worst 
consequences the society predicts for such outsiders. What Twain 
needs at this point is not so much a device of completeness for Huck 
but a device of closure: a major part of the developing whole, the 
story of the moral implications of Huck's attempts to define his rela­
tion to his society, is essentially complete. If Twain could find a way 
to have Huck decide to light out for the territory at this point, he 
would be well on his way to a satisfactory ending. 
The problem he faces, however, is how to end Jim's quest. Having 
intertwined Huck's story with Jim's, Twain cannot conclude Huck's 
until he also concludes Jim's. And the options he has open are not 
many: Jim is now in the Deep South where he will be regarded as the 
rightful property of some one or other of the white folks. The most 
logical thing to do is have Jim be set free by his owner, but given the 
way Miss Watson has already been portrayed, to do that would be to 
create a deus ex machina effect. So, falling back on his skills as a 
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humorist, satirist, and scene writer, Twain gives us the Evasion, his 
way of trying to hide the deus ex machina behind a cloud of Tom 
Sawyer's romantic dust. But creating the cloud causes more problems 
than unbinding the material about Huck's relation to Jim. It intro­
duces material that is largely extraneous to the instabilities that have 
moved the plot until this point and it develops that material at great 
length. Although the scenes of the Evasion are funny in themselves, 
their irrelevance to what has gone before makes them as annoying as 
they are humorous. 
The more general point here is that the beginning and the middle 
of Huckleberry Finn get developed in such a way that Twain has an 
unsolvable problem on his hands: given that beginning and middle, 
he cannot write a satisfactory ending. The ending in this case is not 
determinative of the beginning and the middle, and I would suggest 
that no ending could be. Furthermore, the ways the ending goes 
wrong exceed the ways predicted by Brooks's theory. One could per­
haps say that had Twain initially chosen a better ending, he could 
have made it determinative of the beginning and the middle. But such 
a move would have required him to write a different beginning and 
middle, and who would want to give up the beginning and middle 
that Twain has created? 
The corollary of this point about Brooks's overemphasis on the 
power of the ending is that he underestimates the power of the mid­
dle. Although he attributes to middles the important role of appro­
priately guiding the desires aroused by the beginning, the middle 
remains a means subordinated to the end of reaching resolution. It is 
a place of detour, of deflected direction, of arabesques. As Huckleberry 
Finn and Pride and Prejudice show, it is all those things—but can be 
much more as well. In Twain's novel, the middle creates the impos­
sibility of satisfactory ending, while in Austen's it is the place where 
many of the thematic functions of Elizabeth's character—especially 
those surrounding her own pride—are realized. 
A second significant difference between Brooks's model and my 
own is what each one implies about the reader's activity—and thus, 
ultimately what each implies about the nature of the narrative text. 
Brooks's discussion of the dynamics of reading becomes finally a de­
scription of a sequence of drives and reactions—the beginning estab­
lishes an initial tension that produces desire for ending, the middle 
produces the detour or arabesque leading eventually toward the end, 
and the end produces the discharge of pleasure with the release of 
the tension. This account is very consistent with Brooks's announced 
intention of imposing "psychic functioning on textual functioning." 
The problem is not with its consistency but with its adequacy as a 
description of the reader's activity. In Brooks's account, the dynamics 
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of the plot itself merge with the dynamics of reading that plot. To give 
an account of reading for the plot is to give an account of the structure 
of the plot. In this respect, Brooks is working with a model of a single-
layered text. 
By contrast, the model of the text implied in my account of pro­
gression is double-layered. On this account, the text contains not just 
the patterns of instabilities, tensions, and resolutions but also the au­
thorial audience's responses to those patterns.4 In other words, the 
concept of progression assumes that the narrative text needs to be 
regarded as the fusion of two structures: (1) the narrative structure 
per se—essentially the structure that Brooks describes in his model, 
or what I call the pattern of instabilities and tensions; and (2) the 
sequence of responses to that structure that the text calls forth from 
the authorial audience.5 In still other words, we might say that pro­
gression involves not only the developing pattern of instabilities and 
tensions but also the accompanying sequence of attitudes that the au­
thorial audience is asked to take toward that pattern. This conception 
has been operating throughout my analysis so far, perhaps most ob­
viously in the discussion of Scholes's model and my arguments about 
the importance of the authorial audience's involvement with the 
mimetic component of character. The pattern of judgments, fears, 
hopes, desires, expectations, and so on that typically but not exclu­
sively cluster around the mimetic component is as much a part of the 
dynamics of reading as the sequence of actions in which the character 
participates. I will return to this point shortly because it has conse­
quences for a third difference between Brooks's model and mine, 
but there is another side to this present difference that needs to be 
illuminated. 
In the discussion of "Haircut" in the introduction, I noted that the 
final sentences help resolve the instabilities by contributing to the com­
pletion of the narrative through the alteration of the authorial audi-
ence's understanding of the resolution that has already been narrated. 
In the discussion of Pride and Prejudice, I claimed that although Char­
lotte Lucas's marriage to Collins does not complicate the instabilities 
of the main narrative line it nevertheless had a significant influence 
on the authorial audience's understanding of that line, and indeed, 
played an important role in Austen's development of the thematic 
function associated with Elizabeth's attribute of independence from 
the marriage market. Such conclusions about the dynamics of reading 
these narratives are, I think, simply not available if one is operating 
within Brooks's system. When the dynamics of reading are merged 
with the dynamics of plot structure, the reader's role is implicitly lim­
ited to responding to the movement of the instabilities. 
Both consequences of this second difference between Brooks's 
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model and my own are related to the third difference. Because Brooks 
conflates the dynamics of reading and the dynamics of plot, he must 
find the key to reading for the plot not in the reader's affective expe­
rience of the text but in formal features of the text, and as we have 
seen, his psychoanalytical framework leads him to repetition as the 
identifiable key. In order, however, to account for the significance of 
repetition within the limits of his way of talking about the reader's 
experience, he must resort to talking about the thematic importance 
of the repetitions. The problem again is not so much that this is 
wrong, but that it is inadequate. When repetition gets linked to 
theme, then reading for the plot becomes reading for the themes in 
motion. 
Ill 
These last two differences between the models should become clearer 
as we examine Brooks's analysis of Great Expectations, a novel that he 
chooses in part because it "gives in the highest degree the impression 
that its central meanings depend on the workings-out of its plot" 
(p. 114). Furthermore, the novel is "concerned with finding a plot and 
losing it, with the precipitation of the sense of plottedness around its 
hero, and his eventual 'cure' from plot. The novel imagines in its 
structure the kind of structuring operation of reading that plot is" 
(p. 114). Note here that in the very act of setting up his analysis Brooks 
implicitly makes reading for the plot reading about plot. Brooks's 
model is already committing him to read about themes in motion, but 
that model leads him away from such standard themes as the indi­
vidual and society toward this more reflexive one. 
Brooks begins his account with an analysis of the novel's famous 
opening paragraphs, where Pip discusses his acquisition of his name 
and his "first most vivid and broad impression of the identity of 
things." This impression occurs on the day in the churchyard when 
he became fully conscious of his environment and his own place in it 
as an orphan, a consciousness that in turn leads to his tears that are 
then interrupted by a "terrible voice," crying out "Hold your noise!"6 
Brooks has many insightful things to say about this passage, some of 
which I shall return to, but his main conclusion stresses what the 
passage suggests about the role of plot in the novel. "This beginning 
establishes Pip as an existence without a plot, at the very moment of 
occurrence of that event which will prove to be decisive for the plot­
ting of his existence, as he will discover only two-thirds of the way 
through the novel" (p. 117). In the first part of the novel, Brooks ar­
gues, Pip is in search of a plot and the novel recounts how a plot 
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seems to gather around him. In fact, Brooks identifies four lines of 
plot moving around Pip before the declaration of his expectations: 
1. Communion with the convict/criminal deviance. 
2. Naterally wicious/bringing up by hand. 
3. The dream of Satis House/the fairy tale. 
4. The nightmare of Satis House/the witch tale. (P. 117) 
Brooks argues further that the four plots are paired as follows: 
2/1 = 3/4. "That is, there is in each case an 'official7 and censoring 
plot standing over a 'repressed' plot" (p. 117). Pip himself favors plot 
3, and when Jaggers comes with the news of Pip's Expectations, it 
appears that reality is conforming to his desire, and that the question 
of plot is now taken care of. But of course the Expectations "in fact 
only mask further the problem of the repressed plots" (p. 117). 
The relation between the official and the repressed plots is perhaps 
best illustrated by the relation between the official, public events of 
Pip's life and both the continual return of "the convict material" and 
the repetitive features of Pip's experience in Satis House. After Pip is 
"bound" as an apprentice to Joe, the plot is all but suspended as the 
narrative recounts what Brooks calls a "purely iterative existence" in 
which the romance of life appears to be shut out. After the announce­
ment of the expectations, Pip thinks that he need only wait for the 
next turn of the plot that is now happily controlling his life. Yet for 
the reader neither binding is sufficient to contain the energy dis­
charged by the initial graveyard scene and the initial visits to Satis 
House. Moreover, the reappearance of the convict's leg-iron, and of 
Joe's file, as well as the "compulsive reproductive repetition that char­
acterizes every detail of Satis House" (p. 123), including the trips by 
Pip and Miss Havisham around the bridal cake, signal the important 
presence of the repressed plots. 
The middle of the narrative is, according to Brooks, "notably char­
acterized by the return," specifically Pip's returns from London to his 
hometown, ostensibly to see and make reparation to Joe Gargery, and 
perhaps to find out something of Miss Havisham's intentions for him, 
but deflected always to a reminder of the nightmare of Satis House 
and his association with the convict. "Each return suggests that Pip's 
official plots, which seem to speak of progress, ascent, and the satis­
faction of desire, are in fact subject to a process of repetition of the 
yet unmastered past, the true determinant of his life's direction" 
(p. 125). 
Pip comes face to face with this determinant in the novel's recog­
nition scene, which Brooks sees operating "for Pip as a painful forc­
ing through of layers of repression, an analogue of analytic work, 
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compelling Pip to recognize that what he calls 'that chance encounter 
of long ago' is no chance, and cannot be assigned to the buried past 
but must be repeated, reenacted, worked through in the present" 
(p. 128). Pip's "education and training in gentility turn out to be 
merely an agency in the repression of the determinative convict plot. 
Likewise, the daydream/fairy tale of Satis House stands revealed as 
a repression, or perhaps a 'secondary revision' of the nightmare" 
(p. 130). The "return of the repressed shows that the story Pip would 
tell about himself has all along been undermined and rewritten by the 
more complex history of unconscious desire, unavailable to the con­
scious subject but at work in the text. Pip has in fact misread the plot 
of his life" (p. 130). 
The resolution of the plot for Pip occurs after he comes to accept 
Magwitch, which also means accepting his past as both "determina­
tive and past/' Once Pip is able, through the repetitions of the aborted 
escape, to work through the material from his past, he is in effect able 
to escape from plot. In this respect, Dickens's original ending to the 
narrative is superior to the amended ending in which Pip's reunion 
with Estella may undercut the extent of his escape. Brooks offers the 
following summary of his conclusions: 
Great Expectations is exemplary in demonstrating both the need for 
plot and its status as deviance, both the need for narration and the 
necessity to be cured from it. The deviance and error of plot may 
necessarily result from the the interplay of desire in its history with 
the narrative insistence on explanatory form: the desire to wrest 
beginnings and ends from the uninterrupted flow of middles, from 
temporality itself; the search for that significant closure that would 
illuminate the sense of an existence, the meaning of life. The desire 
for meaning is ultimately the reader's who must mime Pip's acts of 
reading but do them better. Both using and subverting the systems 
of meaning discovered or postulated by its hero, Great Expectations 
exposes for its reader the very reading process itself: the way the 
reader goes about finding meaning in the narrative text, and the 
limits of that meaning as the limits of narrative. (P. 140) 
As even this somewhat truncated summary of Brooks's reading in­
dicates, he is an impressive reader, one who uses his model with ap­
propriate flexibility to produce an interpretation that is in many ways 
both compelling and original. My quarrel is less with the particulars 
of that reading than with its adequacy as an account of the experien­
tial dynamics of Great Expectations. Brooks's theoretical conflation of 
plot structure and the reader's experience has its corresponding prac­
tical conflation here. The affective component of reading for the plot 
is nowhere present in Brooks's analysis. The reader's activity is exclu­
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sively cognitive: "The desire for meaning is ultimately the reader's 
who must mime Pip's acts of reading but do them better." Brook's 
reading in effect collapses the question of the experiential dynamics 
of the narrative with the question of how Pip's narrative can itself be 
seen as about plot. If one wants to know an answer to this second 
question, then Brooks is the man to see, but if one wants to know the 
answer to the first question, one better look somewhere else. In short, 
Brooks's conflation of the question of experiential dynamics with a 
question about a theme in motion fails to do justice to the complexity 
of the response built into Dickens's narrative. I shall now try to sub­
stantiate these brave words by offering a contrasting analysis of the 
progression. In order to build the contrast with Brooks's reading, I 
shall focus first on material he does discuss—the opening chap-
ters—and then on material he does not discuss—the functions of 
Wemmick. Considering Wemmick will also add to the general move­
ment of this part of the book, because he is a good example of how a 
character with a foregrounded synthetic component can affect both 
the mimetic and thematic levels of our reading. 
IV 
If we are not asking how Great Expectations is itself about plot, then 
we will respond more directly to the literal level of the opening para­
graphs, and thus can recuperate some of Brooks's shrewd, specific 
insights. Rather than noting that these paragraphs characterize Pip as 
an existence without a plot, we note instead that they establish a spe­
cific instability that becomes the generating moment for the whole 
narrative. With Pip's description of his "first fancies" about his par­
ents on the basis of the shapes of the letters on their tombstones, the 
narrative introduces the important idea that at this stage Pip is not 
the best reader of signs.7 Thus, later when Pip concludes that Miss 
Havisham is the agent behind his Expectations, we have cause to rec­
ognize that the tension of unequal knowledge between Dickens and 
the authorial audience is nevertheless maintained. More germane to 
the opening itself, the way in which Pip is wrong—imagining ap­
pearances from the shapes of the letters on tombstones—emphasizes 
the force of the initial instability, as it emphasizes his distance from 
and ignorance of his parents. 
In the passage recounting his "first most vivid and broad impres­
sion of the identity of things," Pip tells us, as Brooks points out, how 
in effect he has become certain of his own difference from and alone­
ness among everything else. He concludes his litany of what he 
knows ("this was the churchyard, there were the graves of my dead 
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parents and brothers, that was the marshes, that over there was the 
river, and beyond that was the sea") with his conclusions that "the 
small bundle of shivers growing afraid of it all and beginning to cry, 
was Pip." Because Pip's acquisition of self-consciousness is accompa­
nied by his fear and grief, the narrative identifies the initial instability 
as one involving Pip's own identity and place in the world. In this 
respect, the omission of Pip's situation as the adopted son of Joe and 
Mrs. Joe is significant: that situation is less a part of his identity than 
his awareness of himself as orphan. Furthermore, the information of 
the first paragraph—Pip's account of how he got his name—now 
functions to emphasize his aloneness: he has not only lost his parents 
and brothers but also the name he shared with them.8 The narrative, 
then, gets its initial movement from the problem of whether and how 
this orphan will achieve an identity that will enable him to overcome 
his fear and anxiety. This question gets modified in different ways as 
the narrative progresses (when Pip the narrator speaks from the time 
of narration we worry less about whether and more about how) and 
redefines and resituates Pip's fear and anxiety, but it remains a signifi­
cant issue until the very end of the narrative. 
Again if we are not asking about how Dickens's novel is itself about 
plot, but rather what its temporal dynamics are, then we will rede­
scribe Brooks's four plot lines in the opening chapters as three, be­
cause there are three distinguishable tracks along which the instabili­
ties operate, all three of which are related to the initial instability of 
Pip's anxiety about identity. These three are what we might call the 
convict plot, the home plot, and the Satis House plot. In addition, the 
initiating moments of the convict plot and the Satis House plot estab­
lish some significant tensions that suggest an expansion of the scope 
of the narrative beyond Pip's struggle; the early moments of the con­
vict plot establish a tension about the relationship between Pip's 
convict and his hated counterpart, and the introduction of Miss 
Havisham immediately introduces a tension about her past as well as 
about the presence of Estella in her house. Although the resolutions 
of these tensions, like the development of the instabilities along three 
different tracks, does place Pip's story in a much broader thematic 
context, those resolutions are more striking for the way in which 
Dickens skillfully links them to the pattern of instabilities surround­
ing Pip. But that is getting ahead of our ourselves. 
As we move into the middle of the narrative we see that the chief 
(though by no means only) source of the complication of the instabili­
ties is Pip's resistance to the identity offered by his home: he can be 
an honest blacksmith like Joe. At the same time, we recognize that 
the way in which Dickens has intertwined the plots makes Pip's ac­
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ceptance of that identity virtually impossible. He begins with the con­
vict plot, immediately interlaces it with the home plot, and then 
further entwines them both with the Satis House plot, first covertly, 
then overtly. More specifically, Pip's association with the convict not 
only complicates his life with Mrs. Joe by making him steal from her, 
but for him it also increases his tendency to internalize her treatment 
of him as "naterally wicious." With this sense of his identity firmly 
established by the time he goes to Satis House, he is of course easily 
stung by being regarded as "common" and his desire to escape the 
scenes of his identity as criminal is understandably strong. At the 
same time, however, the home plot shows us that another side of his 
identity, the one that develops in his relationship with Joe, has made 
him unfit for the role he tries to play when the Expectations arrive. 
He goes on miserably caught between these two sides of his identity 
until Magwitch makes himself known, a resolution of a tension that 
sets in motion a major shift in the development of the instabilities. In 
short, Magwitch's return sets in motion a chain of events in which Pip 
works through his anxiety and fear about his identity by working 
back through the instabilities of the now fully interconnected plots 
and coming finally to accept and appreciate first Magwitch, then Joe, 
and finally himself. 
In the course of these events the main tensions of the Satis House 
plot and the convict plot are also resolved in a way that signals the 
success of Pip's working through. Magwitch gives Pip part of the 
story about Compeyson, Herbert gives him part of the story about 
Miss Havisham, and he—and the authorial audience—learn of the 
connection between Miss Havisham and Magwitch through Compey­
son. Jaggers and Wemmick give Pip part of the story about Molly, he 
makes the connection between Molly and Estella, Magwitch tells Her­
bert about the woman in his past, and Pip puts all the pieces together, 
even going so far as to startle Jaggers with his conclusions. When Pip 
is able to tell Magwitch on his deathbed that his daughter is alive and 
that he, Pip, loves her, the working through is essentially complete. 
It then remains for Pip to reestablish his relation with home first, 
through his reunion with Joe in London when Joe comes to nurse him 
through his illness and then through his being appropriately chas­
tened for his dream of marrying Biddy by arriving home on the day 
of her wedding to Joe. 
This sketch of the progression overlaps to some extent with Brooks's 
account of the plot but from this overlap our analyses move in two 
different directions—his toward the way in which the narrative is it­
self about plot, mine toward the affective structure of the progres­
sion, including the way it defines the relations among the mimetic, 
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thematic, and synthetic components of character.9 Let us return then 
to the first chapter. 
Even as the first chapter identifies the initial major instability of 
the narrative and sets in motion the convict plot, it also induces the 
authorial audience to adopt a set of attitudes that are crucial to our 
experience of the whole narrative. Dickens handles the style of the 
first-person narration to convey Pip's discovery of his own misery 
with a combination of wit and matter-of-factness that results in our 
responding to the discovery with full and deep sympathy rather than 
seeing in it a sign of Pip the narrator's own unattractive self-pity. In 
fact, the humor of Pip's misreading of his parents' tombstones and of 
the "five little stone lozenges" (p. 1) marking the resting places of his 
brothers all but deflects our overt attention from Pip's situation as an 
orphan. As we have already seen, when Pip declares his own discov­
ery of self-consciousness, it comes both matter-of-factly and wittily at 
the end of a series of discoveries (this place was the churchyard, etc. 
down to "the small bundle of shivers growing afraid of it all and be­
ginning to cry, was Pip" [p.2]). With this arrangement and the shift 
to the third person, we register the narrator's own distance from the 
scene and so give our sympathy without reservation. Because Dick­
ens establishes this initial sympathy at the time he establishes the 
initial instability, he has almost irrevocably established the authorial 
audience's positive attitude toward Pip. He then takes advantage of 
this firm foundation of sympathy later in the narrative when he 
shows how egregiously Pip wrongs Joe. At these points our founda­
tional sympathy—as well as Dickens's recourse to letting the mature 
Pip comment on his former self—moves us to be pained not just for 
Joe but also—and perhaps even more—for Pip. The importance of 
this element of the dynamics will become clearer when I turn to dis­
cuss the functions of Wemmick; for now I want to emphasize that 
initially at least this pattern of judgments is developed in a context 
where the mimetic function of Pip is given more emphasis than any 
other. Indeed, the very presence of so many psychoanalytic readings 
of Pip's character is itself a sign of the strong mimetic signals being 
sent by the text.10 
Following hard upon the initial instability, the arrival of the convict 
(whom Pip describes as a man "in coarse grey, with a great iron on 
his leg") plays a crucial role in the development of Pip's identity-
Through Dickens's alternation between Pip on the marshes with the 
convict and Pip at home with Joe and Mrs. Joe in the first four chap­
ters, he establishes the interpenetration of the convict plot with the 
home plot. Forced to act to aid the convict, and being told in countless 
ways by Mrs. Joe that he was no better than a convict, Pip identifies 
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very deeply with him, an identification that propels much of his be­
havior in the novel until the very end. At the same time, Dickens shows 
us that Pip also identifies with Joe, though not nearly as deeply. In­
deed, the way the convict plot intertwines with Mrs. Joe's reminders 
of Pip's "nateral wiciousness" itself hinders the full identification: Pip 
thinks of Joe as an innocent child, himself as a wicked offender. Yet 
again Dickens's narrative technique complicates the audience's under­
standing of Pip's identification with the convict. In the second part of 
Chapter 1, Dickens restricts us to Pip's vision at the time of the action, 
and the overt comments focus, as we might expect given what we've 
just read about Pip's anxiety, on his growing terror. Yet what comes 
through the vision is Pip's intuitive sense of the convict's own misery: 
A fearful man, all in coarse grey, with a great iron on his leg. A 
man with no hat, and with broken shoes, and with an old rag tied 
round his head. A man who had been soaked in water, and smoth­
ered in mud, and lamed by stones, and cut by flints, and stung by 
nettles, and torn by briars; who limped, and shivered, and glared, 
and growled; and whose teeth chattered in his head as he seized 
me by the chin. (P. 2) 
At the same time, he hugged his shivering body in both his arms— 
clasping himself, as if to hold himself together—and limped to­
wards the low church wall. As I saw him go, picking his way 
among the nettles, and among the brambles that bound the green 
mounds, he looked in my young eyes as if he were eluding the 
hands of the dead people, stretching up cautiously out of their 
graves, to get a twist upon his ankle and pull him in. (P.4) 
First and most obviously, such passages (there are similar ones in 
Chapter 3) generate our own sympathy for Magwitch, and thus give 
us a vision of him that is considerably softer than Pip's conscious one, 
a vision later confirmed and expanded on by his "confession" of hav­
ing stolen from the blacksmith's. Second, these passages lead us to 
recognize a subtler motive in Pip's own desire to carry out his promise 
to the convict: not only will he do it to avoid the terrible young man 
but also to give the convict some relief. This subtler motive becomes 
more obvious in Pip's extra effort to take along the pork pie that his 
sister had tucked away in the corner of the pantry. Despite his em­
phasizing that "I had no time for verification, no time for selection, 
no time for anything" (p. 13), he takes extra time for the pie. "I was 
nearly going away without the pie, but I was tempted to mount upon 
a shelf, to look what it was that was put away so carefully in a covered 
earthenware dish in the corner, and I found it was the pie, and I took 
it" (p. 13). 
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The motive is further reinforced as it is essentially echoed in Joe's 
response to the convict's apology for having eaten the pie, which in 
turn reminds us of the essential similarity of Pip and Joe: "We don't 
know what you have done, but we wouldn't have you starved to 
death for it, poor miserable fellow-creatur.—Would us, Pip?" The 
force of all these effects is of course felt later in the narrative when 
Dickens returns to the convict plot and Magwitch is revealed to be 
Pip's benefactor. Pip's initial revulsion at that point seems not only 
unjust to Magwitch, but also untrue to his own earlier self, and thus 
a further sign of how his expectations have hindered rather than 
helped him. 
But even at this early juncture of the narrative, the effects have 
their force. Although Pip feels that his behavior justifies his sister's 
many references to him as guilty and deserving of punishment,11 pas­
sages such as these enable us to recognize both the strength of Pip's 
feelings and the great error he is making—in this sense we have a 
much broader view of Pip than he does of himself. As we see Pip 
moving further and further away from Joe, a movement that begins 
in this opening section and gets accelerated once the Satis House plot 
begins, we also see him moving further and further away from the 
best and truest part of his own developing identity. 
But of course that is not all that is accomplished by these opening 
chapters. More than anything else, they establish the depth and 
strength of Pip's identification with the convict and thus his convic­
tion of his own guilt. In recognizing the strength of his feelings, we 
also recognize the important beginnings of what I might call the psy­
choanalytical side of the narrative: the set of associations that is set 
up here between Pip and Magwitch as father and son; the cluster of 
devices of setting—the wet, cold, misty weather in the early evening— 
that always recalls by association this first meeting, and Pip's subse­
quent guilt, e.g., when he first learns of his sister's being injured, and 
when Magwitch himself makes his return.12 Pip's identity, we feel, is 
not of his own making. When that identity is further confused by his 
visits to Satis House, we see him more and more in the grip of forces 
beyond his control. This background then enables Dickens to develop 
the home plot in such a way that Pip continually seeks to deny that 
home, even as he is never able to kill entirely his attachment to it. 
And as Dickens undertakes that development, he takes Pip to a very 
low point in that plot without seriously threatening our fundamental 
sympathy with the character. 
Now while all that is going on in the mimetic sphere, the progres­
sion is creating multiple developments in the thematic sphere. Al­
though the narrative itself is complicated with many more turns than 
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Pride and Prejudice, the principles governing thematization are essen­
tially the same in the two works: we have multiple characters with 
multiple attributes, many of which are converted by the turns of the 
progression into thematic functions, without there being a single 
dominant function acting as the central point of the progression. We 
can nevertheless identify an especially significant group developed 
from the actions of the main characters: both Magwitch and Miss 
Havisham function in part to exemplify the dangers of making others 
conform to our own images of what they should be; Joe functions as 
the exemplification of simple, honest dignity, while Estella exempli­
fies the absence of feeling. Pip, like Elizabeth Bennet, has multiple 
thematic functions. His responses to his expectations exemplify the 
consequences of a false pride. His responses to Estella offer a picture 
of irrational love. His susceptibility to the convict, Mrs. Joe, and Satis 
House all exemplify the difficulty of forging a strong identity in the 
world of this novel. This list is neither exhaustive nor impressive for 
the subtlety of its inferences about thematic functions. But lack of 
subtlety in the thematic sphere is, I think, a characteristic feature of 
Dickens's work. It is in the ingenious working out of those thematic 
elements in both the mimetic and synthetic spheres that his strength 
and distinctiveness are to be found. 
Indeed, we are often led to pay attention to the thematic sphere of 
his works not only by the turns of the progression but also by his 
occasional foregrounding of the synthetic sphere. As a result, the 
reading of a Dickens novel typically involves a more fluid movement 
by the authorial audience among the spheres of meaning than occurs 
in the reading of a narrative by, say, Austen or James where the syn­
thetic remains covert. One of the features of Great Expectations that 
contributes to this fluidity of movement—and to the ingenious work­
ing out of thematic material—is Dickens's handling of Wemmick. 
After even a quick consideration of Wemmick's function in the narra­
tive, we ought not be surprised that Brooks does not discuss his char­
acter at any length. Not only does Wemmick not fit into the pattern 
of repetition and return that Brooks identifies as the central part of 
the narrative's middle, but he also plays no main role in the working 
out of the resolution. If he were not in the novel, Dickens would have 
to find another means to accomplish such tasks as informing Pip 
about the best time to make his escape, but I daresay that none of us 
would feel that there was a big hole in the narrative, that Dickens just 
ought to have invented a virtually schizophrenic character whose life 
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was as sharply divided between home and office as Wemmick's. Our 
first question then is whether Wemmick actually makes a contribu­
tion to the progression that is consonant with the attention that the 
narrative gives to his character, and if so, what precisely the nature 
of that contribution is. Our second question will be about the relation 
of the components of his character and the influence of that relation 
on the progression as a whole. 
I shall begin with the relation between Wemmick's peculiar mi­
metic status and the variety of synthetic functions that he performs 
in the novel. Wemmick is a character with multiple mimetic dimen­
sions and a doubtful mimetic function. This mid-fortyish man has 
two distinct personalities—Walworth Wemmick and Little Britain 
Wemmick. The first is a gentle, caring, sensitive soul who takes de­
voted and patient care of his Aged Parent and who dotes on Miss 
Skiff ins. He also exercises his imagination, as we see in the way he 
has done up Walworth like a fort. The fort motif is of course symbolic: 
his private self is hidden behind that fort—so much so in fact that 
even when he ventures outside of it in his private mode he hides his 
intentions, as we see in the appearance of serendipity he tries to put 
upon his marriage to Miss Skiffins. As a rule, once Wemmick moves 
to the Little Britain side of the "moat," his character gradually hard­
ens until he becomes the man with a mouth like the slit in a post office 
box, and with dints instead of dimples in his chin. His values un­
dergo a corresponding change: he is almost as hard as Jaggers himself 
and his raison d'etre becomes the acquisition of portable property.13 
In the Wemmick of Little Britain, Dickens gives us a character who 
is part of the convict plot, and he takes advantage of the character's 
mimetic dimensions to accomplish certain synthetic functions. Wem­
mick shows Pip the importance of portable property in their tour 
through Newgate and at other times keeps Pip in contact with the 
"soiling consciousness" of his own identification with the convict, a 
contact that encourages his repression of the connection between Es­
tella and Molly until after he has worked through his own relation to 
Magwitch, and that also contributes to his neglect of Joe.14 In Wal­
worth Wemmick, Dickens gives us a character who invites reflection 
on the instabilities of the home plot. Wemmick performs the synthetic 
function there of providing a contrast between his treatment of his 
Aged P. and Pip's treatment of Joe. To that extent, the synthetic func­
tion reinforces the authorial audience's and the mature Pip's own 
judgments about Pip's treatment of Joe. 
Yet the predominant effect of Wemmick's presence on the affective 
structure of the text is quite different from the function of either the 
Little Britain or the Walworth Wemmick alone. The very facts that 
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foreground Wemmick's synthetic component—the sharp division and 
exaggeration of his two sides—give him a thematic function that in 
turn has consequences for our response to the mimetic function of 
Pip. Wemmick's extreme self-division exemplifies the difficulty of liv­
ing satisfactorily in two different spheres, among two very different 
sets of people. Consequently, Wemmick's very presence in the novel 
works to generalize Pip's difficulty in honoring his own lower-class 
background as he embarks upon his expectations. The problems we 
see Pip face are not just ones of his own reactions but ones endemic 
to living in a society where social mobility is becoming more common 
and where the separation between public and private spheres is be­
coming more and more pronounced. At the same time, Wemmick's 
situation indicates one kind of solution to that difficulty. Although 
Wemmick is more succesful than Pip in living in both spheres, the 
very division of his personality indicates that his solution is less than 
ideal. Despite the charm of the Walworth Wemmick, Dickens's point 
is clear: Pip needs to work through to an integration of his different 
spheres that Wemmick never attains. 
In these ways, then, Dickens uses Wemmick to complicate our 
judgments about the instabilities of the home plot, especially Pip's 
relation to Joe. Even as the mature Pip is appropriately severe in his 
judgments of his earlier self's treatment of Joe, Dickens's elaboration 
of Wemmick's character puts his behavior in a broader context, which 
allows a greater understanding of Pip's problem and a softer judg­
ment of his failures to solve it until so late in the narrative. Dickens 
also uses Wemmick to complicate our judgments in the convict plot, 
which of course is tightly wound together with the other plots in 
the latter stages of the narrative. Wemmick's self-division functions to 
deepen our sense of what it is that Pip must overcome as he slowly 
comes to accept Magwitch. If Wemmick shuts out his private self from 
his public life, if Pip experiences a difficulty acknowledging Joe once 
he comes into his expectations, then how much more difficult is his 
task of acknowledging and accepting the fact that the source of those 
expectations is the convict. Consequently, Wemmick's presence sub­
stantially increases our sense of what Pip eventually achieves in 
working through to that acceptance. Thus, despite being "compart­
mentalized" in both Little Britain and Walworth, Wemmick functions 
to influence significantly the authorial audience's responses to the 
main narrative line. At the same time, the way in which his fore­
grounded synthetic component leads to an emphasis on his thematic 
function, which in turn influences our response to the mimetic 
sphere of Pip's story, illustrates my earlier claim about the fluidity of 
movement among the three spheres of meaning in Dickens. When 
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Pip and Wemmick interact, the authorial audience has an overt 
awareness of all three components of their characters. In one sense, 
this simultaneous overt awareness makes Great Expectations less 
strictly realistic than, say, "The Beast in the Jungle/' but it does not 
lead either to a rejection or even a subordination of the mimetic level 
of reading. 
There is more to the story of Dickens's handling of Wemmick, but 
it is worth pausing here to reflect on the nature of the claims just 
made. In effect, I am arguing that Wemmick functions the way Char­
lotte Lucas does in Pride and Prejudice, only on a larger scale. Just as 
Charlotte's marriage to Collins influences the authorial audience's 
affective response to (and thematic understanding of) Elizabeth's re­
jection of Darcy's first proposal, so too does Wemmick's presence 
influence the authorial audience's affective response to and thematic 
understanding of many of Pip's actions. The question the analysis 
raises is one of limits: if the connection between the main and the 
secondary characters is to be found in the thematic sphere, can't one 
always find a thematic connection—if only by making a thematic leap 
of the kind that Levin has justly criticized? 
The answer is that the thematic connection is not itself sufficient to 
justify the relevance or explain the contribution of the secondary 
character. (If it were, all narratives could be elaborated endlessly.) The 
connection in the thematic sphere needs to be tied not only to an 
affective result but also to the specific narrative means for achieving 
that effect. In Pride and Prejudice, Austen largely restricts herself to 
Elizabeth's point of view and commits herself to a mode of presenta­
tion that limits her own role as commentator and thus leaves much to 
her readers' inferences. By rendering Charlotte's decision within this 
largely dramatic mode of presentation, Austen gives the thematic 
point a force that would be impossible through the narrator's overt 
commentary on the pressures of the marriage market. In Great Expec­
tations, Dickens's use of Wemmick works wonderfully well with his 
decision to have the mature Pip tell his own story. Dickens can then 
guide his audience's judgment by having Pip judge his treatment of 
Joe in the harshest possible terms, while also directing that audience 
to see the difficulty of Pip's position in relation to both Joe and Mag-
witch through the presentation of Wemmick. In that sense, Dickens's 
handling of Wemmick can be seen as the consequence of his decision 
to write the novel as a retrospective first-person account. 
Another aspect of this same general point concerns some of the 
specific actions that Pip performs in his association with Wemmick. 
When Pip stays with the Aged P. and not only takes care of him but 
enjoys taking care of him, we see that side of his own character that 
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has only intermittently appeared since the bestowal of his expecta­
tions. Because we see Pip still able to act from the better side of his 
character, that side associated with Joe, we remain sympathetic to 
him and indeed strengthen our desires that he will correctly resolve 
the instabilities about his own identity, especially as these relate to 
Joe and Magwitch. Dickens's treatment of Wemmick is, in short, very 
well integrated with the progression of the whole narrative. 
Consider, by contrast, Dickens's handling of Pip's visits to Matthew 
Pocket's household. This material, which emphasizes the way in 
which the Pocket children "were not growing up or being brought 
up, but were tumbling up" (p. 178), can be seen as thematically re­
lated to Pip's own experience of being brought up by hand. Signifi­
cantly, however, that thematic connection is not sufficient to give it 
any significant role in the progression. As far as I can see, it does not 
materially alter our understanding or judgment of Pip or his actions. 
It does indicate some of the difficulties and ironies of his situation— 
with his great expectations comes this environment—and it does in­
crease Pip's desire to help Herbert, but the extended focus on the 
family is much less a functioning part of the progression than the 
material on Wemmick, if in fact it is not altogether extraneous. Dick-
ens's depiction of the Pocket family is funny in the way that Dickens 
is often funny, but the humor lacks the punch accompanying his de­
piction of Wemmick because the depiction itself is finally digressive. 
Let us return then to Wemmick and Dickens's development of his 
mimetic dimensions into a function or at least a quasi-function. In 
effect, what Dickens does here is elaborate a mini-plot about Wem­
mick, one based on the tensions about the relations between his two 
selves, and complicated by the resolution of that tension in such a 
way that we can posit him as having at least a quasi-mimetic function, 
which makes possible a kind of satisfaction for the authorial audience 
in the last event of this mini-plot, his so odd ("Halloa! Here's a 
church!" "Halloa! Here's Miss Skiffins!" Halloa! Here's a ring!") but so 
characteristic wedding. For a time our awareness of Wemmick's syn­
thetic function is heightened by our uncertainty about how aware 
Wemmick himself is of the difference between the two sides of his 
personality. Then, after he refers to the difference, we remain unsure 
whether one side or the other is in effect the "real" Wemmick. This 
question does not get resolved until after Pip himself has come to 
accept Magwitch, has worked out the solution to the mystery of Es-
tella's parentage, and desires confirmation from Jaggers at his office 
in Little Britain. When Jaggers initially tries to put him off, Pip suc­
cessfully appeals to the Walworth Wemmick, and thus we know for 
certain that it is that side of his personality that is the real Wemmick: 
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the Little Britain twin is a creation of the Walworth character, a cre­
ation that has become a second nature, but a creation nonetheless. It 
is striking, I think, that it is only after this event that Dickens shows 
us Wemmick's marriage to Miss Skiffins, as if this alteration in Wem-
mick's situation could not occur until the question of the relation be­
tween the two sides of his character were settled. 
At this point in the progression, the effects of Wemmick upon Pip's 
story that I described above have already occurred. Wemmick's mar­
riage adds one small additional effect, even as it predominantly 
makes a different contribution to the whole. As the Walworth Wem­
mick functions to offer an alternative reading of the home plot, his 
marriage to Miss Skiffins raises questions about Pip's own eventual 
marrying. At first, the event may seem to suggest that Pip ought to 
marry Biddy. But a little reflection shows that Wemmick's marriage is 
working by contrast. Wemmick has a claim, while Pip has none. More 
importantly, however, the marriage itself adds another positive note 
to the ending of the book. It occurs right after Magwitch's trial and 
right before his death. We take a kind of pleasure in Wemmick's mar­
riage that carries over and lightens the potentially dolorous emotions 
associated with Magwitch's death. This chain of effects could not have 
been possible without Dickens's gradual movement of Wemmick to­
ward the mimetic. Again, Dickens proves to be a master of using the 
secondary characters to influence the affective structure of the pro­
gression, even as that use depends on the rather fluid movement 
among spheres of meaning. 
Wemmick's marriage to Miss Skiffins also, I think, has the effect of 
making Dickens's revised ending, in which Pip sees no shadow of a 
further parting from Estella, less problematic. There is certainly no 
necessity for such an ending: the major instabilities of the narrative 
are resolved—Pip has worked through the issues of his identity, his 
relation to his own home, to his expectations, and to his past—in 
both the first and the second endings. Furthermore, unlike the situa­
tion in The French Lieutenant's Woman, the completeness of this narra­
tive does not require two closures. To have closure Dickens does need 
to bring Pip into contact with Estella one last time, but since com­
pleteness has already been achieved, he has some latitude in choos­
ing the outcome of the final meeting. In any representation, he must 
show that Estella is as altered as Pip or else Pip's feelings for her won't 
be in keeping with his present state; that stricture in turn means that 
any indication of their facing the future together must itself be muted, 
accompanied as it will be by their mutual knowledge of the unhappy 
past. Thus, regardless of the details of the closure, its emotional qual­
ity is already determined by the progression to this point. The ending 
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can be hopeful, indeed, it should be hopeful, but it cannot signal a 
fulfillment: too much painful education has preceded it; to make the 
ending triumphant would be to deny the validity of the middle. 
Within those limitations, Dickens can choose to unite Pip and Estella 
or to have them meet and pass on.15 
My own preference is for the original ending because I prefer 
the idea of Pip living independently now that he has achieved his 
peace with himself and his acceptance of who he is. Nevertheless, 
Wemmick's recent marriage is a reminder that the narrative has been 
concerned from the very beginning with questions of identity as they 
relate to family and, to some extent, to marriage. Consequently, the 
impulse to see Pip with his newly forged identity end, like Herbert 
and like his older allies Wemmick and Joe at slightly earlier stages, in 
a relationship that will lead to marriage and family is rather strong. It 
is that impulse that Wemmick's marriage strengthens and that Dick-
ens's revised ending is responding to. 
VI 
A final note about the relation between Brooks's model and my own. 
In emphasizing the differences between the two models, I have shied 
away from any claim that the trouble with Brooks's model is its com­
mitment to psychoanalysis. I locate that trouble rather in Brooks's lim­
ited conception of the nature of the narrative text, a limit that stems 
more from the heritage of the New Criticism (reading for the plot 
must be reading the structure of the plot) and the whole Anglo-
American critical habit of equating interpretation with thematizing. 
One consequence of this approach to Brooks is that he—or more 
likely another theorist committed to psychoanalysis—could come 
along and recast my whole rhetorical approach to progression in a 
psychoanalytical frame. That is, such a theorist could situate my in­
terests in the sequential and affective structure of narrative in a 
psychoanalytical framework, one that would among other things psy­
choanalyze the responses of the authorial audience. I would have no 
great objection to such a procedure provided that no strong claims 
were being made about that recasting being a superior (rather than an 
alternative) form of explanation. 
The reason I would object to any claim for superiority is connected 
to the one way in which I would fault Brooks for his turn to psycho­
analysis. Such a move presupposes that to explain the surface struc­
ture of texts, to explain the experience of reading, we need to move 
away from that surface and propose a model of its deep structure. 
The trouble with that assumption is that it immediately causes one to 
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work at some distance from the details of texts, as one tries to find a 
model that will be applicable to all texts. In Brooks's case, we see him 
going to psychoanalysis, which gives him the concept of the death 
instinct, which in turn gives him the idea of the dominance of end­
ings, which in turn causes him to underrate the importance of begin­
nings and middles. 
The moral I draw at this point is that we need to do more work 
with the details of the surface structures before we are ready to con­
sider different models of deep structures. My concept of progression 
commits its user to very little in the way of conclusions about the 
nature of any narrative to be read and interpreted. Instead, it seeks to 
posit categories and principles of analysis that correspond to the ex­
perience of reading, categories and principles that are specific enough 
to lead to detailed insights into individual narratives but flexible 
enough to be useful across the wide variety of surface structures that 
narratives offer us. As an additional test of my categories and princi­
ples, I turn in the next chapter to take an extended look at a self-
reflexive, metafictional text in which the synthetic component of the 
protagonist is foregrounded throughout the whole narrative: Italo 
Calvino's If on a winter's night a traveler. 
Foregrounding the Synthetic: 
Calvino's "Reader" and the 
Audiences of Narrative 
The previous analyses of both The French Lieutenant's Woman and 
Great Expectations have given some indications of the effects created 
when the mimetic illusion is broken and the authorial audience's 
usual covert awareness that character is an artificial construct be­
comes overt. In those narratives, however, the synthetic foreground­
ing of character is only an occasional feature of the text, and one not 
much applied to the protagonist. What happens when the synthetic 
component of the protagonist's character becomes the dominant one? 
Italo Calvino's If on a winter's night a traveler raises this question with 
a kind of playful vengeance, as its foregrounding of the synthetic leads 
Calvino's audience to a wonderfully complicated self-consciousness 
about its own reading activity. Indeed, in a sense, Calvino's narrative 
also functions as a critical text: by inducing so much reflexiveness into 
the activity of its own reading, it investigates—or better, puts under 
a metafictional microscope—the concepts of character, progression, 
and audience. Thus, even as If on a winter's night a traveler presents a 
new and challenging example of a narrative where the synthetic com­
ponent is dominant, its reflexiveness requires a more comprehensive 
view of the concept of audience than we have yet developed. Fur­
thermore, it can initially be seen to challenge the conclusions of the 
last chapter about the importance of the affective structure of the nar­
rative text and about the connection between that affective structure 
and the mimetic component of character. In short, Calvino's narrative 
will require me both to extend my account of the relation between 
character and progression and to reflect upon—and revise—some of 
the theoretical foundations and conclusions of the study so far. 
The main issue of the whole narrative is rather disarmingly raised 
in its first sentence: "You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino's 
new novel, If on a winter's night a traveler."l The issue is what it means 
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to read this narrative, and the sentence itself introduces subtle but 
significant tensions between author and authorial audience. The use 
of the second-person, the present tense, and the content of the sen­
tence suggest that it is a kind of "Before the Curtain" address to the 
flesh-and-blood reader—me and you in all our commonality and idio­
syncracy. But other elements of the sentence work against that infer­
ence. First, the use of the adjective "new" locates the address—and 
thus its audience—in time. The "you" of the sentence is not the me 
rereading this novel in 1987, or the you reading it after it is no longer 
2new.  Second, the address is actually after the curtain, part of the 
novel proper. The addressed "you" is about to begin reading the 
novel, while we are already reading it. In this way, Calvino's very first 
sentence asks the authorial audience to take its first step toward self-
reflexiveness, and that step seems to reinforce the distinction be­
tween authorial and narrative audiences. We (the authorial audience) 
are reading about a reader (whom, following our usual practice, we'll 
label the narrative audience, addressed as "you") who is about to 
begin reading a novel by the same author and with the same title as 
the one we are reading. 
Once we take that step, however, other questions arise. Is the nar­
rative audience's If on a winter's night a traveler the same as the author­
ial audience's? Is Italo Calvino the same for both audiences? The 
tensions implicit in these questions generate the initial movement of 
the narrative, as it continues with its location of "you" in a particular 
reading situation, flashes back to an account of the purchase of the 
book, begins telling the tale proper in the chapter entitled "If on a 
winter's night a traveler," and then breaks off when "you" discovers 
that the book has one sixteen-page signature repeated several times. 
This discovery, which, as we shall see, is a crucial point in the pro­
gression, leads the "you" back to the bookstore and to his initial 
meeting with the Other Reader. 
At this stage of the narrative, the initial tensions appear to be re­
solved as new ones take their place (why disrupt the narrative in this 
way?) and as new instabilities develop (will "you" and we ever hear 
the end of the story? what will happen between "you" and the Other 
Reader?). Furthermore, at first glance the resolutions of the initial ten­
sions appear to reinforce further the distinction between authorial 
and narrative audiences. The narrative audience's If on a winter's night 
a traveler is clearly different from the authorial audience's: "you" 's is 
only that repeated sixteen-page signature, ours contains the story of 
"you'"s response to that limit. By the same logic, "Calvino" is differ­
ent for each audience: he speaks to the narrative audience only in that 
sixteen-page signature, but he speaks to the authorial audience in ev­
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ery sentence of the whole book. Continuing with this logic, we can 
also see that Calvino has playfully inverted the author-narrator rela­
tionship for the narrative audience. In Chapters 1 and 2, indeed in all 
the numbered chapters, "you" is addressed by a narrator figure who 
is distinct from the Italo Calvino named in the book's first sentence 
and subsequently identified as just the author of the first titled 
chapter—or so it seems until chapter 12, when Calvino ends the nar­
rative with another twist on the author-narrator-audience relation­
ships, a twist we shall later examine in detail. 
This logic, essentially the same as that employed in the discussion 
of Chapters 13 and 55 of The French Lieutenant's Woman, helps explain 
the complicated author-narrator-audience relationships Calvino is es­
tablishing in the opening three chapters, but it does not go quite far 
enough. The logic would be adequate if Calvino had employed either 
the first or third person. "He is about to begin reading Italo Calvino's 
new novel, If on a winter's night a traveler/' (Notice that one conse­
quence of using the second person is that Calvino can include both 
sexes in his address.) "I am about to begin reading Italo Calvino's new 
novel, If on a winter's night a traveler." In each case the narrative voice 
would evoke the double audience—one implicitly addressed within 
the fiction, one implicitly addressed outside it—and each audience 
would recognize the "I" or the "He" as a character distinct from itself. 
The reading activities of the character and the audiences might coin­
cide (as in the titled chapters) but the distinction between character 
and audience would always be clear. By using the second person, 
however, Calvino makes the "you" both character and audience, a 
situation that in Chapter 2 leads to the eventual separation of "you" 
not just from the authorial but also from the narrative audience. In 
other words, by using the second person in combination with the 
present tense, Calvino in effect makes "you" the addressed party of 
the discourse without making "you" equivalent to the narrative au­
dience. If I am right about this separation, then Calvino's narrative 
strategy suggests that we need to recognize an additional possible 
audience in narrative discourse, what I will call the characterized 
audience.3 
The differences between Calvino's strategies and those of first- and 
third-person narration help explain how his addressed audience, 
"you," is not identical to the narrative audience. First- and third-
person narration presuppose a narrative audience that will be taken 
in by the narrative, "held round the fire," in James's words, by their 
insistent desire to see how the instabilities and tensions will be com­
plicated and resolved, by their desire to reach narrative's end. In Cal-
vino's narrative, there is also such an audience implied, although its 
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separation from the characterized audience is not accomplished until 
the beginning of Chapter 2. It is this audience that gets caught up in 
"you"'s double quest—as character—for the continuation of all the 
narratives he begins and for a union with the Other Reader. In this 
respect, the narrative audience is as distinct from "you" as it would 
be if the protagonist were an unnamed "I" or a "he" named, say, Jack 
Dereader. Yet the use of the second person allows Calvino to begin 
by merging the narrative and characterized audiences, to separate 
them later, and then occasionally to merge them again. I shall under­
take a detailed consideration of these strategies and their conse­
quences for character and progression in If on a winter's night a traveler 
after I explain further this concept of a characterized audience. 
Most simply, a characterized audience is created whenever a narrator, 
using direct address, ascribes attributes to his or her audience. From 
the perspective of the narrative audience, the characterized audience 
may be either real or hypothetical—that is, it may be an actual char­
acter such as Shreve McCanlin in Absalom, Absalom! or any number of 
figures in epistolary novels, or it may be a construction of the narrator 
such as the various Sirs and Madams invented by Tristram Shandy. 
The actual functions of characterized audiences are various, but as 
we might imagine, the most significant of them involve their role as a 
screen between the narrator and the narrative audience. Behind those 
screens author and authorial audience frequently engage in some 
complex kinds of communication. In cases where the characterized 
audience is "real," the possible effects are similar to those created by 
any dialogue: the narrative audience's relation to the narrator's ad­
dress will depend heavily on what it knows about and how it judges 
the addressee. When, for example, Conrad has Marlow tell the final 
part of Lord Jim's story to the one previous listener who was most 
interested, Marlow addresses him thus: 
I remember well you would not admit he had mastered his fate. 
You prophesied for him the disaster of weariness and of disgust 
with acquired honour, with the self-appointed task, with the love 
sprung from pity and youth. You had said you knew so well "that 
kind of thing," its illusory satisfaction, its unavoidable deception. 
You said also—I call to mind—that "giving your life up to them" 
(them meaning all of mankind with skins brown, yellow, or black 
in colour) was "like selling your soul to a brute." You contended 
that "that kind of thing" was only endurable and enduring when 
based on a firm conviction in the truth of ideas racially our own, in 
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whose name are established the order, the morality of an ethical 
progress. "We want its strength at our backs/' you had said. #'We 
want a belief in its necessity and its justice, to make a worthy and 
conscious sacrifice of our lives. Without it the sacrifice is only for­
getfulness, the way of offering is no better than the way to perdi­
tion." In other words, you maintained that we must fight in the 
ranks or our lives can't count. Possibly! You ought to know—be it 
said without malice—you who have rushed into one or two places 
single-handed and came out cleverly, without singeing your wings. 
The point, however, is that of all mankind Jim had no dealings but 
with himself, and the question is whether at the last he had not 
confessed to a faith mightier than the laws of order and progress.4 
Given Conrad's effort to transform the material basis of Jim's story— 
his jump from the Patna, his failure in Patusan—into a narrative that 
insists on the significance of his life despite the ambiguous meaning 
of his actions, we can see that this use of a characterized audience 
functions to foreclose some judgments of Jim that the authorial audi­
ence might otherwise make. Marlow, whom both the authorial and 
narrative audiences view as reliable, declares some of those judg­
ments to be less than pertinent: 'The point . .  . is that Jim . . . had 
no dealings but with himself.'" Furthermore, Conrad implicitly asks 
the authorial audience to reject the characterized audience's judg­
ments as too easy, based as they are on the suspect attitudes about 
the superiority of the white race that underlay British colonialism. 
During this part of Marlow's address to the characterized audience 
the screen between him and the narrative audience is very thick and 
significant; when Marlow goes on to tell him the final, events of Jim's 
life, the screen all but disappears. 
Some different effects are frequently created when the character­
ized audience is constructed by the narrator himself. Listen for a mo­
ment to a famous eighteenth-century gentleman-narrator: 
My uncle TOBY SHANDY, Madam., was a gentleman, who with 
the virtues which usually constitute the character of a man of hon­
our and rectitude,—• -possessed one in a very eminent degree, 
which is seldom or never put into the catalogue; and that was a 
most extream and unparalleled modesty of nature;—• tho' I cor­
rect the word nature for this reason, that 1 may not prejudge a 
point which must shortly come to a hearing; and that is, Whether 
this modesty of his was natural or acquir'd. ••—Which ever way 
my uncle Toby came by it, 'twas nevertheless modesty in the truest 
sense of it: and that is, Madam, not in regard to words, for he was 
so unhappy as to have very little choice in them, -—but to 
things;- —and this kind of modesty so possess'd him, and it 
arose to such a height in him, as almost to equal, if such a thing 
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could be, even the modesty of a woman: That female nicety, 
Madam, and inward cleanliness of mind and fancy, in your sex, 
which makes you so much the awe of ours.5 
Tristram's characterization of his audience here is minimal: the rele­
vant attributes of "Madam" are only her sex and its allegedly accom­
panying modesty—indeed, Tristram's discourse works in large part 
on the principle that "Modesty, thy name is woman." In the first 
part of the address (down to "modesty in the truest sense of it"), 
the screen erected between Tristram and the narrative audience by 
Sterne's use of the characterized audience is thin and transparent: the 
information is reliable and Tristram's manner of delivering it is not 
significantly altered by the presence of the characterized audience. In 
the latter part of the discourse, however, the screen becomes thicker 
and more opaque. Indeed, the narrative audience comes to recognize 
Tristram's address as part of his own narrative performance, another 
indication of those narrative abilities that, along with his foibles as 
both person and narrator, provide a major center of interest in the 
narrative. The screen in turn allows Sterne to incorporate different 
degrees of irony into his communication to the authorial audience: he 
is least ironic about Toby's modesty, more ironic about the modesty 
of women, and most ironic about the relation between the sexes. 
Now compare Tristram to the narrator of Vanity Fair: 
We say (and with perfect truth) I wish I had Miss MacWhirter's 
signature to a cheque for five thousand pounds. She wouldn't miss 
it, says your wife. She is my aunt, say you, in an easy careless way, 
when your friend asks if Miss MacWhirter is any relative? Your 
wife is perpetually sending her little testimonies of affection, your 
little girls work endless worsted baskets, cushions, and foot-stools 
for her. What a good fire there is in her room when she comes to 
pay you a visit, although your wife laces her stays without one! 
The house during her stay assumes a festive, neat, warm, jovial, 
snug appearance not visible at other seasons. You yourself, dear 
sir, forget to go to sleep after dinner, and find yourself all of a 
sudden (though you invariably lose) very fond of a rubber. What 
good dinners you have—game every day, Malmsey-Madeira, and 
no end offish from London. Even the servants in the kitchen share 
the general prosperity; and, somehow, during the stay of Miss 
MacWhirter's fat coachman, the beer is grown much stronger, and 
the consumption of tea and sugar in the nursery (where her maid 
takes her meals) is not regarded in the least. Is it so, or is it not so?6 
Here the screen between narrator and narrative audience is erected 
by the end of the second sentence and maintained throughout the 
passage. Although the characterized audience is more particularized 
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than Tristram's "Madam," the screen does not provide as much 
distance between audiences as in Tristram's discourse. Despite the 
particularization, the characterized audience is still a representative 
figure: he is a middle-class Englishman with a wife and daughters, a 
house and servants, and above all a desire to increase his worldly 
possessions. Partly because of that representativeness and partly be­
cause of the tight connection between the point of this passage and 
the narrative's central thematic message about the vanity of human 
actions, the narrative audience recognizes that the narrator intends 
them to apply the passage to themselves. At the same time, the nar­
rative audience registers the witty creation of the screen as another 
performance by the Showman of Vanity Fair. The authorial audience, 
in turn, makes the corresponding inferences about Thackeray. As a 
consequence of his performance in creating this characterized audi­
ence, Thackeray induces his authorial audience to recognize the nec­
essary application of the passage—it's not just Becky, Amelia, and 
Dobbin, I'm talking about, but you too—without having us feel di­
rectly attacked by the narrator.7 
As the analysis of these three passages indicates, isolating the char­
acterized audience for critical attention is worthwhile to the extent 
that that audience acts as a screen or buffer between the narrator and 
the narrative audience. In narratives such as "Haircut" or Lolita a 
characterized audience is coextensive with the narrative audience, 
and the buffer effect does not exist. In fact, in these works the distinc­
tion between the two audiences has no analytical payoff, except to the 
extent that it is helpful to remind ourselves that in Lardner's tale we 
need to imagine ourselves in Whitey's barber chair and in Nabokov's 
narrative in the jury box as one of the "ladies and gentlemen" Hum-
bert Humbert so impassionedly addresses. Similarly, such addresses 
as Jane Eyre's famous "Reader, I married him," or the Middlemarch 
narrator's various comments to a generalized "you" explicitly acknow­
ledge the importance of the narrator's relationship to a narrative au­
dience without creating a characterized audience of any significance. 
The concept of characterized audience can perhaps be further clari­
fied by considering its relation to Prince's notion of the narratee and 
to Rabinowitz's notion of the ideal narrative audience. Any character­
ized audience would also be a narratee in Prince's sense of the term. 
The difference between the concepts is not so much in their definition 
but in our respective understandings of the consequences of the con­
cepts. For Prince, the creation of the category of "narratee" means 
that he does not need a category analogous to narrative audience, 
whereas for me the importance of the characterized audience arises 
out of its difference from and relation to the narrative audience. Our 
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differences become clear in Prince's argument in his essay "The Nar­
ratee Revisited/'8 Prince claims that the notion of a metanarratee is 
untenable. "Just as in 'I ate a hamburger for lunch/ the character-I is 
the one who ate and the narrator-I the one telling about the eating, in 
'You ate a hamburger for lunch/ the character-you is the one who ate 
and the narratee-you the one told about the eating" (p. 301). Thus, 
just as the use of "I" allows the double function of acting and narrat­
ing, so too the use of "You" allows the double function of acting and 
receiving the narration. The example supports Prince's conclusion, 
but it is not sufficiently representative of the range of narrative com­
munication. As soon as we complicate the example, a metanarratee 
emerges: "You, who so well know the nature of your stomach, ate a 
hamburger for lunch and now must face the consequences." Because 
the "character-you" is distinct from the authorial audience, that au­
dience adopts a triple perspective: receiving the narration as if it were 
the "you" addressed (i.e., adopting the position of narratee/charac-
terized audience); receiving the narration while knowing it is not 
"you," but nevertheless participating in the illusion that "you" is real 
and therefore interested in following "character-you's" story (i.e, 
adopting the position of narrative audience); recognizing these two 
previous perspectives as part of the indirect manner of communica­
tion between the creator of "you" and itself. Or, to take a better ex­
ample: in the passage from Tristram Shandy, the effect of Sterne's 
irony depends not only on his use of a characterized audience but on 
the characterized audience's relation to two others: first, one that be­
lieves in Tristram as an autonomous narrator and sees the address to 
Madam as part of his performance; and second, one that sees both of 
those audiences as devices for a complex communication from Sterne 
as orchestrator of the whole discourse. My point, in short, is that 
what Prince calls a narrateee and I call a characterized audience will 
sometimes be distinguished from a narrative audience, and when that 
happens the narrative audience will function as a metanarratee. At 
the same time, Prince is right to resist the notion that all second-
person addresses result in the creation of a metanarratee; sometimes 
the characterized and narrative audiences will, for all intents and pur­
poses, merge. 
More generally, I think it is worth noting a key difference between 
structuralist models of audience like Prince's and rhetorical models 
like Rabinowitz's or Wayne Booth's slightly modified version of it. The 
structuralist account remains anchored to the idea that the discourse 
of the narrative will define the features of the audience, whereas the 
rhetorical approach considers the presuppositions and beliefs that 
operate for the different audiences that are always present in the ap­
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You have now read thirty pages and you're becoming caught up in 
the story. At a certain point you remark: 'This sentence sounds 
somehow familiar. In fact, this whole passage reads like something 
I've read before." Of course: there are themes that recur, the text 
is interwoven with reprises, which serve to express the fluctuation 
of time. You are the sort of reader who is sensitive to such refine­
ments; you are quick to catch the author's intentions and nothing 
escapes you. But, at the same time, you also feel a certain dismay; 
just when you were beginning to grow truly interested, at this very point 
the author feels called upon to display one of those virtuoso tricks so cus­
tomary in modern writing, repeating a paragraph word for word. Did 
you say paragraph? Why it's a whole page; you make the compari­
son, he hasn't changed even a comma. And as you continue, what 
develops? Nothing: the narration is repeated, identical to the pages 
you have read! 
Wait a minute! Look at the page number. Damn! From page 32 
you've gone back to page 17! What you thought was a stylistic sub­
tlety on the author's part is simply a printers' mistake: they have 
inserted the same pages twice. (R 25; emphasis mine) 
To appreciate the consequences of this development in the nar­
rative, it will be useful to consider the objection that positing a 
characterized audience in a second-person narrative may be counter­
intuitive, especially since the first sentence here supports that view. 
All four audiences I have posited—the flesh-and-blood, the authorial, 
the narrative, and the characterized—have been reading the chapter 
entitled "If on a winter's night a traveler." Certainly at least the last 
three of these are "becoming caught up in the story." Why then make 
the distinction? Alternatively, if we make it, how does it help us ana­
lyze what is happening in that first sentence? We need to make the 
distinction, I think, because of what happens in the rest of the pas­
sage. The characterized audience becomes a character, whose actions 
the other audiences read about: "you" compares pages, while neither 
the authorial nor narrative audiences join him. Just as Elizabeth Ben-
net does not know—as we do—that she is a character in a novel by 
Jane Austen, "you" does not know—as we now clearly do—that he 
is a character in a novel by Italo Calvino (though not necessarily the 
"new novel, If on a winter's night a traveler" referred to in the book's 
first sentence). 
The distinction is useful for even the first sentence of this passage 
because it helps us understand how Calvino guides the authorial au­
dience to reflect on the activity of its own reading. Calvino's strategy 
is to vary the thickness of the screen between the narrator and the 
narrative audience erected by the use of the characterized audience, 
and then to take advantage of the second-person narration to make 
the authorial audience reflect on the nature and significance of that 
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variation. As we move from the thin, transparent screen in the first 
sentence to the thick, opaque screen in the second paragraph, we 
pass through the clauses emphasized in my quotation: "just when 
you were beginning to grow truly interested, at this very point the 
author feels called upon to display one of those virtuoso tricks so 
customary in modern writing, repeating a paragraph word for word/' 
In these transitional clauses overtly addressed to the characterized 
audience, Calvino covertly but directly addresses the authorial audi­
ence. Just as "you" thinks he is witnessing a "virtuoso trick" on the 
part of his Calvino, the authorial audience becomes aware that it is 
witnessing such a trick on the part of our Calvino. The virtuoso trick 
is the introduction of the device of the repeated signatures, which 
alters the course of the progression by effecting the separation of the 
characterized audience from the others. The instability of the narra­
tive now has less to do with the situation of the spy whose adventures 
we were following in the titled chapter than it does with the experi­
ence of "you'"s reading. 
The corresponding tension of the narrative now centers on the re­
lationship between Calvino and the authorial audience: why has the 
author displaced our interest in the titled chapter with this interest in 
"you"'s experience of reading? Even more significant is a further ten­
sion that arises as a result of the previous sentence. There all three 
audiences are told that "You are the sort of reader who is sensitive to 
such refinements; you are quick to catch the author's intentions and 
nothing escapes you." Acting upon the implied message here, and 
attempting to catch the intention of the refinement introduced by the 
dual communication about virtuoso tricks, the authorial audience be­
gins to reflect on the complexity of its own reading about reading, 
without yet reaching any firm conclusions about that activity. At this 
point, the affective structure of the book is not being destroyed but 
rather redefined. Rather than the characters and our interest in them 
carrying our affective interest in the whole narrative, the characters 
will act as a vehicle for a more direct kind of interplay between author 
and audience: the affective component of the structure comes from 
Calvino's setting various challenges for himself to meet and for the 
audience to decipher—and reflect upon. 
The significance of this separation among audiences at the begin­
ning of Chapter 2 can be more fully appreciated by understanding the 
"retrospective patterning" it produces.12 Again it will be helpful to 
look at specific passages of narrative discourse from Chapter 1 and 
the first incipit: 
In the shop window you have promptly identified the cover 
with the title you were looking for. Following this visual trail, you 
have forced your way through the shop past the thick barricade of 
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Books You Haven't Read, which were frowning at you from the 
tables and shelves, trying to cow you. But you know you must 
never allow yourself to be awed, that among them there extend for 
acres and acres the Books You Needn't Read, the Books Made for 
Purposes Other Than Reading, Books Read Even Before You Open 
Them Since They Belong To The Category Of Books Read Before 
Being Written. And thus you pass the outer girdle of ramparts, but 
then you are attacked by the infantry of the Books That If You Had 
More Than One Life You Would Certainly Also Read But Unfortu­
nately Your Days Are Numbered. With a rapid maneuver you by­
pass them and move into the phalanxes of the Books You Mean To 
Read But There Are Others You Must Read First, the Books Too 
Expensive Now And You'll Wait Till They're Remaindered, the 
Books ditto When They Come Out In Paperback, Books You Can 
Borrow From Somebody, Books That Everybody's Read So It's As 
If You Had Read Them, Too. (Pp. 4-5) 
The great fun of this passage (which continues for another three 
paragraphs) the first time we come upon it depends upon the merg­
ing of the characterized and narrative audiences, both of which are 
also very close to the authorial audience. (In addition, we may specu­
late that each of these audiences will be close to virtually any flesh-
and-blood reader likely to pick up a book like If on a winter's night a 
traveler.) As we join the narrative audience, we are asked not just to 
witness this trip through the bookstore but to imagine ourselves hav­
ing actually taken it. Moreover, because the authorial audience is so 
close to the narrative audience here, it endorses the witty accuracy of 
this description of the trip. In general the description functions as 
part of the authorial and narrative audiences' charming introduction 
to the whole narrative. After we get to Chapter 2, however, and dis­
cover the separation of the narrative and characterized audiences, the 
passage—and indeed, the whole chapter—takes on a quite different 
import. The "you" addressed is not just the narrative audience but 
the characterized one as well, and so the authorial audience once 
again has to be conscious of how the discourse of the first chapter has 
a double application: it is being introduced not just to the situation of 
the narrative audience but also to the first events of the Reader's story, 
his trip to the bookstore and his preparations before reading his copy 
of If on a winter's night a traveler. These opening events take on greater 
importance as the Reader's story continues, but before I pursue them, 
let us look at some samples of the narrative discourse in the first 
incipit. 
This chapter, like "Outside the town of Malbork," is different from 
the other eight titled chapters because of the degree to which it incor­
porates reflections on its own reading.13 It opens this way: 
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The novel begins in a railway station, a locomotive huffs, steam 
from a piston covers the opening of the chapter, a cloud of smoke 
hides part of the first paragraph. In the odor of the station there is 
a passing whiff of station cafe odor. There is someone looking 
through befogged glass, he opens the glass door of the bar, every­
thing is misty, inside, too, as if seen by nearsighted eyes, or eyes 
irritated by coal dust. The pages of the book are clouded like the 
windows of an old train, the cloud of smoke rests on the sentences. 
It is a rainy evening; the man enters the bar; he unbuttons his 
damp overcoat; a cloud of steam enfolds him; a whistle dies away 
along tracks that are glistening with rain, as far as the eye can see. 
(P. 10) 
The blurring of audiences continues here: are we reading the actual 
first paragraph of "If on a winter's night a traveler" or a summary of 
its beginning? Is the "you" of the first chapter reading something dif­
ferent from what the narrative and authorial audiences of the whole 
narrative are reading here? Is this narrative itself to be one that in­
duces reflection on its own reading? How are these questions related 
to the soon-to-be-introduced instabilities of the incipit, the man's pos­
sible relation with Madame Marne, and his failure to switch his suit­
case with another just like it? Because the transition from the voice of 
these passages to the voice of the action is virtually seamless, the 
narrative audience is, I think, inclined to take the chapter as the full 
replication of the book that "you" is reading and thus to regard the 
references to the clouded pages and smoky sentences neither as sum­
maries nor as metafictional maneuvers but as devices designed to 
contribute to the mood of mystery and intrigue that hangs over the 
narrative. In having this internal function, they are similar to such 
reflexive passages as the following: 
I am not at all the sort of person who attracts attention, I am 
an anonymous presence against an even more anonymous back­
ground. If you, reader, couldn't help picking me out among the 
people getting off the train and continued following me in my to-
and-froing between bar and telephone, this is simply because I am 
called "I" and this is the only thing you know about me, but this 
alone is reason enough for you to invest a part of yourself in the 
stranger "I." Just as the author, since he has no intention of telling 
about himself, decided to call the character "I" as if to conceal him, 
not having to name him or describe him, because any other name 
or attribute would define him more than this stark pronoun; still, 
by the very fact of writing "I" the author feels driven to put into 
this "I" a bit of himself, of what he feels or imagines he feels. Noth­
ing could be easier for him than to identify himself with me; for the 
moment my external behavior is that of a traveler who has missed 
146 Chapter Five 
a connection, a situation that is part of everyone's experience. But 
a situation that takes place at the opening of a novel always refers 
you to something else that has happened or is about to happen, 
and it is this something else that makes it risky to identify with me, 
risky for you the reader and for him the author; and the more gray 
and ordinary and undistinguished and commonplace the begin­
ning of this novel is, the more you and the author feel a hint of 
danger looming over the fraction of "I" that you have heedlessly 
invested in the "I" of a character whose inner history you know 
nothing about, as you know nothing about the contents of that 
suitcase he is so anxious to get rid of. (Pp. 14-15) 
The internal function here is to increase both the mystery of the 
"I" and the suspense about the coming danger. When, however, we 
get to Chapter 2, the retrospective patterning gives both sorts of pas­
sages a double application. Their potential to function as comments 
on the act of reading in general is actualized. The first kind teases us 
into thought about the relation between style and atmosphere, as the 
sentences themselves produce the smoky effect they appear to be 
claiming for other sentences. This second passage functions as an 
invitation to the authorial audience to explore the analogy between 
the multiple roles of "I"—Calvino, the author of the whole book, 
"Calvino," the alleged author of this If on a winter's night a traveler, 
and the nameless narrator of this version—and the multiple roles of 
"You"—authorial, narrative, and characterized audiences. Other pas­
sages in the incipit offer different specific variations on Calvino's gen­
eral technique of inducing the double application: 
These remarks form a murmuring of indistinct voices from which 
a word or a phrase might emerge, decisive for what comes after­
ward. To read properly you must take in both the murmuring effect 
and the effect of the hidden intention, which you (and I, too) are 
as yet in no position to perceive. In reading, therefore, you must 
remain both oblivious and highly alert, as I am abstracted but prick 
up my ears, with my elbow on the counter of the bar and my cheek 
on my fist. (P. 18) 
Here the authorial audience applies the narrator's directions about 
reading properly not just to the reading of the incipit but to the read­
ing of the whole narrative—including the passage itself. The author­
ial audience thus becomes self-consciously aware of its warrant for 
reading self-consciously. 
In summary, then, the opening paragraphs of Chapter 2 do not 
obliterate either the narrative audience's participation in the address 
of Chapter 1 or the mimetic reading experience of the first incipit but 
they do complicate those two acts of reading. As a result of the turn 
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taken in the progression with those paragraphs, the authorial audi­
ence needs in effect both to preserve and uplift those experiences, to 
recognize each of them as part of the whole narrative's general con­
cern with the nature of reading, including the nature of reading this 
narrative itself. To see how the narrative further complicates and per­
haps resolves this concern, we must consider how Calvino guides the 
authorial audience's responses to the character of the Reader and to 
the subsequent progression of his story. 
IV 
As we have already seen, much of Calvino's treatment of the Reader, 
including of course giving him that name, works to foreground his 
synthetic component. The narrator, moreover, deliberately refrains 
from any detailed mimetic portrait: "Who you are, Reader, your age, 
your status, profession, income: that would be indiscreet to ask. It's 
your business, you're on your own" (p. 32). Nevertheless, the Reader 
has several mimetic dimensions. In Chapter 1, the narrator tells us, 
You're the sort of person who, on principle, no longer expects any­
thing of anything. . . . You know that the best you can expect is to 
avoid the worst. . . . What about books? Well, precisely because 
you have denied it in every other field, you believe you may still 
grant yourself legitimately this youthful pleasure of expectation 
in a carefully circumscribed area like the field of books, where 
you can be lucky or unlucky, but the risk of disappointment isn't 
serious. (P. 4) 
This attribute contributes to the Reader's desire to find the continua­
tions of the various incipits: since reading is the last area of ex­
pectation he has, it is all the more important to him that he can 
find out how the expectations generated by the narrative beginnings 
he encounters are brought to some resolution. In Chapter 2, when 
he meets Ludmilla, the Other Reader, another mimetic dimension 
emerges. He acts like the proverbial boy in a boy-meets-girl narrative: 
he wants to get the girl as much as he wants to get the continuation 
of the narrative he began. In the later chapters we see that part of 
being the proverbial boy is to be jealous of any possible rival for the 
Other Reader's affections. This first encounter also reveals him to be 
an ordinary Reader relative to the extraordinary Other Reader, who 
has read many more novels than he, and who has much better recall 
of what she has read. As we see later when he describes himself ex­
plicitly, he is in effect defined as the ordinary reader: 
"I like to read only what is written, and to connect the details with 
the whole, and to consider certain readings as definitive; and I like 
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to keep one book distinct from the other, each for what it has that 
is different and new; and I especially like books to be read from 
beginning to end/7 (Pp. 256-57) 
At the end of Chapter 2, then, the main movement of the Reader's 
story is established: this ordinary man with the strong desire for the 
completion of his interrupted reading and a strong hope for the de­
velopment of his relationship with the Other Reader sets out on his 
double quest to achieve both his desire and his hope. The narrator's 
summary of the situation at this point both sets the stage for the rest 
of the quest and reminds the authorial audience of its own reading 
activity: 
You are bearing with you two different expectations, and both 
promise days of pleasant hopes: the expectation contained in the 
book—of a reading experience you are impatient to resume—and 
the expectation contained in the telephone number—of hearing 
again the vibrations, at times treble and at times smoldering of that 
voice, when it will answer your first phone call in a short while, in 
fact tomorrow, with the fragile pretext of the book, to ask her if she 
likes it or not, to tell her how many pages you have read or not 
read, to suggest to her that you meet again . . . 
Who you are, Reader, your age, your status, profession, income: 
that would be indiscreet to ask. It's your business, you're on your 
own. What counts is the state of your spirit now, in the privacy of 
your home, as you try to re-establish perfect calm in order to sink 
again into the book. . . . But something has changed since yester­
day. Your reading is no longer solitary: you think of the Other 
Reader, who, at this same moment, is also opening the book; and 
there, the novel to be read is superimposed by a possible novel to 
be lived, the continuation of your story with her, or better still, the 
beginning of a possible story. . . . Does this mean that the book 
has become an instrument, a channel of communication, a rendez­
vous? This does not mean its reading will grip you less: on the 
contrary, something has been added to its powers. (P. 32) 
The double application here is more intermittent than in some of 
the passages we have just looked at, but its presence is equally signifi­
cant. The authorial audience's expectations are not identical to the 
Reader's, but they do overlap: we are bearing with us the expectation 
of a reading experience contained in the book, one consisting of both 
further embedded narratives and of the developing relationship be­
tween the Reader and the Other Reader. Furthermore, although the 
authorial audience is not in precisely the same relation to this nar­
rative and an Other Reader as the characterized audience, the pat­
tern of reflexive reading already established—and reinforced by this 
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passage—induces the members of the authorial audience to contem­
plate the effects of reading-relationships, the importance of reading 
as a social activity, the relation of each one's reading of this book to 
that of his or her fellow readers. 
At this point, the authorial audience's understanding of Chapter 1 
takes on a new layer: beneath the ingenuity of the description of the 
trip to the bookstore, beneath the wit of the merging of the audiences, 
there also exists the opening step in a story about reading and its 
conditions. That chapter has in effect presented the Reader one-on-
one with the bookstore and with the book. Now the progression is 
moving us to consider a two-on-one situation, or better, given the 
reflexiveness already established and the existence of inner and outer 
narratives, it is inviting us to consider the relations between intertex­
tuality and interreaderality. 
The relation between character and progression here is typical of 
the relation between the two in the whole narrative: the minimal at­
tributes of the character give the narrative movement a slight push, 
but the most important features of that movement revolve around 
Calvino's relationships with the narrative and authorial audiences. 
Consequently, the character fades back into the progression; it is not 
his drives and desires that we are most interested in following but 
rather how Calvino manipulates them as he keeps announcing and 
enacting his concerns with reading. This relationship between char­
acter and progression is strikingly different from anything we have 
seen so far. The other characters we have analyzed have all been 
given a clear identity, and the progression has affected the functions 
that those characters perform while preserving that identity. In this 
narrative, the Reader has a minimal identity, one that is sometimes 
merged with the generalized portraits of the narrative and authorial 
audiences. Furthermore, because that identity just is the identity of 
the ordinary reader, and because the analysis of the progression just 
is the analysis of the authorial audience's temporal reading, the pro­
gression here does not only affect the functions of the character, but it 
also absorbs or subsumes them. 
This point is given further support when we consider the relation 
of the Reader's thematic component to his mimetic and synthetic ones. 
As the discussion of the first few chapters of the book indicate, Calvino 
presents us with the other side of James's coin: where James merges 
the thematic and the mimetic components of John Marcher, Calvino 
merges the thematic and synthetic components of the Reader. In If on 
a winter's night a traveler, the primary ideational concerns of the text 
are about the activity of its own reading. Since these concerns are 
both announced and enacted as part of the progression of the whole 
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narrative, to discuss the synthetic component of character and of the 
narrative in general is to discuss the thematic component as well. 
Thus, to analyze the relation between the mimetic and synthetic com­
ponents here is simultaneously to analyze the relation between the 
mimetic and thematic components. And again, since the mimetic 
component of the Reader's character is limited to a few traits neces­
sary for a surface narrative underneath which the more significant 
narrative of our own reading about reading is developed, the detailed 
analysis of character here can best be done by folding it into the analy­
sis of the progression. 
These conclusions reinforce my earlier statements about the affec­
tive structure of the progression here. Accompanying the fusion of 
the synthetic and thematic components of character is our awareness 
of Calvino's relation to the authorial audience, and this relation be­
comes more and more playful as the narrative progresses. We ask 
questions like these: what twist will he give his construction next? 
Will I be able to follow it? What will that in turn set up? In general, 
can he meet his own challenges to write this self-reflexive work that 
induces reflection on its own reading and can we catch all the devices 
by which he tries? We progress through the narrative enjoying the 
challenge, wanting to be equal to it, but hoping also that we are not 
so equal to it that we feel somehow ahead of our playful guide. When­
ever we do feel like we're catching up to Calvino, we have not only 
the satisfaction of meeting his challenge but also the payoff of learn­
ing something new—or articulating more clearly something we've al­
ready known—about our reading. The story of the Reader becomes 
the occasion for this serious play. 
The pattern of the progression after Chapter 2 is in one sense fairly 
predictable and in another characteristically surprising. The Reader's 
two quests appear to proceed along parallel lines until Chapter 7. 
Every lead that the Reader follows to find the continuation of the 
previous narrative brings him only to the beginning of another new 
narrative, and the pattern of the opening chapters continues: num­
bered chapter addressed to characterized audience; titled chapter 
read in common by the Reader, the narrative audience, and the au­
thorial audience; numbered chapter, and so on. Each lead the Reader 
follows takes him into a new situation of reading: reading aloud, 
reading in a university setting, reading followed by academic analysis 
of it, reading against the backdrop of its production in a publishing 
house. The result is that the authorial audience is led to reflect on 
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the variety of situations and relationships that contextualize its own 
reading. 
During this stage, two other sorts of readers are introduced, and 
these set off how even the ordinary reading of the Reader is defined 
by a specific set of interests and desires. First, Calvino introduces 
Ludmilla's sister, Lotaria, the Utilitarian Reader who wants only to 
know "the author's position with regard to Trends of Contemporary 
Thought and Problems That Demand a Solution" (p. 44). Second, he 
introduces Irnerio, the Non-Reader who has trained himself not even 
to read what appears before his eyes. Through the Reader's interac­
tions with these two and with Ludmilla herself, Calvino maintains 
the instability surrounding the Reader's quest for her. During this 
stage, the Other Reader is far more interested in her reading than in 
him. In Chapter 7, however, a new stage of the progression begins as 
Calvino introduces one of his surprises and thereby intertwines the 
two major instabilities. Ludmilla matter-of-factly invites the Reader 
"to begin," and they engage in a reading of each other's bodies. 
The surprise here is that Calvino reverses the conventions of the boy-
meets-girl, boy-wants-reluctant-girl, boy-eventually-gets-no-longer-
reluctant-girl formula that he has been working with until this point. 
One important consequence of the move is to take the narrative even 
further away from the mimetic and into the realm of the synthetic: 
characters need not follow the minimal mimetic characterizations that 
they are initially given, but may act in new ways at the convenience 
of the author. At the same time, Calvino's use of the characterized 
audience and the metaphor of reading to describe their lovemaking 
allows the authorial audience to make a personal application of the 
description if it sees fit. 
One effect of this surprise in the progression is of course to 
comment upon the conventions of the boy-meets-girl plot that Cal­
vino is inverting here. The other is the way it intertwines the two 
instabilities: 
in the satisfaction you receive from her way of reading you, from 
the textual quotations of your physical objectivity, you begin to 
harbor a doubt: that she is not reading you, single and whole as 
you are, but using you, using fragments of you detached from the 
context to construct for herself a ghostly partner, known to her 
alone, in the penumbra of her semiconsciousness, and what she is 
deciphering is this apocryphal visitor, not you. (P. 156) 
Since the jealous Reader suspects his rival to be either the translator 
who injects falsehoods into books, Ermes Marana, or the author who 
is said to "produce books the way a pumpkin vine produces pump­
kins," Silas Flannery, the Reader is unable to be satisfied in his quest 
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for the Other Reader until he satisfies his quest for—or at least ge 
to the bottom of the mystery about—the continuation of the inte 
rupted narratives. Thus, Calvino continues the focus on the produ 
tion, uses, and situations of books and their reading as the Read< 
goes first to visit Silas Flannery, and then to an imaginary country i 
South America, fruitlessly trying to unravel the "apocrypha coi 
spiracy." Finally, he ends up in a library in his hometown, where tt 
ten books he has begun are all catalogued but unattainable. Instea 
of getting the books themselves, he gets into a discussion on readir 
with seven other readers that eventually leads him to decide to man 
Ludmilla. No sooner decided than done, and the narrative ends wil 
one final twist that I shall examine below. 
Meanwhile, the story of the Reader's quest continues to be pun 
tuated by the beginnings of new narratives that always break off. Ju 
as the numbered chapters explore different conditions of readin; 
these incipits explore different kinds of reading experiences, each or 
anticipated by a wish of Ludmilla's: before "Outside the town of Me 
bork," she says, "I prefer novels that bring me into a world whe: 
everything is precise, concrete, specific/7 and lo and behold that 
just what the narrative is. Similarly, before "Looks down in the gat] 
ering shadow/' the story of the man trying to get rid of the corpse < 
his rival, Jojo, she says "The novel I would most like to read at th 
moment should have as its driving force only the desire to narrate, 
pile stories upon stories, without trying to impose a philosophy < 
life on you, simply allowing you to observe its own growth, like 
tree, an entangling as if of barbs and branches" and again that is ju 
what we get (p. 92). 
In sum, then, there are two main underlying principles of the pr 
gression: to explore reading and its multifaceted relationships and 
offer a variety of distinct reading experiences. As compared, say, 
the principles of progression in Pride and Prejudice, these allow th€ 
author considerable freedom. Once Austen establishes the particul 
instabilities of her narrative, she then must carefully select—ar 
situate—those incidents that will contribute to the authorial auc 
ence's greatest satisfaction in the eventual resolution of the inst 
bilities accomplished by the engagement of Elizabeth and Dare 
Calvino, on the other hand, is relatively free to employ his narratr 
ingenuity to use the surface movement of the progression in his e 
ploration of reading and its situations. Both the particular way 
which he induces self-reflexiveness on the part of the authorial auc 
ence and the particular issues that he chooses are only minimal 
constrained by the early strokes of the narrative. The constrain 
imposed by his general principles are only that he actually display tl 
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variety of reading and that he move the narrative further and further 
into its exploration of the synthetic component of narrative. 
The surprises I alluded to above satisfy those constraints, even as 
they exhibit Calvino's ingenuity and substantially affect the specific 
development of the progression. The surprise of Chapter 7 is soon 
followed by the deviation of Chapter 8, where the second-person ad­
dress to the characterized audience gives way to the diary of Silas 
Flannery, written in the first person. Furthermore, the status of the 
diary within the whole narrative situation is not at all clear. At the 
end of chapter 7, the Reader resolves to visit Flannery, but the narra­
tor never tells us that the Reader actually gets the diary in his posses­
sion. Indeed, toward the end of the chapter he appears as a figure in 
the diary seen now from Flannery's perspective, and the diary contin­
ues beyond the Reader's last visit. Thus, for the first time both the 
narrative and authorial audiences now have access to information 
about the characterized audience that the Reader himself does not 
have. Where previously the Reader's actions in effect controlled 
the narrative discourse—in Chapters 1 through 7 (and indeed, in 9 
through 12) the narrator describes and sometimes reacts to or com­
ments further upon the Reader's actions—the discourse in Chapter 8 
is quite independent of him.14 Since the narrator of the other chapters 
does not appear until the very end of Chapter 8 and does not account 
for the presentation of the diary, the authorial audience is inclined to 
take it as a gift from Calvino himself. This inference of course further 
supports the authorial audience's awareness of the synthetic nature 
of our reading experience here. 
This drive further and further into the synthetic continues with the 
embedding of the idea of Calvino's own book within Flannery's diary. 
Characteristically, Calvino also gives a twist to this rather obvious 
narrative maneuver, and the twist leads to another of the progres-
sion's surprises. 
I have had the idea of writing a novel composed only of the 
beginnings of novels. The protagonist could be a Reader who is 
continually interrupted. The Reader buys the new novel A by the 
author Z. But it is a defective copy, he can't go beyond the be­
ginning. . . . He returns to the bookshop to have the volume 
exchanged. . . . 
I could write it all in the second person: you, Reader. . .  . I could 
also introduce a young lady, the Other Reader, and a counterfeiter-
translator, and an old writer who keeps a diary like this diary. . . . 
But I wouldn't want the young lady Reader, in escaping the 
Counterfeiter, to end up in the arms of the Reader. I will see to it 
that the Reader sets out on the trail of the Counterfeiter, hiding in 
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some very distant country, so the Writer can remain alone with the 
young lady, the Other Reader. 
To be sure, without a female character, the Reader's journey 
would lose liveliness: he must encounter some other woman on his 
way. Perhaps the Other Reader could have a sister. . . . (Pp. 197-8) 
Since Flannery is the author-figure of the narrative, and since the first 
part of the description encapsulates Calvino's own narrative, the lat­
ter part establishes a tension between Calvino and the authorial au­
dience: will this plan be carried out? The tension is resolved in 
Chapter 9 when the Reader has the following encounter with Lotaria, 
who has successively appeared under the names Corinna, Alfonsina, 
Ingrid, Gertrude, and Sheila. 
. . . Sheila-Alfonsina-Gertrude has thrown herself on you, torn 
off your prisoner's trousers; your naked limbs mingle under the 
closets of electronic memories. 
Reader, what are you doing? Aren't you going to resist? Aren't 
you going to escape? Ah, you are participating. . . . Ah, you fling 
yourself into it, too. . . . You're the absolute protagonist of this 
book, very well; but do you believe that gives you the right to have 
carnal relations with all the female characters? Like this, without 
any preparation. . . . Wasn't your story with Ludmilla enough to 
give the plot the warmth and grace of a love story? What need do 
you have to go also with her sister (or with somebody you identify 
with her sister), with this Lotaria-Corinna-Sheila, who, when you 
think about it, you've never even liked. . . . It's natural for you to 
want to get even, after you have followed events of pages and 
pages with passive resignation, but does this seem the right way 
to you? Or are you trying to say that even in this situation you find 
yourself involved, despite yourself? You know very well that this 
girl always acts with her head, what she thinks in theory she does 
in practice, to the ultimate consequences. . .  . It was an ideological 
demonstration she wanted to give you, nothing else. . . . Why, 
this time, do you allow yourself to be convinced immediately by 
her arguments? Watch out, Reader: here everything is different 
from what it seems, everything is two-faced. . .  . (P. 219) 
The narrator's remarks to the Reader about the freedom that comes 
with his role as "absolute protagonist" are reminiscent of Fowles's 
narrator's remarks in Chapter 13 of The French Lieutenant's Woman 
about the autonomy of his characters, and here too those remarks 
actually emphasize the synthetic status of the protagonist. Because 
Calvino's narrator is addressing a characterized audience, however, 
he creates the effect in a somewhat different way. Although the ques­
tion is about the character's rights to independent action, it presup­
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poses that the Reader knows he is a character, a knowledge that he 
did not seem to have before this point. 
This further foregrounding of the synthetic is effected by another 
use of the characterized audience: the double applications it invites 
do allow almost everything in the discourse to be two-faced—at least. 
Why does the Reader fling himself into it? His action violates the few 
mimetic dimensions that he has: as the narrator says, the Reader has 
never even liked Lotaria and what we have seen of his own jealousy 
leads us to infer that he would regard a sexual encounter with her as 
a kind of betrayal of his own feelings for Ludmilla. The answer to the 
narrator's question is that the Reader has no choice; the event appears 
to be dictated by the plan in Flannery's diary, which is itself of course 
dictated by a plan of Calvino's. Or to put it another way, the Reader 
is flung into it by Calvino, who wants his authorial audience to won­
der about the levels of reality in the narrative: at this point, in addi­
tion to the frame story and the incipits, we have Flannery's diary 
embedded in the frame and then, in a sense, this episode growing 
out of that embedded diary: the inside has become the outside, mak­
ing the former outside an inside—perhaps. The effect of this de­
velopment is to induce the authorial audience to reflect upon the 
irreducibly synthetic and wonderfully complex nature of reading fic­
tion, especially this one, a reflection that take us to the role of the 
author in controlling the synthesis, and the role of the reader in seek­
ing to detect its "hidden intention." 
As we see in this development of the progression, part of the in­
tention here is to take a character with a prominent synthetic com­
ponent and minimal mimetic dimensions and make that synthetic 
component increasingly prominent, even as some pretense about the 
mimetic consistency and/or autonomy is preserved. This part of the 
intention is given one of its most striking—and appropriate—twists 
in the final chapters, but before examining them, I would like to back 
up and consider the relation of the incipits to the progression of the 
outer story. 
As noted above, one of the relations between these incipits and the 
outer story is that each of them (except the first) offers a reading ex­
perience that fulfills the wish of the Other Reader.15 In this respect, 
their relation to the outer story parallels the relation of the Reader's 
encounter with Lotaria to Flannery's diary: the apparent autonomy of 
the later development is undercut because it is actually a consequence 
of an earlier moment in the narrative. (Furthermore, there are certain 
proper names carried over from one incipit to the other that also serve 
to undercut their apparent autonomy.) At the same time, because 
Ludmilla's desires are consistently fulfilled, her way of reading—her 
156 Chapter Five 
openness to a variety of experiences, her delight in reading for read-
ing's sake, her excellent recall of what she has read—is presented as 
superior to the Reader's. 
Of course, Ludmilla's desires are not so specific that they deter­
mine in advance the precise details and developments of the incipits. 
As a result, Calvino sets himself a very challenging narrative project. 
The challenge, in effect, is to emphasize the distance between the 
authorial and the narrative audiences and then get us to participate 
in the narrative audience in spite of ourselves. Although the stories 
range from following the conventions of realism to invoking the ele­
ments of the fantastic, the narrative audience in each is clearly invited 
to believe in the reality of the events, to get caught up in the develop­
ing plots. Of course, as the outer narrative emphasizes the synthetic 
more and more, the challenge becomes greater: the authorial audi­
ence, in effect, has to travel farther and farther to enter the narrative 
audience of each succeeding incipit. Moreover, after the first two or 
three titled chapters, we enter the next ones knowing that they too 
will break off before they reach resolution, a knowledge that also in­
hibits our entrance into the narrative audience. By inducing us to en­
ter these different audiences in spite of these difficulties, Calvino not 
only displays his own narrative virtuosity, but also teaches something 
about the power of our own desires for the mimetic illusion. Thus, in 
a curious way, even the experience of participating in the narrative 
audience gets transformed by the whole narrative into something that 
ultimately reinforces the synthetic nature of the whole narrative. 
Within this general account of the role of the incipits, some further 
distinctions need to be made. Because the first two are part of the 
whole narrative setup, introducing the authorial audience to the con­
cern with reading and with the shifting planes of narrative action, 
they are set apart from the rest by their own use of second-person 
narration. I have argued above that in "If on a winter's night a trav­
eler" the second-person address appears to be a part of the actual 
narrative. In "Outside the town of Malbork," the situation is more 
ambiguous. At first, the evidence suggests that the second-person 
discourse is a summary made by the narrator of the outer story: 
Here everything is very concrete, substantial, depicted with sure 
expertise; or at least the impression given to you, Reader, is one of 
expertise, though there are some foods you don't know, mentioned 
by name, which the translator has decided to leave in the origi­
nal. . .  . (P. 34) 
Then, however, the voice will employ the first person as well as 
the second and will therefore appear to be a voice within this narra­
tive only: 
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Every moment you discover there is a new character, you don't 
know how many people there are in this immense kitchen of ours, 
it's no use counting, there were always many of us, at Kudgiwa, 
always coming and going. . .  . (P. 35) 
The ambiguity within "Outside the town" has its appropriate corre­
spondence on the level of the narrative as a whole: even as we are 
entering the new narrative audience here, the ambiguity keeps us 
actively involved in the narrative audience of the frame story: we are 
again aware of our situtation as readers reading about readers read­
ing. Later on, however, when Calvino's problem is to get us to enter 
the narrative audience of the incipits, he drops this kind of ambiguity 
and offers more direct mimetic narration. Here, for example, is the 
beginning of the eighth incipit, "On the carpet of leaves illuminated 
by the moon:" 
The ginkgo leaves fell like fine rain from the boughs and dotted the 
lawn with yellow. I was walking with Mr. Okeda on the path of 
smooth stones. I said I would like to distinguish the sensation of 
each single ginkgo leaf from the sensation of all the others, but I 
was wondering if it would be possible. Mr. Okeda said it was pos­
sible. (P. 199) 
We could, at this stage, be reading Hemingway-among-the-ginkgos— 
or any one of a number of novelists committed to preserving the mi­
metic illusion. 
Interestingly, although the incipits consistently explore themes of 
identity and of shifting realities and in that sense echo and reinforce 
the frame story, Calvino does not establish any direct correspon­
dences between the action of any given incipit and the action of the 
outer story that follows. His interest rather seems to be in keeping the 
audiences stretching to move from one to the other.16 One conse­
quence of this strategy is that beyond the shift that occurs in the nar­
rative discourse after "Outside the town of Malbork," Calvino is not 
especially tied down to the order of these fragments. If "On the car­
pet of leaves illuminated by the moon" preceded the third incipit, 
"Leaning from the steep slope," a story of a naive narrator who gets 
mixed up in a dangerous situation that he doesn't understand, there 
would be no significant consequences for the narrative. Similarly, 
there are no definite limits on the number of such fragments Calvino 
could incorporate into the narrative. If we had twelve or eight rather 
than ten, it would work much the same way. At the same time, there 
are some general limits. At the lower end, he needs to include a suf­
ficient number to give his audiences a significant variety of reading 
experiences; only in that way can the whole narrative's exploration of 
the nature of reading be satisfactory. While eight might be enough, 
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five would doubtless be too few. At the upper end, he faces the con­
straint imposed by his own return to the irreducibly synthetic nature 
of reading. He is, I think, able to meet his difficult challenge of induc­
ing us to enter new narrative audiences in spite of ourselves for the 
ten incipits he gives us, but he could not do so indefinitely. He is 
skillful enough to win us over a few more times if he chose, but by 
the fourteenth or fifteenth time, the whole process would doubtless 
grow tedious. 
Within the incipits themselves, Calvino faces another constraint. He 
needs to generate a progression that will in fact catch us up and he 
needs to break it off before any resolution is reached. Beyond that he 
also needs to provide a partial closure so that we do not end up sim­
ply frustrated that the fragments are never completed. In general, his 
strategy is to offer us some initial incident of a narrative, one that 
points toward further possible complications even as the incident it­
self is essentially completed. For example, in ' I n a network of lines 
that enlace/' the story of the professor who, while out jogging, an­
swers the phone in an empty house, the audience is taken through 
the whole process of his hesitation about answering the phone, his 
initial escape from it, his irresistible attraction to it, his answering it 
and receiving the message about Marjorie being tied up and in danger 
of death, his doubt about whether this could be any Marjorie he 
knows, his suspicion that this Marjorie is one of his students, his 
sudden decision, when learning from other students that she hasn't 
shown up for two days, to go to the address given in the message. 
Then we have the conclusion: 
I have already run off. I leave the campus. I take Grosvenor Ave­
nue, then Cedar Street, then Maple Road. I am completely out of 
breath, I am running only because I cannot feel the ground beneath 
my feet, or my lungs in my chest. Here is Hillside Drive. Eleven, 
fifteen, twenty-seven, fifty-one; thank God the numbers go fast, 
skipping from one decade to the next. Here is 115. The door is 
open, I climb the stairs, I enter a room in semidarkness. There is 
Marjorie, tied on a sofa, gagged. I release her. She vomits. She 
looks at me with contempt. 
"You're a bastard," she says to me. (P. 139) 
The conclusion resolves most of the tensions and the instabilities: his 
neurosis about answering the phone seems to have suited some-
body's purpose; furthermore, his reaction has proven, at least in one 
sense, to be a sound one: we now know that the Marjorie of the mes­
sage is the Marjorie he knows. In short, we have a full incident here. 
At the same time, other instabilities remain: Who called him? How 
much does the caller know? Why is Marjorie bound and gagged? 
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Why does Marjorie swear at him, when he has apparently rescued 
her? And of course, what will happen next? In short, having entered 
the narrative audience here, we are interested in hearing more, but 
our desires for resolution have been partially satisfied. 
If this analysis of the progression of the incipits is correct, especially 
in its discussion of the number of such beginnings the narrative can 
incorporate, then it suggests that they cannot establish their own clo­
sure, either singly or as a group. Since the Reader's two quests be­
come intertwined in Chapter 7, and since one of the few absolute 
certainties of the narrative is that the Reader cannot succeed in the 
quest to find the end of any of the incipits, Calvino cannot end the 
narrative by taking the usual route of resolving the major instabilities. 
However, if I am right in saying that after Chapter 7 the progression 
increasingly emphasizes the synthetic nature of the whole reading 
experience, then an appropriate ending ought at least to make some 
gesture toward resolving the instabilities as it also offers some final 
twist on the issues explored in the synthetic realm. By bringing the 
Reader back to his hometown library and having him decide to marry 
Ludmilla, Calvino solves his problem with characteristic ingenuity. 
The Reader's discussion with the other readers in the library serves 
several important functions, but before looking at those, we should 
note that Calvino has gone so far away from the mimetic that he does 
not even trouble to explain how the Reader got out of his apparent 
difficulties in Ircania to return to his hometown. Calvino wants the 
Reader there, so he puts him there. In effect, the same thing happens 
with the marriage. He wants to get the Reader and Ludmilla married, 
so he declares them married—Ludmilla's desires, motivations, pos­
sible hesitations, etc. are simply not an issue at this point. The reason 
the authorial audience does not object to Calvino's doing these things 
is that they have come to regard the mimetic surface of the narrative 
as only an occasion for him to explore his concerns with the nature of 
reading. He can thus manipulate that surface as long as the manipu­
lation pays off on the thematic-synthetic level. 
The first function served by the discussion among the readers in 
the library is to complicate the authorial audience's reflections on 
reading by introducing each reader's explicit credo about reading. Be­
cause these readers discuss their experiences in reading both one 
book and many books, the authorial audience is led to reflect not just 
on its own reading of this book but also on the relation of that reading 
to its reading of other books. As Calvino presents the different kinds 
of readers here—the one who is so stimulated by reading that he can 
never read more than a few pages of any book, the one who cannot 
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take his attention from what he is reading, another who continually 
rereads, discovering a new book each time, the one who sees all 
books as part of the same book, and so on—he does not favor 
one over the others, and he does not favor Ludmilla's over any of 
them. Consequently, the authorial audience, having been brought to 
a heightened awareness of the nature and variety of reading fictional 
narrative, must now reexamine its own typical habits of reading, and 
adopt the stance that any one habit may be too limiting. This step 
goes a long way toward completing Calvino's exploration of one of 
the main issues in the narrative. 
The second function is to supply a twist on the Reader's search for 
the continuation of the incipits, a twist sufficient to help end the quest 
and thus provide closure. That twist comes through the sixth reader, 
the one who revels in the moment preceding reading. He takes the 
step of putting all the titles together: 
"If on a winter's night a traveler, outside the town of Malbork, leaning 
from the steep slope without fear of wind or vertigo, looks down in the 
gathering shadow in a network of lines that enlace, in a network of lines 
that intersect, on the carpet of leaves illuminated by the moon around an 
empty grave—What story down there awaits its end?—he asks, anxious 
to hear the story/' (R 258) 
Although the Reader initially objects that this is not the first para­
graph of a book, the authorial audience recognizes it as the final re­
flexive move of the incipits: here we have a new incipit, constructed 
out of the titles of the ten previous ones and the fragment from 
the Arabian Nights included in this chapter. Furthermore, the move 
sets up the comment by the seventh reader—the one concerned with 
endings—that leads the Reader to his decision to marry Ludmilla: 
"Do you believe that every story must have a beginning and an 
end? In ancient times a story could end only in two ways: having 
passed all the tests, the hero and heroine married, or else they 
died. The ultimate meaning to which all stories refer has two faces: 
the continuity of life, the inevitability of death." (P. 259) 
Suddenly aware of his own developing story, the Reader chooses 
marriage and life, while the authorial audience acknowledges and ad­
mires Calvino's witty manner of bringing about the resolution of the 
surface instability. The final stroke of the narrative comes appropri­
ately in its final line. 
Now you are man and wife, Reader and Reader. A great double 
bed receives your parallel readings. 
Ludmilla closes her book, turns off her light, puts her head back 
against the pillow, and says, "Turn off your light, too. Aren't you 
tired of reading?" 
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And you say, "Just a moment, I've almost finished If on a winter's 
night a traveler by Italo Calvino." (P. 260) 
This last line of course brings the authorial audience back to the 
first—"You are about to begin reading the new novel by Italo Calvino, 
// on a winter's night a traveler"—and functions as a strong signal of 
closure in the same way that Whitey's "Comb it wet or dry?" signals 
closure in "Haircut:" it signals the end of the action or situation that 
makes the narrative possible. At the same time, the line contributes 
to the appropriate completeness of the narrative because it pro­
vides a final twist on the development of Calvino's relations to his 
audiences. 
The similarities and differences between the first and last sentences 
are revealing of how far the authorial audience has traveled. Whereas 
the first sentence conceals the distinction between the narrative and 
characterized audience, the final one overtly plays with the distinc­
tion. It remains ambiguous in a way that the first one does not. Once 
the authorial audience reaches Chapter 2, it must disambiguate the 
first sentence by reading it as referring to the first incipit. That reading 
of the first line actually reinforces a secondary meaning—and thus, 
the ambiguity—of this last line: perhaps the Reader has finally ob­
tained the full text of the narrative he began lo those many narratives 
ago and is finally about to reach its end. At the same time, of course, 
the primary reading of the line is one that interprets it as referring to 
the book that the authorial audience finishes reading when it finishes 
the line. 
But to hold onto that reading, we must assume that the Reader has 
in a sense adopted our perspective on himself, i.e., has become the 
authorial audience for the narrative of his own life, including his final 
action of discussing his reading of that narrative. This authorial au­
dience recognizes that such a narrative situation leads to an infinite 
regress of mirrors-reflecting-mirrors, readings-within-readings, but 
from Calvino's point of view that recognition is a contemplation de­
voutly to be wished. In this respect, the final line is the culmination 
of all the reflexive devices of the narrative. 
In this reading of the line, we also see the screen erected by the 
use of the characterized audience expand and contract. By having the 
characterized audience speak in the narrative that the narrative audi­
ence is reading, Calvino is obviously communicating with the nar­
rative audience behind a thick screen. When the characterized audi­
ence, however, utters a sentence that can more easily be applied to 
the narrative audience (the application doesn't require as many mir­
rors), the screen quickly becomes thinner. Nevertheless, it cannot be­
come fully transparent—the characterized audience presumably has 
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more to read after speaking, while the narrative audience finishes its 
reading with that utterance. Thus, Calvino appropriately leaves the 
authorial audience reflecting on the quickly shifting relationships be­
tween the two audiences, relationships that have been crucial to the 
experience of the entire narrative. In so doing, the line appropriately 
completes the affective structure of the narrative as well: Calvino's 
last move is appropriately among the strongest signs of his virtuosity, 
one that offers in a highly concentrated dose the serious pleasure that 
has marked the entire developing interchange of the progression. 
As its title indicates, this second part of my study has been concerned 
with showing how different narratives have exploited the synthetic 
component of character for specific uses in their different progres­
sions. The examples we have looked at in detail are not exhaus­
tive but they certainly represent a broad range of functions for the 
synthetic component. The French Lieutenant's Woman shows how the 
occasional foregrounding of the synthetic can displace interest from 
the mimetic to the thematic sphere. Great Expectations is an example 
of how the foregrounded synthetic component of a supporting char­
acter can cause a ripple effect through the mimetic and thematic func­
tions of a protagonist. // on a winter's night a traveler is above all an 
example of how the synthetic can subsume the other two functions— 
and in so doing, establish an admirably inventive kind of progression. 
At this stage the principles of the interpretation of character and 
progression in narrative have been repeatedly exemplified and reex­
amined. In the next part, I turn to consider another, equally crucial 
side of the rhetorical transaction of reading narrative: resisting the 
understanding that these principles might lead one to. My focus will 
be the character of Catherine Barkley in Hemingway's A Farewell to 
Arms, but the actual analysis of her case will draw on most of the 
principles that have been developed so far. In another sense, though, 
my discussion of her character is an extension of the concerns of this 
part of the study: I will be looking at the interaction of the mimetic, 
thematic, and synthetic functions in this character where the syn­
thetic component remains in the background. 
Ill Evaluating—and Resisting— 
Character and Progression 

Evaluation and Resistance: 
The Case of Catherine Barkley 
i 
To this point, my questions about character and progression have 
been contained within the fence erected by my concern with entering 
the authorial audience. Moreover, in specifying the way the compo­
nents of character relate to each other and to the progression of the 
different narratives we have examined, I have also implicitly been 
accepting—even honoring—those works. Now I would like to turn 
my attention to the great wide world beyond the fence, or, to switch 
metaphors, to move from understanding to "overstanding"—that is, 
to some critical evaluation of what we have understood.1 What hap­
pens when we enter the authorial audience only to find the author's 
hospitality lacking—or even offensive? On what rhetorical ground do 
we take our stand when we want not only to resist a narrative and its 
characters but also to claim that the resistance is more than personal 
or idiosyncratic? Or to phrase the question in the way most pertinent 
to this inquiry: what happens when a character performs thematic 
functions that clash with the values of a substantial number of flesh-
and-blood readers? 
The thematic functions of Catherine Barkley in Ernest Heming-
way's A Farewell to Arms provide an instructive and challenging op­
portunity for exploring this side of our rhetorical exchange with 
authors. On the one hand, these thematic functions seem to invite 
negative responses from most modern readers—Catherine apparently 
reflects Hemingway's sexism—but on the other, their relations to her 
mimetic and especially her synthetic functions complicate the act of 
overstanding by making us reassess our understanding. Indeed, of 
the narratives we have examined so far, Hemingway's has probably 
received the greatest range of interpretation and evaluation. For some 
critics Frederic Henry is an estimable hero, for others a figure to be 
scorned or perhaps pitied; for some, the novel is an achievement of 
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the first rank, for others a sentimental or pernicious tale. Conse­
quently, before our overstanding can proceed with any confidence we 
will need to reconstruct carefully the narrative's progression and 
Catherine's various functions within it. We will pay special attention 
to her synthetic component, not because it is foregrounded like Wem-
mick's but because the uses to which Hemingway puts Catherine 
have an especially intricate relation to her thematic functions. In or­
der to provide the best context for this whole investigation, let us 
begin with a look at a vigorous attack on the novel that includes a 
strong indictment of Hemingway's characterization of Catherine: Ju­
dith Fetterley's feminist critique in The Resisting Reader.2 
II 
Fetterley's project is to "make palpable" the designs that American 
fiction has on its female readers (p. xii), to uncover the covert story of 
men's power over women that repeatedly appears in the canonized 
works of male authors. In A Farewell to Arms 
the issue of power is thoroughly obscured by the mythology, lan­
guage, and structure of romantic love and by the invocation of an 
abstract, though spiteful "they" whose goal is to break the good, 
the beautiful, and the brave. Yet the brave who is broken is 
Catherine; at the end of the novel Catherine is dead, Frederic is 
alive. . . . Frederic survives several years of war, massive injuries, 
the dangers of a desperate retreat, and the threat of execution by 
his own army; Catherine dies in her first pregnancy. Clearly, biol­
ogy is destiny. Yet Catherine is [also] . .  . a scapegoat. . . . For 
Frederic to survive, free of the intolerable burdens of marriage, 
family, and fatherhood, yet with his vision of himself as the heroic 
victim of cosmic antagonism intact, Catherine must die. Frederic's 
necessities determine Catherine's fate. He is, indeed, the agent of 
her death. (Pp. xv-xvi) 
Fetterley divides her detailed reading of the novel into five sec­
tions. The first opens by claiming that the novel is a lie, whose surface 
idealization of romantic love disguises Frederic's "true aims:" to evade 
the fact that he must grow up and to eliminate Catherine because she 
threatens to force adulthood upon him (p. 47). This surface idealiza­
tion, then, disguises "a hostility whose full measure can be taken 
from the fact that Catherine dies and dies because she is a woman" 
(p. 49). From these claims, this section moves on to explore the way 
in which the background of the whole love story, the culture of 
war—reflected for the most part in Rinaldi's comments—"erases the 
distinctions among women that normally keep male hostility under 
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some restraint and . . . legitimizes aggression against all women" 
(p. 49). The second section narrows its focus to Frederic Henry. Fet­
terley claims that despite his superficial apparent difference from his 
companions, Frederic embodies the attitudes of his culture toward 
women. He resents women such as Miss Van Campen who are in 
positions of authority and is contemptuous of women such as Mrs. 
Walker who are less than competent. More importantly, his ultimate 
attitude toward Catherine is hostility: 
If the violence of the novel's ending is striking, so too is its abstract 
nature, its reliance on a biological trap which is the agent of an 
impersonal "they" who break the brave and the beautiful. Yet 
surely this abstraction masks both Frederic's fear of Catherine and 
his hostility toward her. The image of strangulation, suggested 
by the comparison with Othello [Catherine has called Frederic 
"Othello with his occupation gone"], persists, leaving in us the 
nagging suspicion that Frederic Henry sees himself in the dead 
fetus which emerges from Catherine's womb and that her death, 
however much it may be shaped as biological accident, is in fact 
the fulfillment of his own unconscious wish, his need to kill her 
lest she kill him. (P. 53) 
The third section seeks to demonstrate this charge more fully by 
examining the relation between Frederic and Catherine. The basis of 
that relationship is Frederic's desire to be served and Catherine's will­
ingness to meet his needs. 
It is possible for Frederic to love Catherine because she provides 
him with the only kind of relationship he is capable of accepting: 
he does not have to act; he does not have to think about things 
because she thinks for him . . . ; he does not have to assume re­
sponsibility; and he does not have to make a final commitment 
because both her facile logic and her ultimate death give him a 
convenient out. (Pp. 59-60) 
Furthermore, Frederic erects a phony moral basis for his refusal to 
accept responsibility in his "sense that he is a victim of betrayal" 
(p. 61). Catherine serves this sense by betraying him too. She "entan­
gles him in a relationship with her, pretending that there will be no 
drawbacks, no demands, pressures, or responsibilities, only benefits; 
then she gets pregnant" (p.61). That pregnancy of course eventually 
leads to her death, which makes Frederic feel even more like a victim. 
So in serving his sense of betrayal, she also fails him. She can't win, 
but "her death is the logical consequence of the cumulative hostilities 
Frederic feels toward her, and the final expression of the connection 
between the themes of love and war" (p. 62). 
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In the fourth section, Fetterley seeks to demonstrate that the novel 
connects the womb and death. She notes the connection made in the 
first chapter's description of soldiers carrying their ammunition— 
"the cartridge boxes . . . bulged forward under the capes so that the 
men, passing on the road, marched as though they were six months 
gone with child"—and comments that the novel could hardly state 
more clearly "that pregnancy is death and the womb an agent of de­
struction" (p. 61). Fetterley then traces the contrasts the novel estab­
lishes between inner and outer space, arguing finally that the safe 
inner world of the womb becomes "a chamber of horrors filled with 
blood and death" (p. 65). 
In the fifth and final section, Fetterley discusses the contradictions 
of Catherine's character—sometimes tough, sometimes gentle, some­
times romantic, sometimes businesslike, sometimes a partner who 
acts as Hemingway's version of the male buddy, sometimes a com­
panion who is the essence of the feminine. Fetterley maintains that 
"Catherine's contradictions are not resolvable because her character is 
determined by forces outside of her; it is a reflection of male psychol­
ogy and male fantasy life and is understandable only when seen as a 
series of responses to the male world that surrounds her" (p. 66). To 
read her character carefully, for Fetterley, is once again to discover the 
hostility toward women underlying the whole narrative. Catherine 
"defines herself in terms of men," and she adopts a negative self-
image as a result: "in a world in which the ideal is an asexual priest 
and in which women are defined solely in sexual terms, it is no won­
der Catherine hates herself and feels guilty for existing" (p. 69). And 
so she is always apologizing. Moreover, in a final expression of hos­
tility, according to Fetterley, "the responsibility for both her death 
and the child's is implicitly placed on Catherine" (p. 70), while the 
male doctor's competence is never questioned. In summary, 
if we weep at the end of the book . . . , it is not for Catherine but 
for Frederic Henry. All our tears are ultimately for men, because in 
the world of A Farewell to Arms male life is what counts. And the 
message to women reading this classic love story and experiencing 
its image of the female ideal is clear and simple: the only good 
woman is a dead one, and even then there are questions. (P. 71) 
The specifics of this powerful indictment, I think, are best as­
sessed not one at a time but as part of a consideration of Fetterley's 
whole interpretive method. Her practical criticism, like that of Scholes 
and Brooks, raises some significant questions about methodology, 
though, unlike theirs, her project is not explicitly theoretical and so 
does not directly address those issues. The methodological question 
underlying her analysis is how one determines what a covert story is, 
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or, more formally, what principles guide the operation of uncovering 
the covert story implied in a narrative. We can readily identify two: 
(1) The inferences about what is covert need to follow from a satisfac­
tory explanation, tacit or expressed, of the overt story. If one mischar­
acterizes the overt story, then the inferences one draws about its 
covert message will be highly suspect—at best one could be right for 
the wrong reason; at worst, one could be resisting not the author's 
narrative but only some of the material out of which the narrative is 
built, or even a different narrative constructed by the critic out of the 
same materials as the author's. (2) Those inferences ought to follow 
from a pattern detectable in the overt story. Since any one character, 
incident, or narrative comment can easily be recontextualized and of­
fered in support of countless covert messages (one could, for ex­
ample, construct a hypothesis about Hemingway's covert negative 
message about Switzerland on the basis of Catherine's dying there or 
a positive one on the basis of its being like the priest's homeland, the 
Abruzzi), the plausibility of any one hypothesis will depend in large 
part on its being anchored in a recognizable pattern in the overt 
story.3 In any one case, then, the successful execution of this second 
principle will depend on the successful execution of the first. One can 
only detect the patterns after the details of the whole have been 
arranged. 
My claim here is that characterizing the whole is logically prior to 
detecting the pattern; it may or may not be temporally prior. Some 
critics may detect a pattern before they detect the configuration of the 
whole; the understanding of that pattern and its effects, however, 
must be confirmed or disconfirmed by the understanding of the 
whole. 
Fetterley implicitly acknowledges the necessity of seeing the covert 
as tied to the overt in her characterization of the overt as based on the 
mythology of romantic love and in her attempts to show the various 
patterns of the novel's hostility toward women under that myth. But 
since she spends so much time on her claims about the patterns of 
hostility and so little on the way in which the overt narrative asks the 
reader to take those elements constituting the pattern, we must pause 
before fully accepting her indictment. Is Fetterley resisting Heming-
way's narrative or some possible narrative she has implicitly con­
structed out of Hemingway's material? This question has greater force 
when we note that her handling of the textual evidence in making her 
case for the covert message rests on three significant methodological 
assumptions: (1) There is no significant progression in the book, 
except for its gradual revelation of male hostility toward women. 
Although Frederic's external circumstances change, his character re­
mains largely unchanged. Thus, Frederic's attitudes toward Catherine 
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early in the narrative can be taken as an accurate sign of his later 
attitude toward her. Imagery from one part of the narrative can be 
related directly to later parts; to take just one instance, Fetterley has 
no apparent qualms in building her case that Catherine's remark about 
Othello is a sufficient sign that Henry wants to kill Catherine before 
she kills him.4 (2) The male characters can be seen as reliably reflect­
ing Hemingway's beliefs. Thus, Rinaldi's views of women can be 
taken as Hemingway's views of women. Thus, Frederic's attitude to­
ward Catherine early in the narrative reflects Hemingway's. (3) Effi­
cient causes are actually final causes. Although Frederic sees the final 
cause of Catherine's death as the nature of the world, Fetterley never 
gives serious consideration to that explanation. For her, it is simply a 
mask behind which Frederic hides the real final cause, his—and 
Hemingway's—hostility toward her. 
Now this third assumption is one that is clearly part of Fetterley's 
resistance. We can ask for a warrant for the assumption, but simply 
to point out that the narrative makes a distinction between the two 
kinds of causes is only to tell Fetterley what she already knows. The 
first two assumptions, however, have a different status. Fetterley 
does not claim that the overt story offers a progression that is covertly 
undermined, or that it offers an apparent distance between author 
and character that is covertly closed. Instead, she is working to un­
cover the attitudes hidden beneath the romantic surface of an overt 
story that exhibits progression of circumstance but no progression of 
attitudes and that establishes no significant difference between the 
author and his male characters. 
As might be expected by anyone who has stayed with me this far, 
I think that the key assumption is the one about the progression. If 
Fetterley is justified there, then her indictment will be far more con­
vincing than otherwise. If, for example, she is justified there, then 
she will in effect be giving a warrant for her third assumption: if the 
only significant progression is the gradual revelation of the hostility 
of men to women, then the covert message of Catherine's death 
would be that she died because she was a woman. If, however, her 
assumption about the progression does not hold up, then much of 
her case will be in jeopardy, because in effect the narrative that she is 
resisting will not be Hemingway's. Let us now turn to consider the 
progression of the overt story in some detail. 
Ill 
The central progression of the novel begins in the first chapter with 
the establishment of a tension between Frederic and the authorial au­
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dience. That tension is made possible by Hemingway's careful control 
of the first-person narration in the famous opening. 
In the late summer of that year we lived in a house in a village that 
looked across the river and the plain to the mountains. In the 
bed of the river there were pebbles and boulders, dry and white 
in the sun, and the water was clear and swiftly moving and blue in 
the channels. Troops went by the house and down the road and 
the dust they raised powdered the leaves of the trees. The trunks 
of the trees too were dusty and the leaves fell early that year. . . .5 
The authorial audience infers Hemingway's negative attitude toward 
the troops, his message about their disruption of nature: the appeal­
ing vision of river, plain, and mountains, of the boulders and pebbles 
of the riverbed and the clear, blue water of its channels is disrupted 
by the entry of the troops whose marching eventually leads to the 
unnatural, early falling of the leaves. Because Frederic, however, is 
just describing and not analyzing—we supply the causal links, he 
piles up the "ands"—it is questionable whether he shares in this 
communication between Hemingway and the authorial audience. 
This question persists as Hemingway uses Frederic's narration to 
show us a connection between the rain and the destruction of life, a 
connection that also is established in part through descriptions of the 
trees: "in the fall when the rains came the leaves all fell from the 
chestnut trees and the branches were bare and the trunks black with 
rain. The vineyards were thin and bare-branched too and all the coun­
try wet and brown and dead with autumn" (p. 4). The final sentences 
of the chapter answer the question. "At the start of the winter 
came the permanent rain and with the rain came the cholera. But it 
was checked and in the end only seven thousand died of it in the 
army" (p. 4). 
The authorial audience blanches at that "only" and at the restricted 
concern with the "army." Even acknowledging that a cholera epi­
demic could easily wipe out more than seven thousand, we cannot 
overlook the callous attitude toward those troops (and an untold 
number of civilians) that is expressed in the sentence. Frederic seems 
to be mouthing here the party line, the official account of what hap­
pened, just as in his later debate with Passini he will mouth the offi­
cial line that defeat is worse than war. In sum, by the end of the first 
chapter the authorial audience knows that it is being addressed by a 
narrator whose knowledge of his own situation is more limited than 
its own and whose values are rather distant from those of his author. 
The progression is then further complicated by the introduction of 
the major instabilities: Frederic's situation as an American in the Ital­
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ian army and his relation with Catherine. Here too we recognize a 
distance between him and Hemingway: he has simply drifted into the 
war, and he feels distant from it. "Well, I knew I would not be killed. 
Not in this war. It did not have anything to do with me. It seemed no 
more dangerous to me myself than war in the movies" (p. 37). He 
becomes interested in Catherine because pursuing her "was better 
than going every evening to the house for officers where the girls 
climbed all over you and put your cap on backward as a sign of affec­
tion between their trips upstairs with brother officers" (p. 30). He 
does not recognize her own insight into the games they are playing, 
does not realize all the ways in which she is in control of what hap­
pens between them. 
In short, at the outset of the narrative, Hemingway asks us to re­
gard Frederic as a callow, unreflective, self-centered youth, who is in 
over his head both in the war and in his relationship with Catherine. 
The complications of the main instabilities follow a path that gradu­
ally also leads to a resolution of the initial tension. The progression 
traces Frederic's slow evolution into a mature man who both learns 
and faces up to what the narrative presents as the overwhelming 
truth of his existence. He is in danger not just from the war but from 
the world itself, which is inevitably and wantonly destructive. In his 
initial stumbling through this world, he is introduced by Catherine to 
the possibility of an alternate world. He slowly realizes what that 
world is all about, slowly realizes its difference from and superiority 
to the world of the war that he has been living in, and he eventually 
commits himself to a life with Catherine in which they try to live in 
that alternate world. 
When Frederic first sees Catherine walk into his hospital room in 
Milan, he claims that "I was in love with her" (p. 89). But Hemingway 
does not give his authorial endorsement to Frederic's claim. Instead 
Hemingway shows that although Frederic has moved beyond prefer­
ring Catherine to the whores at the front, his love is stll seriously 
deficient. Frederic is in love with Catherine's physical beauty, but he 
still does not commit himself fully to her, as Hemingway indicates 
through Frederic's selfish reaction to the news of her pregnancy 
and through his characteristically unthinking decision to leave her 
and head back to the front. Both actions also maintain the ten­
sion, because they show that he still does not know what we—and 
Catherine—know about the world. After the disastrous retreat from 
Caporetto that leads Henry to make his separate peace, one of the 
major instabilities is all but resolved. Frederic and Catherine need to 
get fully clear of the army and the war, as they eventually do in the 
flight to Switzerland, but Frederic's symbolic baptism in the Taglia­
mento signals the end of his own involvement in the war. 
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By this point, however, the authorial audience has seen so much 
evidence of Hemingway's view of the world that a new kind of in­
stability replaces that one—and in fact carries the narrative through 
to the end. Once we know that the world is destructive, then we 
know—in general terms at least—the outcome of the narrative. We 
read on both to see how that outcome will emerge and to see whether 
Frederic will come to know what Hemingway, the authorial audience, 
and Catherine already know. This instability becomes even more 
prominent because once Frederic returns to Catherine the instability 
about his commitment to her is resolved. "Often a man wishes to be 
alone and a girl wishes to be alone too and if they love each other 
they are jealous of that in each other, but I can truly say we never felt 
that. We could feel alone when we were together, alone against the 
others. It has happened to me like that once. I have been alone while 
I was with many girls and that is the way you can be most lonely. But 
we were never lonely and never afraid when we were together" 
(pp. 238-39). As this passage indicates, the final section of the nar­
rative shows Frederic's growing knowledge of the world, a knowl­
edge ultimately attained through his witnessing of the death of his 
child and especially the death of Catherine. The separate world he 
and Catherine have sought to create has not been expanded but de­
stroyed, and Frederic is left to live out his life with the knowledge of 
what he has lost and the certainty that there is no escape from the 
destruction he has just experienced. 
The emotional quality of this progression is similar to that we as­
sociate with tragedy, but its trajectory is different from the classical 
pattern. Given Hemingway's view of the world, Frederic's doom is a 
condition of existence, not something that he is even partly respon­
sible for: there is no moment of tragic choice here. And unlike 
Oedipus, Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello, and King Lear who become in­
creasingly ravaged as their tragedies unfold, Frederic actually grows 
in wisdom and grace. As he slowly changes, he becomes more and 
more aligned with Hemingway's norms—and thus more estimable in 
the eyes of the authorial audience. The last step in that growth is not 
made until the last sentences of the narrative, which provide both 
completeness and closure as they depict Frederic's response to his 
loss. 
His initial impulse is to have one final romantic scene with Cath­
erine, and he chases the nurses out of the hospital room to be alone 
with her. "But after I got them out and turned off the light it wasn't 
any good. It was like saying good-bye to a statue" (p. 314). As Eugene 
B. Cantelupe has noted, Frederic's earlier reflections on the marble 
busts in the hospital at the front have loaded the simile with great 
force: "They had the complete marble quality of looking alike. Sculp­
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ture had seemed a dull business . . . marble busts all looked like a 
cemetery" (p. 28).6 Frederic now must face the reality of Catherine's 
death and respond to that. The very last sentence of the narrative, 
"After a while I went out and left the hospital and walked back to the 
hotel in the rain" (p. 314), conveys the knowledge (after a while) and 
the grief (it was what makes him move so slowly) and the control (he 
moves nevertheless, even as he is being hit in the face with the de­
structive rain) behind his very deliberate action. The instabilites and 
tensions are all resolved here. There is nothing left for him to do for 
Catherine. There is no longer any gap in either his knowledge about 
or his experience of the world's destructiveness. His doom is com­
plete. And yet in spite of his knowledge and in spite of his experi­
ence, he is not crushed but takes a step that indicates he may become 
one of those who are strong at the broken places. 
If even this partial analysis of the progression has merit, then, as 
noted above, it casts strong doubt on much of Fetterley's indictment. 
If Frederic's treatment of Catherine throughout much of the book is 
not endorsed by Hemingway, then it cannot be used as evidence of 
Hemingway's view of women. At the same time, this analysis leaves 
parts of the indictment untouched. Fetterley's point about the covert 
message of Frederic's treatment of women in authority or without ap­
propriate competence does correspond to a pattern in the overt story 
that the progression neither requires nor transforms. But of course 
the crucial issue for assessing Fetterley's resistance is the narrative's 
treatment of Catherine, the subject to which I now turn. 
IV 
Though incomplete, the above analysis of the progression indicates 
that for the novel to be effective Hemingway needs to accomplish at 
least three synthetic tasks: (1) provide some means to bring about 
Frederic's change; (2) incorporate evidence that the world is in fact 
destructive; and (3) create the sense that Catherine's death is not the 
fault of anything or anyone except the impersonal "they" who kill 
everyone eventually, hurrying after only the very good and the very 
gentle and the very brave. Significantly, Hemingway gives Catherine 
synthetic functions that contribute to his accomplishing all three of 
these tasks. 
More than anything or anyone else Catherine is responsible for the 
change in Frederic, for his growth in knowledge about the world and 
for his corresponding growth in unselfish love. To be sure, Henry's 
experiences in the war contribute to his knowledge about the world 
175 Evaluation and Resistance 
but it is his life with Catherine that enables him to understand the 
significance of those experiences. Hemingway shows us, for example, 
that even after watching Passini die a very painful death and having 
his own knee blown up, Frederic is blind to the nature of the war. 
Immediately before those events Frederic and Passini argue about the 
war: the Italian driver claims that nothing is worse, while Frederic 
rather weakly maintains that defeat is worse. 
"It could not be worse/' Passini said respectfully. 'There is nothing 
worse than war." 
"Defeat is worse." 
"I do not believe it," Passini said still respectfully. "What is de­
feat? You go home." . . . 
"Tenente," Passini said. "We understand you let us talk. Listen. 
There is nothing as bad as war. We in the auto-ambulance cannot 
even realize at all how bad it is. When people realize how bad it is 
they cannot do anything to stop it because they go crazy. There are 
some people who never realize. There are people who are afraid of 
their officers. It is with them the war is made." 
"I know it is bad but we must finish it." 
"It doesn't finish. There is no finish to a war." 
"Yes there is." 
Passini shook his head. 
"War is not won by victory. What if we take San Gabriele? What 
if we take the Carso and Monfalcone and Trieste? Where are we 
then? Did you see all the far mountains to-day? Do you think we 
could take them all too? Only if the Austrians stop fighting. One 
side must stop fighting. Why don't we stop fighting? If they come 
down into Italy they will get tired and go away. They have their 
own country. But no, there is a war." (Pp. 49-50) 
At this point, Frederic essentially gives up the argument by com­
menting on Passings delivery rather than replying to the substance of 
his remark: "You're an orator" (p. 50). 
With this argument as backdrop, Frederic's description of the shell­
ing that kills Passini and injures himself takes on more significance: 
Through the other noise I heard a cough, then came the chuh-
chuh-chuh-chuh—then there was a flash, as when a blast-furnace 
door is swung open, and a roar that started white and went red 
and on and on in a rushing wind. I tried to breathe but my breath 
would not come and I felt myself rush bodily out of myself and out 
and out and out and all the time bodily in the wind. I went out 
swiftly, all of myself, and I knew I was dead and that it had all been 
a mistake to think you just died. Then I floated, and instead of 
going on I felt myself slide back. . .  . In the jolt of my head I heard 
somebody crying. I thought somebody was screaming. I tried to 
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move but I could not move. I heard the machine-guns and rifles 
firing across the river and all along the river. There was a great 
splashing and I saw the star-shells go up and burst and float 
whitely and rockets going up and heard the bombs, all this in a 
moment, and then I heard close to me some one saying "Mama 
Mia! oh, Mama Mia!" I pulled and twisted and got my legs loose 
finally and turned around and touched him. It was Passini and 
when I touched him he screamed. His legs were toward me and I 
saw in the dark and the light that they were both smashed above 
the knee. One leg was gone and the other was held by tendons 
and part of the trouser and the stump twitched and jerked as 
though it were not connected. He bit his arm and moaned, "Oh 
mama mia, mama Mia," then, "Dio te salve, Maria. Dio te salve, 
Maria. Oh Jesus shoot me Christ shoot me mama mia mama Mia 
oh purest lovely Mary shoot me. Stop it. Stop it. Stop it. Oh Jesus 
lovely Mary stop it. Oh oh oh oh," then choking "Mama mama 
mia." Then he was quiet, biting his arm, the stump of his leg 
twitching. (P. 54) 
When the priest then visits Frederic in the hospital, he tells Fred­
eric, "You do not mind the war. You do not see it. You must forgive 
me. I know you are wounded." Henry replies, "That is an accident." 
The priest: "Still even wounded you do not see it" (p. 68). Yet when 
Frederic and the priest next discuss the war—upon Frederic's return 
to the front after his summer of convalescence in Milan—Frederic 
adopts Passings position. He tells the priest that victory may be worse 
than defeat because it prolongs the war and that "the peasant has 
wisdom because he is defeated from the start." Reflecting on these 
statements, Frederic says, "I do not think and yet when I begin to talk 
I say things that I have found out in my mind without thinking" 
(p. 172). 
For the authorial audience, however, the experience of reading the 
preceding chapters describing Frederic's life with Catherine in Milan 
leads to a more concrete source of Frederic's mental turnabout— 
Catherine herself. As Spanier points out, Catherine knows what the 
war—and the world—are like before she meets Henry. During their 
first conversation, she says, "People can't realize what France is like. 
If they did, it couldn't all go on. He didn't have a sabre cut. They blew 
him all to bits" (p. 20).7 Much of her behavior in the novel, especially 
her willingness to give herself to Frederic and to construct their alter­
nate world, is a response to this knowledge. Given the belief that the 
world is inevitably destructive, she doesn't care any more about her 
own soon-to-be-destroyed identity; she cares instead about living for 
as long as she can in a world built on the values of gentleness, service, 
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and communion. Catherine occasionally articulates pieces of this 
knowledge, but it is her behavior that affects Frederic. To move as 
Frederic does from life with Catherine to life on the front is to move 
from a world of tenderness and gentleness to a world of impersonal 
violence and destruction. It is no wonder that upon returning to the 
front Henry is suddenly able to articulate his newfound appreciation 
for defeat and the gentleness that accompanies it. 
Similarly it is also not surprising that he articulates his knowledge 
of the world directly after the account of his reunion with Catherine 
in Stresa. Although the shift in tense indicates that he has attained 
this knowledge only after the events of the narrative, his placement 
suggests how strongly he associates that knowledge with Catherine. 
Thus, the apparently abrupt transition from his thoughts about Cath­
erine to his thoughts about the world is striking but logical—it is she 
who has taught him: 
I know that the night is not the same as the day: that all things are 
different, that the things of the night cannot be explained in the 
day, because they do not then exist, and the night can be a dreadful 
time for lonely people once their loneliness has started. But with 
Catherine there was almost no difference in the night except that it 
was an even better time. If people bring so much courage to this 
world the world has to kill them to break them, so of course it kills 
them. The world breaks everyone and afterward many are strong 
at the broken places. But those that will not break it kills. It kills 
the very good and the very gentle and the very brave impartially. 
If you are none of these you can be sure it will kill you too but there 
will be no special hurry. (Pp. 238-39) 
As Catherine teaches Henry, she also teaches the authorial audi-
ence—though she is not the only element of the novel providing evi­
dence for Hemingway's case that the world is malevolent. Frederic's 
unreflective descriptions of the war, the rain, the cholera, and the 
various injuries and deaths he witnesses are what give us this instruc­
tion most strongly. But once these descriptions illustrate Heming-
way's view, he can then use Catherine to speak about the world for 
him in order to reinforce or extend this view. "I'm afraid of the rain 
because sometimes I see me dead in it" (p. 121). "There's only us two 
and in the world there's all the rest of them. If anything comes be­
tween us we're gone and then they have us" (p. 134). "I'm not brave 
anymore, darling. I'm all broken. . . . They just keep it up till they 
break you" (p. 306). As the narrative progresses and Hemingway uses 
Frederic's descriptions and Catherine's comments to make his world 
view clearer and clearer, our knowledge that Henry and Catherine 
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are doomed becomes firmer and firmer—and part of our knowledge 
is that this doom is a condition of existence, not the responsibility of 
any human agent. 
Fetterley's neglect of these synthetic functions in the overt story is 
a serious omission in her analysis. As Hemingway has Catherine per­
form these functions, he in effect stands with her as they both look 
down upon Frederic. To argue that there is an underlying hostility in 
this major aspect of Hemingway's characterization is to argue that 
Hemingway is using Catherine to express hostility toward himself. 
That line of argument may have a certain appeal, but it would lead to 
a very different covert story from the one Fetterley recounts. Never­
theless, what we have seen so far is not the whole story of Catherine's 
role in the narrative. 
In addition to the synthetic functions traced above, Catherine per­
forms one more in her death, for that event is not only the final sign 
of the world's malevolence but also the final test of Frederic's growth. 
As noted above, to know the nature of the world abstractly is one 
thing, to experience its destruction in the most painfully personal 
way is another, and to respond to that pain without being destroyed 
even further yet another. Frederic is able to survive this test, and for 
that Hemingway asks us to admire him. The point I want to stress 
now is that in this synthetic function, as in the others, Catherine is 
subordinated to Frederic; her death provides the occasion for the last 
stage of his growth. Whether there is an offensive covert implication 
here is a question that we can better answer after considering Cath-
erine's mimetic and thematic functions and their relations to these 
synthetic ones. Since Catherine's mimetic function has been espe­
cially problematic, I shall begin with it. 
Setting aside for the moment the extent to which she is the product 
of a male fantasy, we can recognize that she possesses the following 
traits: she is tall, blond, attractive, and slim-hipped; she is self-
effacing, gentle, and compliant; sexually inexperienced but knowl­
edgeable about the world; despite her gentleness, tough in the face of 
danger or pain. As Fetterley notes, critics have often found this group 
of traits to result in an incoherent character—sometimes tough, some­
times gentle, sometimes a partner who acts as Hemingway's version 
of the good man, sometimes a companion who is the essence of the 
feminine. Yet if we can grant Hemingway his premise that the shock 
of her first boyfriend's death has jolted Catherine into knowledge of 
the world, then I think that she can be more accurately seen as having 
a coherent mimetic function. The basis of her character is her tough­
ness, but the basis of her behavior is her knowledge of the world. 
Starting with the belief that doom is a condition of existence, that the 
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world will visit its impersonal violence on her, Catherine acts to es­
tablish a life based on opposing principles, on the values of gentle­
ness, tenderness, and union with another human being. To the extent 
that the other also appreciates those values, she will succeed in cre­
ating that alternate though temporary life. It takes a long time, but I 
think that Hemingway wants us to see Frederic in Switzerland be­
coming such another.8 At the same time, because Catherine is fun­
damentally tough, she is able to stand up to the problems along the 
way: the pregnancy, Frederic's going back to the front, the flight into 
Switzerland, the pain of her childbirth. 
Of these many attributes, only some become the basis for thematic 
functions. Consider, for example, the different ways the progression 
leads us to regard two of Catherine's physical traits, her long hair and 
her narrow hips. As previous critics have noted, Catherine's long hair 
is a sign of her feminine sexuality, but over and above that it becomes 
a sign of the temporary but important barrier Catherine and Frederic 
attempt to erect between themselves and the world's destruction. 
I loved to take her hair down and she sat on the bed and kept very 
still, except suddenly she would dip down to kiss me while I was 
doing it, and I would take out the pins and lay them on the sheet 
and it would be loose and I would watch her while she kept very 
still and then take out the last two pins and it would all come down 
and she would drop her head and we would both be inside of it, 
and it was the feeling of inside a tent or behind a falls. (Pp. 109-10) 
With Hemingway's implicit endorsement of the feelings expressed 
here, the long hair, while perhaps not being converted into a separate 
thematic function, certainly participates in and contributes to the the­
matic function carried by her traits of toughness and gentleness, 
namely, indicating the best responses to the world's malevolence. 
I will say more about that function shortly, but first note that if I 
am right about the progression's emphasis on destruction as a condi­
tion of existence, then Catherine's narrow hips have no analogous 
function—not even in the covert story. They do provide a mimetic— 
and medical—explanation of why Catherine dies in childbirth, but 
the progression works against the inference that the width of Cath-
erine's hips is the real cause of her death. It implies instead that the 
cause is the nature of the world; if it had not been her hips, it would 
have been something else; if it had not been in childbirth, it would 
have been some other time. Fetterley's complaint about Hemingway's 
deflecting responsibility from the doctor seems to miss this whole 
element of the overt story: to make the doctor responsible would be 
to undermine the thematic point of the whole event, since it would 
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imply that if they had chosen a different doctor, things could have 
turned out differently. Even as the progression suggests that if the 
doom had not come this way it would have come another, it supplies 
an implicit logic for this mechanism. By making the efficient cause 
related to Frederic and Catherine's lovemaking, which is itself so con­
nected to their attempts to construct an alternate world, the progres­
sion reinforces the point about the world's malevolence. Second, by 
making Catherine the one who dies, the progression recalls Frederic's 
earlier conclusion that the world goes after the very good and the very 
brave and the very gentle first. To argue that the covert message here 
is that Catherine dies because of her female biology is, I think, not to 
resist the overt story but to ignore it. 
Now consider Catherine's gentleness and her toughness. Together 
these traits form the basis of her identification as one of those who is 
strong at the broken places and as one of the very good and brave 
and gentle. In short, Catherine's response to her knowledge of the 
world—her attempt to establish an alternate way of life—and her 
tough response to pain and danger, especially to her own impending 
death during childbirth, serve the thematic function of demonstrating 
how one should act in the face of such knowledge. In performing this 
thematic function, Catherine again stands with Hemingway, or as 
Spanier puts it, she fulfills the role of a code hero-ine.9 Furthermore, 
the strong connection between Catherine's synthetic functions and 
this thematic function gives it a prominent place in the progression of 
the whole narrative. 
But this is still not the whole story. Even as the progression points 
to this dominant thematic function, it also creates another, more 
problematic one connected with Fetterley's complaint about Cather-
ine's constant desire to serve Frederic and his contentment in having 
her serve. Throughout their time together, both in Milan and in Swit­
zerland, Catherine's first concern is to serve Frederic, and as she does 
so, he repeatedly tells us, apparently with Hemingway's approval, 
"we had a fine life." To enter the authorial audience, we are asked to 
agree, and thereby to assent to a definition of the fine life in which 
the female is endlessly self-effacing, tirelessly available, and continu­
ally sacrificing. In other words, Frederic's descriptions and commen­
tary, even of their life in Switzerland, convert these traits of Catherine 
into a thematic function that can only be described as hopelessly sex­
ist. In this respect, Catherine does appear to be the projection of a 
male fantasy. 
Let us examine more closely the relation between Catherine's posi­
tive and negative thematic functions. The conclusion that the positive 
function has a prominent role in the progression suggests that the 
181 Evaluation and Resistance 
negative function might in fact be what Ralph Rader has called an 
unintended negative consequence of a positive intention: in order for 
Catherine to fulfill her synthetic role as the agent of Frederic's change 
and her other thematic role as the exemplary respondent to the 
world, she unavoidably appears as the image of a sexist male's view 
of an ideal woman.10 Although this explanation has the appeal of co­
herently relating the functions, it is, I think, finally unsatisfactory be­
cause the allegedly unintended consequences are actually avoidable, 
or in other words, they appear as intended as the positive intention. 
The hypothesis that lets Hemingway off the hook does not pay suffi­
cient attention to the way that the progression itself calls attention to 
the "fine life" with Catherine as the image of the ''fine" woman, to 
the way that the emphasis on both this life and Catherine's subservi­
ence are prominent parts of the narrative. As Fetterley notes, Cath­
erine does define herself in terms of men and that mode of defini­
tion appears to be taken for granted as a natural occurrence by 
Hemingway. 
Furthermore, the explanation is not sufficiently reflective about 
Hemingway's alleged positive intention; instead, it is willing to start 
where he starts, willing in other words to take the givens of the nar­
rative situation for granted, willing to silence by critical fiat the voices 
who want to argue. Fetterley certainly wants to reflect on those giv­
ens, and everyone who reads her is likely to do the same. A Farewell 
to Arms is after all a man's story and a story in which we are asked to 
focus on and admire the man's growth. So far so good—or at least 
no problem. But notice what happens: in a parallel to the way Cath­
erine serves Frederic on the mimetic level, she also serves him—and 
Hemingway—on the synthetic level. The woman's initially more ma­
ture vision becomes important largely for its use in our measurement 
of the man. And as we have seen, the logic of the narrative dictates 
that the woman be sacrificed as the final test for the man's growth. 
Furthermore, Frederic's resentment of women in authority and his 
contempt for those who are not fully competent also contribute to 
the narrative's overall subordination of women. Finally, why should 
Catherine and Henry's stillborn child be male rather than female? The 
implicit assumption there seems to be that the death of a son will be 
a greater blow to Frederic than the death of a daughter. It is in short 
another sign of how the narrative takes for granted the subordination 
of women to men. To accept uncritically the invitation offered by the 
work, to join the authorial audience without reservation, is also to 
take that subordination for granted. In this context, the adjective in 
the phrase, "Hemingway's positive intention," becomes extremely 
problematic. 
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Once one registers these problems and registers further the facts 
that the work shares its premises with many, many others and that it 
has a firm place in the canon of American literature, many flesh and 
blood readers will be impelled to argue with Hemingway's character­
ization of Catherine. Yet at the same time, to focus only on those 
problems is to miss some of the genuine power of the book, including 
that offered by the more successful aspects of Catherine's character­
ization, especially Hemingway's ability to make many of Catherine's 
mimetic, thematic, and synthetic functions reinforce each other and 
contribute to the emotional power of the progression. For readers 
who are concerned both with entering the authorial audience and 
holding on to a belief in the equality of the sexes, Hemingway's treat­
ment of Catherine makes the experience of reading A Farewell to Arms 
almost dizzying in its complexity and contradictions: the combination 
of admiration and objection, of positive and negative evaluation that 
the narrative invites and that I have expressed and reasoned to in my 
allegedly neat and linear argument sometimes exists as a single, si­
multaneous response to the narrative. There can, consequently, be no 
neat and simple outcome to the reader's response to the invitation 
Hemingway offers in Farewell. Hemingway's characterization of Cath­
erine is indeed sexist, but that sexism does not entirely destroy the 
power of the narrative or even of her own role in it, because that 
sexism does not exist in isolation from the more positive features of 
the characterization and the narrative as a whole. 
But even this is not yet the whole story. For those readers who want 
to question thoroughly the relation between our values and those we 
are asked to adopt as we enter the authorial audience, there is at least 
one more expository event to endure. In making the case for Cather-
ine's positive synthetic and thematic functions, I have argued that she 
stands with Hemingway in her knowledge of the world and in ex­
emplifying how to respond to that knowledge. Once we step outside 
the authorial audience, we recognize that this "knowledge" is actu­
ally a belief, and clearly a belief that will not be shared by all members 
of Hemingway's flesh-and-blood audience. As we have seen, Fetterley 
does not take the belief at all seriously but views it as Frederic's false 
justification of his sense of betrayal. Other critics such as Gerry Bren­
ner view the passages in which Frederic expresses those beliefs as 
"self-pitying essayettes."11 Even if such critics were, for the sake of 
argument, to accept my point that Hemingway stands behind Fred­
eric in the "If people bring so much courage to this world" speech, 
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then they would argue that Hemingway is standing behind a flawed 
philosophy, a false truth, an erroneous belief. One consequence of 
that argument would of course be to undermine the grounds of my 
partial defense of Hemingway's treatment of Catherine. But how 
would those critics make such a case? Alternatively, how would de­
fenders of Hemingway make a persuasive case for the validity of his 
beliefs? 
One way of arguing either side of the case is simply to invoke one's 
own beliefs about—and one's own experience in—the world: ''that's 
simply not true;" "Hemingway needs to find Jesus;" "Hemingway cap­
tures my experience of living in this awful world." Flesh-and-blood 
readers always make such evaluations, and those evaluations are al­
ways a significant part of their responses to a narrative. Because the 
values, beliefs, and experiences of those readers are almost infinitely 
various, I cannot consider them all, and I have no ambitions to deter­
mine what everyone should believe. Yet notice that neither Fetterley 
nor I have hesitated about saying that a sexist presentation of Cath­
erine ought to be judged negatively by all readers. Our willingness 
to speak against the values implicit in sexism is in part a reflection of 
a cultural norm held by the members of our social class: the feminist 
movement has arguably had its most consistent (if not its most signifi­
cant) success among the upwardly mobile, politically liberal members 
of the American academy. Indeed, to speak in defense of Catherine 
may be to put in question one's credentials as a politically correct 
literary critic. 
Be that as it may, the social pressure in the academy that reinforces 
the norm against sexism only partially warrants the complaints about 
sexism. Underneath that pressure is a clear ethical position that can 
legitimately claim to transcend the differences among the various spe­
cific belief systems of Western culture: To assume that women are 
inherently inferior to men is to deny full humanity to women.12 The 
norms, however, that may be invoked either for or against Heming-
way's world view—those, say, of existentialism on the one side and 
Catholicism on the other—do not transcend the differences among 
specific belief systems and, thus, do not imply any ethical norm as 
widely shared as the one against sexism. Yet if we look closely at the 
method controlling the assessment of Hemingway's uses of Catherine 
to this point, we can still find some guidance for evaluating Heming-
way's beliefs about the world—and by extension Catherine's roles 
that are connected with it. 
My method so far has been to explore two questions: (1) How well 
has Hemingway incorporated Catherine's mimetic, synthetic, and 
thematic functions into the larger progression of the distinct narrative 
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tragedy that he is writing? (2) What are the ethics of reading Cather­
ine as the authorial audience is asked to do? Or, what ethical position 
must one adopt to enter fully into the authorial audience's expected 
responses to Catherine's functions? The negative element of my eval­
uation stems from the conclusion that to enter into the authorial 
audience is occasionally to participate in and give consent to the defi­
cient ethics of sexism. The analogous questions about Hemingway's 
world view, then, are: (1) How well is it incorporated into the narra­
tive so that a flesh-and-blood reader may be induced to enter the au­
thorial audience and adopt that view at least for the time that she is 
reading the narrative? And (2) what are the ethical consequences of 
adopting this world view? 
Hemingway, I think, takes great pains to incorporate convincingly 
his world view into the narrative as a whole. The key problem he 
faced was one of appropriate generalization: most readers would be 
willing to agree that war is inevitably destructive, but how could 
he extend their belief about war to a belief about the world? His first 
device, one which I think is overdone, though not fatally so, is to 
establish the link between rain and destruction, a link that allows him 
to introduce in the very first chapter destruction from a source other 
than the war—the cholera epidemic. His second technique is to rep­
resent virtually all the destruction of the war itself as impersonal. The 
death of Catherine's first boyfriend is presented as just something 
that happens in war. The shelling that kills Passini and injures Fred­
eric is associated not with any malicious Austrian general but with 
the nature of things: go near the front and you may be blown up while 
eating cheese. Similarly, the bullet that kills Aymo during the retreat 
comes suddenly from some unspecified gun. The executions at the 
Tagliamento are as much a sign of the breakdown of the Italian army 
as they are a sign of the problems with the individuals carrying them 
out. Hemingway's third technique is to use from time to time Cath-
erine's own articulations of her knowledge. The result is that by the 
time Frederic articulates the world view in Chapter 34, we have been 
accumulating evidence for it for some time. Since the evidence is gen­
erally easy to accept piece by piece, we are well prepared to accept 
the grand conclusion. 
At the same time, the "If people bring so much courage to this 
world" passage itself is somewhat problematic. First, Frederic's depar­
ture from his normally flat "just-giving-the-facts" narration clearly 
marks the passage as a set piece of Hemingway's and runs the risk of 
appearing overwritten. In that respect, it is different from Frederic's 
articulation of similar beliefs during the agony of Catherine's child­
birth. His "That was what you did. You died" commentary more 
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clearly grows out of the immediate action. Second, the passage's 
claim—absent from the later passages—that the world is not just de­
structive but selective in its decisions about whom to destroy first 
strains one's credulity beyond the evidence of the narrative. Yes, 
Aymo appears to be one of the very good. And so does Catherine. 
And Passini too. But what about all the victims of the cholera? Or the 
soldier who bleeds to death above Frederic on the way to the field 
hospital? Or the men being executed at the Tagliamento? On the other 
hand, if we recall that Frederic expresses these thoughts immediately 
after he is writing about his happiness with Catherine, we can attrib­
ute this part of the generalization to his thoughts of her as very good, 
brave, and gentle. But the sense of the passage as a Hemingway set 
piece blocks that solution to the problem of overgeneralization. We 
are asked to see Frederic speaking for—indeed, with—Hemingway 
here. In summary, Hemingway's artistry in leading up to this passage 
and those that come later works well to win his reader's assent to the 
world view, though the passage itself is not fully successful in clinch­
ing the case. On balance, the artistic inducements for the flesh-and-
blood audience to adopt Hemingway's beliefs about the world, while 
not perfect, are sufficient for me to maintain my claim that Catherine's 
functions connected with the communication of those beliefs are 
positive ones. 
The best way to assess the ethics of Hemingway's world view, I 
think, is to consider the apparent consequences it has for those char­
acters who share it. And in examining its consequences for Catherine, 
we need to face the question of whether the belief in the world's ma­
levolence is connected with the sexist elements of the narrative. Is 
Catherine's willingness to be subservient to Frederic because of her 
knowledge of the world just another sign of Hemingway's automatic 
assumption of the subservience of women? We can better answer this 
question after a look at Count Greffi and the Frederic of Book V. 
Hemingway uses his creation of Count Greffi to perform the syn­
thetic function of showing his audience a character who lives with 
grace and dignity in the face of his own impending death. He would 
probably never make a speech such as Frederic's "If people bring so 
much courage to this world," but Hemingway lets him say enough so 
that the authorial audience can infer that his beliefs are similar to the 
later Frederic's. Greffi says that he values most "someone I love," that 
the war is "stupid," that he values life because "it is all I have," that 
he has expected to become religious as he has grown older "but some­
how it does not come" (pp. 250-51). The ethical consequences of Gref-
fi's beliefs all appear to be positive: he is gentle, kind, and solicitous 
with Frederic; he doesn't take himself too seriously yet he is content 
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with who he is. In the face of his coming death, he goes on much as 
he always has, giving his birthday parties, playing billiards, drinking 
champagne, wondering if he will become religious. If Hemingway's 
beliefs about the world lead to this kind of behavior, then we ought 
to have no qualms about adopting them. 
As the example of Greffi indicates, in considering the ethical di­
mension of Hemingway's beliefs about the world's malevolence, we 
are concerned both with the beliefs themselves and and his view of 
the proper responses to that malevolence. Like Catherine, Greffi per­
forms the thematic function of indicating how to live with the knowl­
edge of the world. He is an image of what Frederic might become in 
his old age. The Frederic we see in Book V is moving in this direction. 
He is content with the small things of his life, his equivalent of Greffi's 
billiards and champagne: he gets excited watching the hairdresser 
wave Catherine's hair; he loves to go riding along the country roads 
with her. More important, he treats Catherine more gently and solici­
tously than he ever has before. Again, while we could all easily imag­
ine higher standards of ethical conduct than Frederic exhibits, the 
ethical consequences of Hemingway's beliefs all seem positive. 
If, as these examples suggest, adopting the world view itself leads 
the male characters to be gentle and solicitous, to become like Cath­
erine, then we can, at least to some extent, separate the beliefs about 
the world from the sexism. Neither is necessarily implicated in the 
other. In fact, the ethical consequences of Hemingway's beliefs about 
the world appear to lead one away from rather than toward sexism. 
Nevertheless, Hemingway's deeply ingrained assumption that women 
are subordinate to men does intersect with those beliefs, most visibly 
in the implicit messages about how men and women respond to 
them. Both Greffi and the later Frederic have a kind of independence 
that is never even presented as an option for the male-identified Cath­
erine. The men can live in the destructive world without women, 
whereas the woman "naturally" turns to another man. Thus, Cath-
erine's subservience is a point where two of Hemingway's otherwise 
independent views intersect: his portrayal of her subservience grows 
out of both his views of the relation of men to women and of how 
best to respond to the knowledge of the world's destructiveness. In 
that respect, this subservience is another instance of what I referred 
to earlier as the way in which reading Catherine's character can be 
dizzying in its complexity and contradictions. But this intersection of 
the beliefs and its consequences for the characterization of Catherine 
do not point to any negative ethical consequences of Hemingway's be­
liefs about the world; instead they once again show the negative con­
sequences of the sexism and the way in which Hemingway's second­
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nature assumption about the subordination of women to men infects 
the whole narrative. 
Thus, as we move to the end of my story of Catherine's functions, 
we have good cause to evaluate positively her synthetic and thematic 
functions related to Hemingway's communication of his beliefs about 
the world, just as we have good cause to evaluate negatively the the­
matic functions related to his sexism. As a coda to the story, I would 
like to point out an interesting by-product of this final event, one 
connected not with the conflict between author and audience caused 
by the sexism but rather with potential conflicts caused by different 
beliefs about the nature of the world. 
If my analysis in this last section holds up, then we can understand 
why flesh-and-blood readers whose beliefs about the world are con­
siderably more optimistic than Hemingway's can still adopt his and 
be moved by the narrative. Such readers do not simply give in to the 
narrative illusion—and they do not end up hating themselves in the 
morning—because they are very likely not only to accept but to admire 
(and perhaps even aspire to) the ethical consequences Hemingway 
draws from that world view. In other words, both existentialists and 
fundamentalists can enter Hemingway's authorial audience without 
compromising their ethical standards. At the same time of course, 
fundamentalists will find themselves resisting the bald statement of 
the world view, but the very experience of being moved by the nar­
rative can establish a very productive relationship with it, one argu­
ably more productive than that of the existentialists who will merely 
have many of their beliefs reinforced. The combination of intellectual 
resistance and emotional suasion has the potential of making one 
rethink—and rejustify or reject—one's own world view. 
For another variation on the same phenomenon, consider the femi­
nists who are opposed to marriage and in love with Jane Austen's 
novels. The potential for conflict between author and readers there is 
of course initially reduced by Austen's concern not with marrying per 
se but with marrying for the best. Thus, the ethical dimension of read­
ing Pride and Prejudice or Emma involves measuring the characters 
(and to some extent oneself) against the ethical norms of the narrator, 
norms which are at once appealing and challenging. For readers op­
posed to marriage as an institution, the marriages themselves may 
become incidental to the core experience of following the carefully 
nuanced, yet clear, ethical paths that the heroines eventually walk. 
For others, of course, the conflict between the ethical dimension of 
reading and the value Austen places on marriage may be too great to 
overcome. But again, for some subset of those readers that conflict 
can be very productive. 
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Not surprisingly, then, the rhetorical consequences of resisting 
reading will be likely to vary from narrative to narrative. The act of 
repudiating a narrative more fully than I have done here may be rela­
tively empty if the repudiation is easy and dependent on an inade­
quate reconstruction of the narrative's design. The resistance is empty 
because there is little genuine encounter between the text and the 
reader. Even if the reconstruction is careful, the repudiation may be 
relatively unsatisfying if the ethical basis of the work is easily re­
jected. In such cases the degree of satisfaction will be at least partially 
dependent on the cultural status of the repudiated text: repudiating 
Faulkner is likely to be more satisfying than repudiating Ferber. Re­
sistance is more likely to be satisfying and productive when it is par­
tial, when we find ourselves in genuine disagreement with some 
parts of a work without entirely losing our respect for it. In these 
cases, we talk with the text and its author more as equals, acknowl­
edging their power, but for that very reason, required to think hard 
about the nature and meaning of their limits. The dialogue estab­
lished in these encounters can go on for a long time and can lead us 
to rethink some of our most fundamental commitments and beliefs. 
Conclusion 
Extensions and Reconsiderations 
i 
The resources of narrative and the inventive capacities of human story­
tellers are, I think, too vast and various for the multitudinous inter­
actions of character and progression to be analyzed in a single study. 
Every reader can no doubt think of numerous narratives where the 
interaction of character and progression is different from the patterns 
examined here. Given this situation, this inquiry does not attempt 
to be exhaustive. It does, however, retain the vaulting ambition of 
comprehensiveness, the goal of establishing—and demonstrating in 
operation—theoretical categories and principles rich enough to have 
substantial predictive value and flexible enough to apply to new 
cases. Consequently, it has sought that richness and that flexibility by 
working with examples that would satisfy the twin criteria of repre­
sentativeness and range. More specifically, through its choice of nar­
ratives and critical positions, this study has been attempting (1) to 
describe and analyze both typical and unusual relations among the 
components of character; (2) to investigate a wide spectrum of prin­
ciples of progression; and (3) to undertake a broad sweep of the inter­
pretive issues connected with viewing character and progression 
from a rhetorical perspective. 
In this final chapter, I want first to make another step toward com­
prehensiveness by demonstrating the flexibility of the categories and 
principles already established, and then second, to move beyond the 
quest for comprehensiveness by reflecting on the predictive power of 
the theory, including the limits on that power. Rather than under­
taking full-scale analyses of new narratives as I approach argument's 
end, I will seek to demonstrate flexibility by addressing some specific 
issues raised by three very different works: Norman Mailer's The Ar­
mies of the Night, George Eliot's Middlemarch, and Virginia Woolf's 
Mrs. Dalloway. The Armies of the Night is the flip side of If on a winter's 
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night a traveler: a narrative where the protagonist is not a fictional 
construct but a historical person. What happens to the mimetic-
synthetic relationship there? To what extent can Mailer the author's 
presentation of Mailer the character be considered synthetic? How 
does such a nonfictional protagonist perform thematic functions? 
Mrs, Dalloway poses the question of how the interaction between 
character and progression works in a narrative where so much of the 
progression is itself a gradual unfolding of character. The question is 
complicated further because Clarissa, though obviously central, is 
one among several characters whose inner lives Woolf opens to her 
audience. In answering the question, I will find it useful to examine 
Eliot's handling of the Fred Vincy-Mary Garth subplot in Middlemarch. 
What Eliot does there in elaborating the subordinate action while 
making it serve the main plot lines both looks back to what Austen 
does with Charlotte Lucas and Dickens with Wemmick and ahead to 
what Woolf does with Septimus Smith. In explaining how the subor­
dinate characters function in those different progressions, the study 
will complete one strand of its own progression. 
II 
In the last paragraph of Book One of his account of the October 1967 
march on the Pentagon to protest American involvement in the Viet­
nam War, Mailer the narrator describes the process by which Mailer 
the character became Mailer the author. 
Then he began his history of the Pentagon. It insisted on becoming 
a history of himself over four days, and therefore was history in 
the costume of a novel. He labored in the aesthetic of the problem 
for weeks, discovering that his dimensions as a character were sim­
ple: blessed had been the novelist, for his protagonist had been a 
simple of a hero and a marvel of a fool, with more than average 
gifts of objectivity—might his critics have as much!—this verdict 
disclosed by the unprotective haste with which he was obliged to 
write, for he wrote of necessity at a rate faster than he had ever 
written before, as if the accelerating history of the country forbade 
deliberation. Yet in writing his personal history of these four days, 
he was delivered a discovery of what the March on the Pentagon 
had finally meant, and what had been won, and what had been 
lost, and so found himself ready at last to write a most concise 
Short History, a veritable precis of a collective novel, which here 
now, in the remaining pages, will seek as History, no, rather as 
some Novel of History, to elucidate the mysterious character of that 
quintessential^ American event.1 
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From our perspective, there are two especially noteworthy elements 
of this passage. First, although it claims that the writing of Book One 
made possible the writing of Book Two, the passage reveals almost 
nothing about the precise relation between them, about, for example, 
how the two parts constitute a single narrative or what the nature of 
that narrative might be. Second, the passage points to the irreducibly 
synthetic component of character even in nonfiction narrative: "[H]is 
dimensions as a character were simple: blessed had been the novelist, 
for his protagonist had been a simple of a hero and a marvel of a fool, 
with more than average gifts of objectivity/' Like Huck Finn in civili­
zation, we've been here before, and like Huck, we've learned not to 
take everything at face value. As we have seen in The French Lieuten-
ant's Woman, when the narrator of a fictional narrative claims that the 
narrative is taking its direction from a character's mimetic function, 
that claim actually foregrounds the synthetic component of the char­
acter. The same logic applies here. If Mailer the character is a "simple 
of a hero" and a "marvel of a fool," it is because Mailer the author has 
emerged from his labor "in the aesthetic of the problem" with a de­
cision to represent himself that way. Understanding the rationale for 
that decision will enable us to understand the connection between 
Books One and Two.2 
Mailer begins his narrative by quoting Time magazine's account of 
his performance during the weekend of the March: 
A Shaky Start 
Washington's scruffy Ambassador Theater, normally a pad for 
psychedelic frolics, was the scene of an unscheduled scatological 
solo last week in support of the peace demonstrations. Its antistar 
was author Norman Mailer, who proved even less prepared to ex­
plain Why Are We in Vietnam? than his current novel of that title. 
Slurping liquor from a coffee mug, Mailer faced an audience of 
600, most of them students, who had kicked in $1,900 for a bail 
fund against Saturday's capers. "I don't want to grandstand un­
duly," he said, grandly but barely standing. 
It was one of his few coherent sentences. Mumbling and spew­
ing obscenities as he staggered about the stage—which he had com­
mandeered by threatening to beat up the previous M.C.—Mailer 
described in detail his search for a usable privy on the premises. 
Excretion, in fact, was his preoccupation of the night. "I'm here 
because I'm like LBJ," was one of Mailer's milder observations. 
"He's as full of crap as I am." When hecklers mustered the temerity 
to shout "Publicity hound!" at him, Mailer managed to pronounce 
flawlessly his all-purpose noun, verb and expletive: "**** you." 
Dwight Macdonald, the bearded literary critic, was aghast at the 
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barroom bathos, but failed to argue Mailer off the platform. Mac­
donald eventually squeezed in the valorous observation that Ho 
Chi Minh was really no better than Dean Rusk. After more obsceni­
ties, Mailer introduced poet Robert Lowell, who got annoyed at 
requests to speak louder. "I'll bellow but it won't do any good/' he 
said and proceeded to read from Lord Weary's Castle. 
By the time the action shifted to the Pentagon, Mailer was perky 
enough to get himself arrested by two Marshals. "I transgressed a 
police line," he explained with some pride on the way to the 
lockup where the toilet facilities are scarce indeed and the coffee 
mugs low-octane. (Pp. 13-14) 
Mailer's comment on the account, "Now we may leave Time in order 
to find out what happened," conveys a withering judgment on its 
accuracy, but his own subsequent description of his initial involve­
ment in the march and of his behavior at the Ambassador seems to 
confirm the Time reporter's assessment of him. 
The mimetic portrait Mailer draws of himself in the early scenes is 
that of a man who is not only a marvel of a fool but also a giant of an 
ego. Reluctantly drawn in to participating in the March, he antici­
pates it with all the eagerness of a blueblood MBA about to spend a 
weekend with a UAW local: "It was going to prove a wasteful week­
end he decided with some gloom—he could have spent it more prof­
itably cutting his new movie. . . . Mailer wished as the Washington 
weekend approached that the Washington weekend were done" 
(pp. 20-21). In his verbal jousting with Robert Lowell at the party 
before the Thursday night rally at the Ambassador, he replies to Low-
ell's compliment that Mailer is the finest journalist in America by say­
ing, "Well, Cal, there are days when I think of myself as being the 
best writer in America" (p 33). When asked by Ed de Grazia, the 
organizer of the rally, if he would like to speak first—before Lowell, 
Dwight Macdonald, and Paul Goodman—Mailer replies, "There'll be 
nothing interesting to follow me" (p. 39). He jumps at the chance de 
Grazia offers him to be M.C., and takes pleasure in "thoughts of the 
subtle annoyance his role as Master of Ceremonies would cause the 
other speakers" (p. 39). 
The gigantic proportions of the Mailer ego are nowhere more evi­
dent than they are in the events at the Ambassador, where Mailer, 
now drunk, acts the part of the self-indulgent M.C., and assesses the 
whole evening according to how well he is doing with the audience. 
He presents his own speech as an attempt to win greater applause 
from the audience than Lowell: "They gave Lowell a good standing 
ovation, much heartiness in it, much obvious pleasure that they were 
there in Washington on a night when Lowell had read from his 
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work. . .  . to Mailer it was now mano a mano" (p. 61). Mailer's own 
speech—and the asides he makes about it in the narration—are comic 
enough to prevent it from being an utter disaster (" 'they [reporters] 
alone have done more to destroy this nation than any force in it/ 
They will certainly destroy me in the morning . . ."), but the speech 
is another egregiously self-indulgent and egotistical performance. 
Mailer claims to be the dwarf alter ego of Lyndon Johnson and de­
lights in spewing obscenities with his adopted Texas accent. His re­
port of his behavior fleshes out the account given in Time, but it leads 
the reader to conclude that Mailer got off easy at the hands of the 
Luce-ites. If John Marcher's main trait is his obsession, Mailer's—at 
this point in the narrative—is his egotism. 
Slowly, however, Mailer's attitude toward participating in the events 
of the weekend changes and so too does the resulting character por­
trait. At the demonstration at the Justice Department on Friday after­
noon, Mailer begins to feel a "deep modesty on its way to him" 
(p. 93). As faculty members walk up and deposit their draft cards in 
a bag to be turned over to the Justice Department, 
he stood in the cold watching [them], yes always one by one, and 
felt his hangover which had come in part out of his imperfectly 
swallowed contempt for them the night before, and in part out of 
his fear, yes now he saw it, fear of the consequences of this week­
end in Washington, for he had known from the beginning it could 
disrupt his life for a season or more and in some way the danger 
was there it could change him forever. (P. 93) 
That night Mailer, Lowell, and Macdonald agree that they will seek 
to get arrested on the March. But Mailer wants to get arrested early 
so he can go back to New York for a party on Saturday night. 
By the time that Mailer emerges from jail on Sunday morning, 
however, his change is complete. The experience of the march, his 
arrest for "transgressing a police line," his night in Occoquan jail 
amid the company of numerous other demonstrators, his witnessing 
of his lawyer's argument with the U.S. Commissioner that eventually 
won him a suspended sentence: all these events have immersed 
Mailer in the weekend he wanted to avoid, and that immersion has 
humbled him, got him out of himself, and focused him on the signifi­
cance of the march. Just as the narrative begins with a report of a 
speech he made, so it ends with such a report, this time from the 
Washington Post: 
Novelist Norman Mailer, using a makeshift courtroom to deliver a 
Sunday sermon on the evils of the Vietnam War, received the only 
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prison sentence yesterday as justice was meted out in wholesale 
lots for hundreds of anit-war demonstrators. 
In his courtroom speech Mailer said, "They are burning the 
body and blood of Christ in Vietnam/' 
"Today is Sunday/' he said "and while I am not a Christian I 
happen to be married to one. And there are times when I happen 
to think that the loveliest thing about my dear wife is her unspoken 
love for Jesus Christ. . . .  " 
Mailer said he believed that the war in Vietnam "will destroy 
the foundation of this republic, which is its love and trust in 
Christ." Mailer is a Jew. (P. 240) 
In this case, however, the gap between what the press reports and 
what Mailer's audience sees is very large. Mailer's speech is not 
prompted by a desire to parade his ego before what he hopes will be 
an appreciative audience but to express a feeling that the cumulative 
experience of the weekend has given him: 
standing on the grass, he felt one suspicion of a whole man closer 
to that freedom from dread which occupied the inner drama of his 
years, yes, one image closer than when he had come to Washing­
ton four days ago. The sum of what he had done that he consid­
ered good outweighed the dull sum of his omissions these same 
four days. So he was happy, and it occurred to him that his clean 
sense of himself, with a skin of compassion at such rare moment 
for all . .  . this nice anticipation of the very next moves of life it­
self . . . must mean, indeed could mean nothing else to Christians, 
but what they must signify when they spoke of Christ within 
them. . .  . (P. 238) 
Mailer's turn to the idea of Christianity here recalls his earlier expla­
nation in the chapter "Why Are We in Vietnam?" (the explanation 
delivered by the author as the character sleeps in Occoquan) that the 
war represents a suppressed schizophrenia in the American charac­
ter: Americans worshiped the Mystery of Christ and the no Mystery 
of the Corporation and found an outlet for the conflict in the war, 
which at least opened up one's emotions for the soldiers and the 
orphans. 
Now that he sees his own connection to the mystery of Christi­
anity, he gives his speech, the second paragraph of which was not 
reported in full by the Post: 
"Some of us," said Mailer to the reporters and the photographer 
and the microphone, "were at the Pentagon yesterday, and we 
were arrested in order to make our symbolic protest of the war in 
Vietnam, and most of us served these very short sentences, but 
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they are a harbinger of what will come next, for if the war doesn't 
end next year/ ' then said he, feeling as modest as he had felt on 
the steps of the Department of Justice, ' 'why then a few of us will 
probably have to take longer sentences. Because we must. You see, 
dear fellow Americans, it is Sunday, and we are burning the body 
and blood of Christ in Vietnam. Yes, we are burning him there, 
and as we do, we destroy the foundation of this Republic, which 
is its love and trust in Christ." (P. 239) 
Viewed in this broader context, the speech seems sane rather than 
farfetched; although it is not an immortal speech, it does present 
Mailer making the kind of gesture for the whole antiwar movement 
he would have been incapable of four days before. This point is un­
derlined by the final part of the coda to his own story. "As the days 
went by, he contracted to write an account of the March on the Pen­
tagon, and wrestled with the difficulties of how to do it, and appeared 
on a television show and amazed himself. For if he had been half as 
conservative as Russell Kirk in prison, he was half as militant on tele­
vision as H. Rap Brown" (p. 241). 
In short, the narrative of Book One is the narrative of Mailer the 
character's alteration from the egotist who is greater than the event to 
the more modest man who is transformed by the event. Even as the 
narrative claims to be truthful, it also gives the protagonist a clear 
synthetic function: Mailer the character functions in the narrative in 
much the same way as a protagonist does in a Bildungsroman: he 
makes the passage from ignorance to knowledge. The thematic com­
ponent of Mailer's character is more like that of Fowles's Charles 
Smithson than that of any other character we have seen. In one re­
spect of course, Mailer and Smithson are very different: where Fowles 
emphasizes the extent to which Charles is typical of his class and his 
age, Mailer the author makes no such claims for representativeness. 
Nevertheless, the thematic function of the character is carried by the 
whole narrative rather than by particular traits being thematized. 
Charles functions as part of Fowles's narrative explanation of the shift 
from the Victorian Age to the modern, and Mailer functions to show 
the power of the march upon those who participated in it: it trans­
formed even so great an egotist as himself. 
Mailer's decision to treat himself this way has some further conse­
quences for our understanding of the progression of Book One and 
for the relation between it and Book Two. By incorporating the re­
ports of Time and the Washington Post and other newspapers into this 
narrative which focuses on his own participation in the march, Mailer 
is implicitly contrasting their methods for getting at the significance 
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of the events with his own. Their methods of course lead to reporting 
which flattens out the events, diminishes them, grinds them up in the 
great mix of personality and one-upmanship they seem so intent on 
pursuing. Mailer's methods are unusual, but they communicate a 
substance to the events that is conspicuously lacking in the mass me­
dia reports. 
One of the most notable features of Mailer's method in Book One 
is that his account of all the events is largely restricted to the vision 
of Mailer the character. The narrative of the events at the Ambassador 
Theater is not interrupted by the more mature vision of the post-
march Mailer the way that, say, the narration of Great Expectations is 
interrupted by the vision and voice of the mature Pip. One conse­
quence of this technique is that the authorial audience may be re­
pulsed not just by Mailer the character but also by Mailer the author. 
Because the authorial audience knows that Mailer the author and 
Mailer the character are, in some sense, the same person, our impulse 
is to view the author and the character as closely aligned: we may 
then conclude that the jerk up on the stage is also the jerk who wrote 
this book. Mailer employs various means—especially displaying a 
sharp wit and a style commanding in its flexibility and range—to pre­
vent the authorial audience from simply giving up on him, but we 
may wonder why he would run the risk. The reason, I think, is not 
far to seek. By presenting the unmitigated view of Mailer the egotist 
at the outset, Mailer makes the effect of the transformation, gradual 
as it is, that much more powerful. 
In Book Two, the Novelist, as Mailer says, "passes the baton to the 
Historian" who broadens his focus considerably and offers an ac­
count of the whole event from its planning to its execution to its last 
minutes and some of its aftermath. The history has a clear thesis: 
despite the failure of the American press to recognize what was going 
on, the March on Washington was a significant event in the history 
of the United States, one that planted the seeds for a new positive 
growth in the character of the whole country. This thesis comes 
through frequently, but it is perhaps most notable in three places, the 
first of which is Mailer's description of the rite of passage undergone 
by those who remained at the Pentagon after the battle of the wedge 
Saturday night and on into Sunday morning: 
each generation of Americans had forged their own rite, in the 
forest of the Alleghenies and the Adirondacks, at Valley Forge, at 
New Orleans in 1812, with Rogers and Clark or at Sutter's Mill, at 
Gettysburg, the Alamo, the Klondike, the Argonne, Normandy, 
Pusan—the engagement at the Pentagon was a pale rite of passage 
next to these, and yet it was probably a true one, for it came to the 
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spoiled children of a dead de-animalized middle class who had 
chosen most freely out of the incomprehensible mysteries of moral 
choice, to make an attack and then hold a testament before the 
most authoritative embodiment of the principle that America was 
right, America was might, America was the true religious war of 
Christ against Communist. (P. 311) 
The thesis about the significance of the march again emerges clearly 
in Mailer's penultimate chapter. He says that the real end of the 
march was probably in Occoquan and the jail in Washington, D.C., 
especially among a group from a Quaker farm in Connecticut who 
continued the protest by practicing noncooperation: "some of them 
refused to eat or drink and were fed intravenously. Several men at the 
D.C. jail would not wear prison clothing. Stripped of their own, na­
ked, they were thrown in the Hole. There they lived in cells so small 
that not all could lie down at once to sleep. For a day they lay naked 
on the floor, for many days naked with blankets and mattress on the 
floor. For many days they did not eat nor drink water. Dehydration 
brought them near to madness" (p. 318). 
Mailer speculates about the significance of their actions: 
Did they pray, these Quakers, for forgiveness of the nation? . . . 
The prayers are as Catholic as they are Quaker, and no one will 
know if they were ever made. . . . But if the end of the March took 
place in the isolation in which these last pacifists suffered naked in 
freezing cells, and gave up prayers for penance, then who was to 
say they were not saints? And who to say that the sins of America 
were not by their witness a tithe remitted? (Pp. 318-19) 
From here Mailer moves to the difficult—and poorly managed— 
metaphors of the final page, where he sets forth his vision of America 
about to give birth to either "the most fearsome totalitarianism the 
world has ever known" or "a babe of a new world brave and tender, 
artful and wild" (p. 320).3 
The power and persuasiveness of Mailer's thesis about the march 
depend of course on the kind of analysis of its events he offers in 
Book Two, but it depends more crucially on the representation of 
himself in Book One. First, Mailer's analysis is frequently imaginative 
and speculative: his audience's willingness to follow him through his 
swoops depends upon the extent to which Book One allows us to feel 
he has earned the right to make them. Second, Book One implicitly 
but powerfully bears witness to the thesis about the significance of 
the march: the change in Mailer the character exists as a sign of the 
event's power to change the country. Then, finally, the two books 
together serve as a final testament to the power of the march and the 
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change in the character. Where he once looked upon the event as 
something to be gotten through, he has ended up being moved to 
write this extraordinary narrative about it. The Armies of the Night, in 
short, is an example of a narrative that uses the mimetic function of 
the protagonist in service of a thematic point about the whole event 
in which that protagonist played a small part. 
Ill 
In the discussion of Pride and Prejudice in Chapter 2, we have seen that 
Austen uses Charlotte Lucas's decision to marry Collins as a way to 
enhance the mimetic power and thematic force of Elizabeth's decision 
to refuse Darcy's marriage proposal. Because Charlotte takes on the 
thematic function of illustrating the power of the marriage market, 
Elizabeth's refusal develops her own thematically significant indepen­
dence from the market's norms even as it further develops the au­
thorial audience's undersanding of her as a possible person. Dickens's 
use of Wemmick in Great Expectations is, in a sense, an elaboration of 
the same principle of narrative construction: the actions of the minor 
character, though not significantly advancing or retarding the actual 
forward movement of the narrative, take on a thematic function that 
plays a significant part in the progression by affecting the response of 
the authorial audience to the mimetic and thematic functions of the 
protagonist. Our sense of both the nature and significance of Pip's 
difficulty in relating his connection to the lower class with his exis­
tence in the upper is enhanced by Dickens's inventive use of Wem­
mick. Eliot in effect takes this same Principle of Indirect Affective 
Relevance about as far as possible by elaborating the role of the minor 
characters to such an extent that they have their own recognizable 
subplot. 
The nature and purpose of Eliot's development of the sometimes 
complained about Fred Vincy-Mary Garth subplot can perhaps best 
be explained if we begin by noticing a curious feature of the novel's 
famous final paragraph: 
Her finely-touched spirit had still its fine issues, though they were 
not widely visible. Her full nature, like that river of which Cyrus 
broke the strength, spent itself in channels which had no great 
name on the earth. But the effect of her being on those around her 
was incalculably diffusive: for the growing good of the world is 
partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so 
ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the 
number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited 
tombs.4 
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What is curious here is that the authorial audience is very willing to 
accept the narrator's claims about Dorothea's contributions to the 
growing good of the world, but the narrative itself has repeatedly 
shown us Dorothea's difficulties in making such contributions. In­
deed, for most of the narrative Dorothea's mimetic portrait empha­
sizes both her good intentions and her relative ineffectuality. Even 
her unselfish intercession in Lydgate and Rosamond's marital diffi­
culties has only a temporary positive effect: it neither prevents Rosa­
mond from bending Lydgate to her will nor gives Lydgate enough 
solace and resolution to keep him from calling Rosamond his basil 
plant. 
Why then does the authorial audience give credence to the narra-
tor's claim here? Or, to begin with the prior question, why doesn't 
Eliot do more to show us Dorothea contributing to the growing good 
of the world? Another way of getting at the same point is to ask why 
the paragraph's assertions about both Dorothea and the growing 
good of the world are so carefully qualified—the growing good of the 
world is only "partly dependent" on such unhistoric acts as Doro-
thea's; our own situation is referred to as "not so ill," and for that we 
are only "half" in debt to those living a hidden life. The penultimate 
paragraph not only provides the basis for an answer but indicates that 
the final paragraph is less a summary of Dorothea's narrative than the 
final step in the completion of her story line. That penultimate para­
graph provides a more accurate summary, and thereby underlines the 
major thematic point of Dorothea's story, one to which our attention 
has been directed from the very first page of the Prelude: 
there is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not 
greatly determined by what lies outside it. A new Theresa will 
hardly have the opportunity of reforming a conventual life, any 
more than a new Antigone will spend her heroic piety in daring all 
for the sake of a brother's burial: the medium in which their ardent 
deeds took shape is forever gone. But we insignificant people with 
our daily words and acts are preparing the lives of many Doro­
theas, some of which may present a far sadder sacrifice than that 
of the Dorothea whose story we know. (Pp. 577-78) 
In other words, Eliot did not show us Dorothea doing more to 
contribute to the growing good of the world, and she does not leave 
her assertions about the world's progress unqualified because of the 
weight Dorothea's narrative has given to this major thematic point. 
Both Dorothea's good intentions and her ineffectuality have been the­
matized. To show Dorothea doing more to contribute to the world 
would be to run the risk of undermining the thematizing of her inef­
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fectuality. At the same time to give Dorothea's story its final devel­
opment in the concluding paragraph, Eliot needed to find some 
mechanism to incorporate into the novel this secondary thematic 
point that, despite the impossibility of heroic action, the world can 
nevertheless improve. As Ralph Rader has suggested, her setting the 
action at the time of the Great Reform Bill is part of that mechanism.5 
Over and above her choice of setting, Eliot establishes the mechanism 
both within and without Dorothea's story line—that is, in what she 
does in the progression of Dorothea's own story and in the creation 
and elaboration of Fred and Mary's. 
As noted above, Eliot uses Dorothea's own story line primarily to 
demonstrate the narrative's major thematic interest. Yet the crucial 
events in the climax of the story line suggest the potential for a differ­
ent emphasis. When Dorothea undergoes her dark night of the soul, 
we see her both openly acknowledging her own emotional needs in a 
way that she never has before—there is a new development in the 
mimetic component of her character—and going beyond them to 
think about the good of others. "What should I do—how should I act 
now, this very day, if I could clutch my own pain, and compel it to 
silence, and think of those three?" (p. 544). Through the events of 
this night and Dorothea's long talk with Rosamond the next day, Eliot 
establishes with great authority and emotional power that Dorothea 
has the capacity to contribute to the growing good of the world. In­
deed, in bringing Rosamond and Lydgate more closely together, at 
least for a time, Eliot does allow us to see that Dorothea can be a 
positive force for good: she is not totally ineffectual. Yet in a larger 
sense her contribution to Lydgate comes too late; the good it does is 
very severely qualified, not only in the Finale but even in the narra-
tor's summary comments after Dorothea's visit to Rosamond: 
Poor Rosamond's vagrant fancy had come back terribly scourged— 
meek enough to nestle under the old despised shelter. And the 
shelter was still there: Lydgate had accepted his narrowed lot with 
sad resignation. He had chosen this fragile creature, and had taken 
the burthen of her life upon his arms. He must walk as he could, 
carrying that burthen pitifully. (P. 552) 
The reason that Eliot does not do more with the positive effects of 
Dorothea's intervention is of course tied up with what she has already 
done with Lydgate's story line. She has developed there a mirror re­
flection of Dorothea's own plot: a character with ardent desires to 
make the world better, through a series of his own mistaken choices 
in combination with the forces of Middlemarch society, is unable to 
translate those desires into effective action. In that respect, Eliot has 
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also developed the Lydgate plot to elaborate the primary thematic 
interest. But there are two major differences between the two story 
lines: (1) Lydgate does not face the obstacle to effective action that 
Dorothea's womanhood represents for her; and (2) he more clearly 
represents the way in which the idealistic individual's own egoism 
may contribute to society's frustration of his ideals; in that sense, he 
has a thematic function that Dorothea lacks. Because of his egoism, 
Lydgate is defeated more thoroughly than Dorothea, and because of 
his greater initial advantages the fall has a far greater impact than it 
would otherwise. In this respect, we can see that the Lydgate story is 
itself being summarized in the novel's penultimate paragraph, and we 
can apply the narrator's comments about Dorothea to him as well: 
indeed, he can be seen as having experienced a far sadder sacrifice 
than the sacrifice of the "Dorothea whose story we know." If Eliot 
were to show Dorothea's intervention as having more positive effects, 
she would undermine the way in which the progression has been 
thematizing the Lydgate story line. 
Thus, Eliot needs another means to make possible the final devel­
opment of Dorothea's story—and to develop the secondary thematic 
point. And the means she chose, I believe, is the Fred and Mary story 
line. Critics have sometimes complained that this strand of the nar­
rative pales by comparison to the two major story lines, but I think 
that its differences from them are both purposeful and necessary. 
Even without a detailed look at their mimetic traits, we can see that 
Fred and Mary provide a counterpoint to Dorothea and Lydgate be­
cause they are less worried about reforming the world than about 
finding a place in it; they are in effect the representatives of the world 
that Lydgate and Dorothea would so much like to help. At the same 
time, they are individualized in such a way—Fred combines good 
nature and indolence, Mary common sense, industry, and loyalty— 
that the traits themselves provide both a good part of the basis for the 
instabilities in their story line and the grounds for the authorial audi­
ence to desire their union. Because their story line consists of the 
working out of that happy union through the unhistoric acts of many 
characters, it provides a very strong warrant for our belief in the nar-
rator's assertion about the growing good of the world. Through Mary's 
constancy and Caleb's generosity, Fred is able to find a purpose for 
his life. 
Even more dramatically, Fred is able to marry Mary through the 
unhistoric acts of Farebrother. Like Dorothea, Farebrother is able to 
put self to one side and not only intercede with Mary for Fred, but 
then later to sway Fred from his gambling. Furthermore, in Fred and 
Mary's eventual succession to Stone Court (itself made possible by 
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Bulstrode's desire to make amends to Harriet by doing something for 
her family) the narrative presents the reclamation of one notable Mid­
dlemarch property. The transformation of Stone Court from the home 
of old Peter Featherstone to the place where Bulstrode is involved in 
the "murder" of Raffles to the scene of Fred and Mary's domestic 
happiness is the narrative's most visible sign of the growing good of 
the world. 
From this vantage point, we can see that the effects created by this 
plot are, like those created by Charlotte Lucas and Wemmick, pow­
erful because they complement the narrator's functions. Eliot's nar­
rator can talk about the growing good of the world in the last 
paragraph because she has presented the narrative evidence to sup­
port her position. Without Eliot's elaboration of the Fred and Mary 
subplot the last step in the completion of Dorothea's story—indeed, 
in the completion of the whole narrative—would seem unearned; 
with them it works very powerfully. In sum, the Fred and Mary sub­
plot is as crucial to the effectiveness of the final development of the 
Dorothea story line as Dorothea's own reactions in her dark night of 
the soul. 
Although there is of course a lot more one could say about the 
complex interaction of the characters and subplots of Eliot's narra-
tive,6 this account of the Indirect Affective Relevance of the Fred and 
Mary story line is sufficient to help explain some salient features of 
the relation between character and progression in Mrs. Dalloway. 
Woolf's novel offers a different kind of progression from anything we 
have analyzed to this point. After we are plunged in medias res by the 
opening sentence, "Mrs. Dalloway said she would buy the flowers 
herself,"7 we are plunged inside Clarissa's consciousness (what a 
lark!), and the forward movement of the narrative is governed by 
Woolf's progressive revelation of her character; this technique empha­
sizes the mimetic component of her character. In effect, the opening 
plunge produces a tension of unequal knowledge about Clarissa be­
tween author and authorial audience. Clarissa emerges from the ini­
tial pages as a highly particularized, if unextraordinary, woman of the 
British upper class. She has a love of life and an awareness of its 
chaos; she dislikes discord and seeks to please others; she has the gift 
of knowing others by instinct; she wonders about the course of her 
life, whether she should have married Peter Walsh instead of Richard 
Dalloway. 
Some of this revelation of the character contains a potential for 
further development in the progression: Clarissa's love of life and her 
fear of its imminent chaos exist as a potential instability. The narra­
tive does not build upon it directly, but it remains an opening to be 
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exploited, and an issue to be explored in later sections of the nar­
rative. Woolf soon does complicate the progression by tension in 
several ways. First, she introduces Peter Walsh, who among other 
things, raises questions about the significance of what it means to be 
Clarissa Dalloway in these circumstances; his most famous question 
of course is "What is the sense of your parties?" In a sense, Peter is 
asking the question analogous to one asked by the authorial audi­
ence: so, what's the point, or more politely, is the point the same as 
that of a dramatic monologue—fleshing out the mimetic portrait of 
the character—or is there also a thematic function associated with the 
character? Second, Woolf's technique of offering shifting and limited 
access to the consciousnesses of many characters and the repetitions 
of imagery within those different consciousnesses work together to 
suggest an underlying connection between them all. The third com­
plication depends in part on this second method: Woolf develops the 
consciousness of Septimus Smith as, in effect, one side of Clarissa's 
own consciousness. Septimus is an example of a mind that has been 
overpowered by the chaos that Clarissa fears. 
The previous analysis of Middlernarch helps explain what is distinc­
tive about Woolf's use of Septimus here. The attention given to the 
revelation of his consciousness is again largely a part of a progression 
by tension rather than one by instability. To be sure, there is a pro­
gression towards his suicide that arises out of the developing in­
stability between his mental state and the treatments suggested by 
Holmes and Bradshaw, but the narrative pays more attention to re­
vealing his state than to generating expectations about his eventual 
fate. But just as the Fred and Mary plot serves to demonstrate that 
the world can become progressively better, so too this revelation 
serves to reinforce the power of Clarissa's anxiety about the danger of 
living. Just as Fred and Mary's story has its own independent devel­
opment, so too does Septimus's. But that development does not fol­
low the progression of an action; it is in effect a subplot of character. 
Woolf brings the two strands of the narrative more directly together 
than Eliot does: at the party, Woolf brings the internal instability 
within Clarissa to its climax as she comes face to face with the chaos 
brought into her party by the news of Septimus's death. At this point 
all the previous complications of the progression come together. 
The potential for the internal instability between Clarissa's attitudes 
toward life is now actualized: will her fear overcome her love? In 
coming to the fore, this instability also functions as a test of the 
significance of Clarissa's life. She has defended herself against Peter's 
questions by saying that her parties were "an offering" (p. 184) to life, 
a way of bringing together people who would not otherwise be 
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brought together. At this juncture, her ability to make such an offer­
ing and her faith in it is severely tested: "Oh! thought Clarissa, in the 
middle of my party, here's death, she thought" (p. 279). And at the 
same time, her ability to work through the instability depends upon 
her capacity to integrate Septimus's death into the life that continues 
around her. Withdrawing from the main room, she thinks, 
Somehow it was her disaster, her disgrace. It was her punishment 
to see sink and disappear here a man, there a woman in this pro­
found darkness, and she forced to stand here in her evening dress. 
She had schemed; she had pilfered. She was never wholly admi­
rable. She had wanted success. Lady Bexborough and the rest 
of it. . . . 
Yet in the course of looking out the window, Clarissa is able to turn 
the disgrace into gladness. 
She parted the curtains; she looked. Oh, but how surprising!—in 
the room opposite the old lady stared straight at her! She was 
going to bed. . . . She was going to bed, in the room opposite. It 
was fascinating to watch her, moving about, that old lady, crossing 
the room, coining to the window. Could she see her? It was fasci­
nating, with people still laughing and shouting in the drawing-
room, to watch that old woman, quite quietly, going to bed. The 
young man had killed himself; but she did not pity him; with the 
clock striking the hour, one, two, three, she did not pity him, with 
all this going on. There! the old lady had put out her light! The 
whole house was dark now with this going on, she repeated, and 
the words came to her, Fear no more the heat of the sun. She must 
go back to them. But what an extraordinary night! She felt some­
how very much like him—the young man who had killed himself. 
She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it away. The clock was 
striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. He made her feel the 
beauty; made her feel the fun. But she must go back. (Pp. 283-84) 
Sparked by her connection with the old lady who goes on with this 
thing called life in a way very different from that of Clarissa, Mrs. 
Dalloway is able to enter imaginatively into both the old lady's life 
and Septimus's. She recognizes his suicide as a positive step, yet 
something very different from her own offering. In effect, Clarissa is 
able to accept her fear of life's chaos and subsume it under her love 
for life in all its variation. Woolf then ends the narrative by affirming 
the importance of Clarissa. Filled with new vitality by her integration, 
Clarissa does return to the others, and, as the final sentences indicate, 
produces an extraordinary effect upon her biggest doubter. 
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"I will come/' said Peter, but he sat on for a moment. What is this 
terror? what is this ecstasy? he thought to himself. What is it that 
fills me with this extraordinary excitement? 
It is Clarissa, he said. 
For there she was. (P. 296) 
The mimetic portrait of the character is complete, her thematic func­
tions of illustrating the connectedness of disparate individuals and of 
demonstrating the possibility of affirming life in the face of its own 
terror are complete, and the author's implicit case for the value of 
such a character is complete. But no substantial change in Clarissa's 
fate or fortune has occurred. Her moment of integration may or may 
not signal a new permanent attitude toward life and her role in it. The 
narrative leads us to see it as an important victory for her, but it does 
not provide assurances that her fear of life's chaos has been overcome 
completely. Similarly Peter's acknowledgment of her importance to 
him is not presented as something that will significantly alter their 
relationship. The ending, in short, is in keeping with the rest of the 
narrative, which gives us a progressive revelation of character rather 
than the progression of an action. 
Woolf's use of Peter Walsh represents a kind of thematizing that 
we have not encountered before—and helps us more fully under­
stand the mimetic-thematic relationship of Clarissa's character. Peter's 
progression from questioning her value to affirming it does not direct 
the authorial audience to any specific thematic conclusion (the mo­
ment of integration does that) but points to the significance of this 
apparently unextraordinary woman. The thematic force here is sub­
ordinated to the mimetic portrait; it is Clarissa we are to focus on most 
fully, but through Peter we are told that this kind of a woman, with 
her flowers, her fears, and her festive parties, has a significance ri­
valling that of any of the great personages who linger on the fringes 
of the book. In one sense, Woolf uses Peter Walsh to supply an ele­
ment of her portrait of a lady that Browning did not need in his por­
trait of a duke: Browning could let the Duke's remarkable actions and 
character speak for themselves; it is easy for audiences to accept the 
implicit significance and interest of the Duke and his actions. Woolf, 
on the other hand, needs a way to build the authorial audience's ac­
ceptance of Clarissa's significance into the narrative. Peter Walsh is 
that way—which is to say, Peter performs that synthetic function. 
IV 
I have suggested above that the comprehensiveness of this theory of 
character and progression ought to be judged by both the predictive 
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power and the flexibilty of its theoretical principles; I now want to 
look more closely at their predictive power. The principles in a sense 
both lead one to predict and cause one to shy away from predic-
tions—and that double movement is, I think, a source of strength. 
They lead one to predictions because they establish a set of categories 
for examining character, and the results of their application here rep­
resent a good cross-section of the possible relations among the pos­
tulated components of character. We have seen mimetic functions 
subordinated to thematic ones (1984, The French Lieutenant's Woman, 
The Armies of the Night) and to synthetic ones (If on a winter's night a 
traveler). We have seen thematic functions subordinated to mimetic 
ones ("My Last Duchess/' Mrs. Dalloway). We have seen mimetic and 
thematic functions move along parallel tracks where one is not clearly 
subordinated to the other, though one may be more centrally related 
to the progression of the narrative (Pride and Prejudice and, on the 
other side of the station, Middlemarch). We have seen the synthetic 
function of characters remain firmly in the background of works ("My 
Last Duchess/ ' Pride and Prejudice, A Farewell to Arms), and we have 
seen it move intermittently into the foreground (1984, The French Lieu-
tenant's Woman, Great Expectations). We have seen the mimetic and 
thematic functions of characters fused ("The Beast in the Jungle") and 
the synthetic and thematic functions fused (If on a winter's night a 
traveler). We have seen thematic functions in harmony (most of our 
examples) and in ethical conflict (A Farewell to Arms). These kinds of 
relationships, for the most part, are not unique to the individual nar­
ratives in which they appear, and so the analyses here can serve as a 
guide to possible patterns of character in other narratives. 
Yet as the above parenthetical groupings indicate, the theory must 
move away from prediction because not all the generally similar rela­
tionships among the components of character get established in the 
same way. To take perhaps the clearest example, the progressions of 
the three narratives that I identify as all subordinating the mimetic to 
the thematic—1984, The French Lieutenant's Woman, The Armies of the 
Night—are very different from each other. There are of course general 
patterns of progression too, and these patterns allow us to make such 
general predictions as (1) representations of actions will typically 
have mimetic and thematic functions of the main characters moving 
along parallel tracks while the synthetic functions remain in the back­
ground and (2) novels with a central thematic point such as 1984 will 
subordinate the mimetic function to the thematic function. The trou­
ble with these generalizations, however, is precisely that they are too 
general. They do not tell us much more about any given narrative 
than its generic classification does. Once we notice a general simi­
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larity between, say, the two tragic-like patterns we have seen—'The 
Beast in the Jungle" and A Farewell to Arms—we can only become 
more aware of how far removed the generalizations are from the ways 
in which a specific progression will establish the relations among the 
components of character. Noticing the differences between these 
two narratives—and indeed, among all the other narratives we have 
examined—will force us back from predictions about character and 
progression in any given narrative to the principles for analyzing it. 
Our narratives have given us numerous examples of when and how 
instabilities and tensions can be introduced, complicated, and re­
solved and those examples can function as a guide to others, but 
clearly not as a set of pre-formed molds into which others may be 
poured. In this respect, the demand for flexibility is more honored 
than the demand for predictive power; such a relationship is appro­
priate to the extent that the relation between character and progres­
sion in narrative is as diverse as I claim.8 
The comprehensiveness of this inquiry needs to be considered in 
another way. What exactly are the nature of my theory's claims for 
comprehensiveness vis-a-vis other theories of character and progres­
sion? Does it purport to sweep all other approaches out of the way? 
What are its limitations? First, it claims to be a comprehensive rhetori­
cal theory of character, not the comprehensive theory. As the intro­
duction briefly suggests in its discussion of the structuralist approach 
to character, this theory is designed to enable its practitioner to 
achieve a certain kind of knowledge about texts, knowledge about 
them as communicative transactions between author and reader. It 
defines the text as the site of that rhetorical transaction, and it views 
those transactions as having both a formal and an affective structure. 
In effect, the study says that if you want to know how character and 
progression participate in these transactions between an author and 
his hypothetical audience, then read me. If, however, you want to 
read literature as, say, a sign of its creator's psyche and thus analyze 
the ways in which it reflects or reveals that psyche, then you are in­
terested in a different kind of knowledge, one that for some critical 
purposes is more important than the kind offered here, but not one 
that this study claims to offer or conflict with. Such a study would 
take up what we might call the expressive component of character, 
the way in which at some level it is a part of its creator's character or 
personality. Such a study might usefully complement the conclusions 
of this one, but there is no necessary logical connection between 
them, i.e., the expressive analysis can neither convincingly confirm 
nor deny the conclusions of the rhetorical and vice versa. 
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At the same time, my attempt to develop a rhetorical theory of 
character does not mean that my principles and conclusions will 
never come into conflict with other approaches to the text. To the 
extent that Levin, Scholes, Brooks, and Fetterley have been con­
cerned with establishing principles relevant to the transactions be­
tween authors and readers offered by texts, their somewhat different 
frameworks overlapped with mine, and I have tried to keep my dis­
cussions of them within the boundaries of the overlap. My response 
to Levin focused on our shared goal of developing interpretive meth­
ods that would correspond to the "literal particulars" of the text in an 
a posteriori rather than an a priori way; my analysis of Scholes fo­
cused on our shared principle that interpretations ought to meet the 
test of explanatory adequacy; my discussion of Brooks focused on his 
similar purpose of explaining "reading for the plot" rather than on his 
use of psychoanalysis per se; or, again, my concern with Fetterley 
was not with the value of her own response to the text but rather with 
the validity of her claim that accepting the overt story of A Farewell to 
Arms means buying into the covert one she identifies. I have had to 
work through the differences, within the areas of overlap, between 
my principles and those of these four critics in order to establish the 
particular claims of comprehensiveness and validity that I wanted 
to make. 
Even within this restricted definition of comprehensiveness, some 
features of the theory may seem either strange or too limited or both. 
Because the theory may seem to read narratives written over a two-
hundred-year span (from Tristram Shandy to If on a winter's night a 
traveler) in essentially the same way, it may seem to be traveling under 
the banner "Never historicize!" Can the differences of sociohistorical 
situatedness between Austen and Calvino be as irrelevant to the rhe­
torical transaction as the theory seems to indicate? The first part of 
the answer is that the appearance of irrelevance is deceptive. Since 
authors typically assume that their audiences know many things, in­
cluding social and cultural codes extant at the time of their writing, 
those elements of sociohistorical situatedness are very much a part of 
the transaction and very relevant to the analysis of these narratives, 
though sometimes, like the synthetic function of characters, they re­
main in the background. Reading Pride and Prejudice in the authorial 
audience requires one to know such things as social conventions 
about visiting among the upper classes, social codes about feminine 
delicacy, what it means to have one's estate entailed, what it means to 
be the daughter of a gentleman, what it means to get one's money by 
trade in that society, and so on. One can always read the novel to see 
how it is using these codes and one can always read against those 
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uses. One might, for example, note the way that servants are used 
and treated in the novel and develop a critique about how Elizabeth's 
happiness and good fortune is juxtaposed with and dependent upon 
a working class that Austen herself takes for granted. Such a reading 
could go on to undermine any positive evaluation of both Elizabeth 
and the implied author. In other words, considering the sociohistori­
cal situatedness of the narrative would in this case appear to have the 
effect of disrupting the congenial rhetorical transaction that I have 
sketched in Chapter 1—and one could imagine other such readings 
for the other narratives I have examined. 
Notice first that the approach I have taken here does not preclude 
such readings but rather sketches the preliminary steps to them. To 
disrupt the transaction, to talk back productively to the text, one 
needs to know the grounds upon which it is being built, and one 
knows that, I claim, by analyzing the progression. In that sense, these 
kinds of readings are not only welcome within my approach but are 
variations, using both historical knowledge and ethical standards, of 
the kind of reading I have done of Hemingway. More generally, his­
torical knowledge can be extremely important for the analysis of the 
progression, and the principles of my rhetorical approach dictate that 
it be used wherever relevant. For example, one must know conven­
tions of both nineteenth- and twentieth-century Anglo-American nar­
rative (as a minimum) in order to understand the progression of The 
French Lieutentant's Woman. Nevertheless, the necessary condition is 
not sufficient: knowing those conventions will not allow one to un­
derstand the functions of Fowles's playing with them. To do that, one 
must look at the internal logic and affective structure of the whole 
progression. In this respect, the rhetorical commitment of my theory 
will always lead me to privilege the transaction itself more than the 
conditions under which the transaction is produced. This commit­
ment and this privileging do not mean that the theory wants finally 
to turn away from history toward the realm of the "purely literary/' 
but rather wants to think about issues such as ethics and ideology as 
they are reflected in the rhetorical transaction of reading. That Hem­
ingway was, like most men of his generation, a sexist is less important 
for my approach than the way the ideology of sexism is built into the 
rhetorical transaction of the narrative. The striking feature of that 
transaction, as we have seen, is how it requires the authorial audience 
both to watch Hemingway stand with Catherine above Frederic and 
to participate with him in his easy assumptions of her secondary, be­
cause womanly, importance. 
As far as character itself goes, historicizing the narrative may reveal 
the greater significance of some attributes than others and may be 
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required for the authorial audience's understanding of some thematic 
functions. But if I am right that the progression itself actualizes the­
matic functions and focuses our attention on specific issues of the 
narrative, then what one most needs to know is the narrative conven­
tions operating at the time the narrative is written. If one knows those 
conventions, then using that knowledge as part of one's analysis of 
the progression will act as a check on one's historical knowledge: it 
will reveal—or sometimes fill—gaps that we can then appropriately 
deal with. 
Again because of my focus on the rhetorical transaction, if I were 
to historicize my project in another way and try to write a history of 
character and progression in the British and American novel, it would 
be a very different kind of history from one that would be written by 
a neo-Marxist or a new historicist critic. I would be interested in such 
things as the power relationships among different members of society 
during different periods of the last three centuries, and I would be 
concerned about the functioning of "ideological state apparatuses," 
because these things would affect the conditions of narrative and an 
individual author's awareness of the possibilities of character and pro­
gression at a given time. These matters, however, would not be the 
focus of my history. Instead, I would try to construct a narrative about 
the development of the variety of forms of progression with particular 
emphasis on the uses of character within progressions. I would try to 
explain such things as how the novel expanded and contracted and 
expanded again between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; 
how changes in the conventions of mimetic representation allowed 
for new ways to develop thematic functions; how the principles of 
progression in Fielding were complicated by Thackeray and Dickens, 
while those of an Austen novel were complicated by a James and then 
transformed by Faulkner; how new principles were forged out of po­
tentialities in eighteenth century fiction by figures such as Joyce and 
Woolf. To the extent that my history told a neat, linear story, I would 
be suspicious of it not only because of the complex relations between 
the development of narrative and the development of culture in gen­
eral but also because narrative itself has been so various and diverse 
at least since the eighteenth century. A history that was somehow 
adequate to that diversity would, I am convinced, cause us to refash­
ion our understanding of how narratives relate to each other—and 
might therefore have implications for anyone doing a sociocultural 
history of the novel. I would need to have far greater erudition than I 
can now lay claim to in order to write such a history, but the line I 
have drawn here from Austen to Dickens to Eliot to Woolf in discuss­
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ing the Principle of Indirect Affective Relevance is a small, incomplete 
example of the kind of analysis this history would undertake. 
In summary, then, my response to the question of the relation be­
tween my rhetorical theory and one that stresses reading through 
history is that the two are largely compatible, though the objects of 
their focus are quite different, and sometimes their findings will im­
pinge on each other in significant ways. 
Whether this theory of character and progression achieves its vaulting 
ambition or o'erleaps itself and falls on its face, it is with the value of 
the rhetorical transactions that I want to end. To participate in the pro­
gression of Winston's doomed rebellion, in Elizabeth's movement to­
ward happiness, Marcher's struggle for tragic illumination, Charles's 
attempt to shed one age for another; to understand what it means to 
be a Wemmick or a Reader, to be tossed and turned by Hemingway's 
treatment of Catherine: these experiences offer no guarantee of im­
proving our own characters but they do offer a kind of life that in its 
intensity and diversity would have preserved Marcher himself from 
the springing of the Beast. We are more fortunate than he, not simply 
in that we lack his obsession, but that we can live by reading Henry 
James—and George Orwell and Jane Austen and Charles Dickens 
and . . . and in doing that we live a life that by its very nature will 
have closure but not completeness. 
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Chapter 1 
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fers from my analysis of the progression not only in particulars of interpre­
tation but also in overall focus: Sperber wants to connect the book to Orwell's 
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ton, 1966), p.l. Hereafter page numbers will be given in parentheses in 
the text. 
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son to Austen: 'Johnson's Rule' and the Development of the Eighteenth-
Century Novel of Moral Action," in James Engell, ed., Johnson and His Age 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984): 461-83. 
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Aristotelean opponents shied away from acknowledging that most literary 
works do make statements. 
22. One possible exception here is the proposal scene itself, where one 
might argue that the deep feeling behind Elizabeth's accusations is necessary 
to make Darcy see the error of his ways. I think, however, that this interpre­
tation underestimates Darcy's virtues. In any case, neither Elizabeth nor 
Darcy is grateful for the manner of her behavior in the proposal scene in the 
way that they are grateful for her behavior to Lady Catherine. Darcy is willing 
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to give Elizabeth the credit for the amelioration of his character, but he fo­
cuses more on the facts of her rejections and reproofs than on the feeling 
behind them. 
23. Another variation on this pattern of thematic dimensions not being 
converted into thematic functions can be found in Orwell's use of Winston's 
optimism. The progression of Orwell's novel requires the attribute—or some­
thing like it—but the progression does not thematize the trait itself. 
Chapter 2 
1. Robert Scholes, Textual Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 
p. 29. Hereafter page numbers will be given in parentheses in the text. 
2. I too will undertake a quest for that grail, or more accurately, will reflect 
on some problems in such quests as part of my interests in the relations 
among the components of Catherine Barkley's character in A Farewell to Arms 
(Chapter 6). 
3. My account of the progression will, I think, highlight certain features 
of the novella and James's method that have not been noticed before, but it 
seeks to deepen rather than challenge the general reading of the tale that has 
been offered by or implicit in most of the criticism: 'The Beast" is the tragic 
story of a man, who, believing that life has singled him out for some grand 
fate, wastes his life waiting for its arrival, who discovers his waste only at the 
very end of his life, when he also realizes that he has been too blind to see 
the escape through love that had been offered him by his fellow-watcher, May 
Bartram. Many critics work with this general understanding of the tale in the 
background as they focus on one or more specific features of the narrative. 
On style, for example, see Jane P. Tompkins, "The Beast in the Jungle': An 
Analysis of Henry James's Late Style," Modern Fiction Studies 6 (1971): 185-92, 
and David Smit, "The Leap of the Beast: The Dramatic Style of Henry James's 
The Beast in the Jungle/ " Henry James Review 4 (1983): 219-30. On narrative 
technique, see Elizabeth Shapland, "Duration and Frequency: Prominent As­
pects of Time in Henry James's The Beast in the Jungle/ " Papers on Language 
and Literature 17 (1981): 33-47, and Wayne C. Booth's discussion in The Rheto­
ric of Fiction, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 278-81. 
For discussions of naming in the tale, see David Kerner, "A Note on The 
Beast in the Jungle/ " University of Kansas City Review 17 (1950): 109-18; Ed­
ward Stone, "James's Jungle: The Seasons," UKCR 21 (1954): 142-44; and 
Rachel Salmon, "Naming and Knowing in Henry James's The Beast in the 
Jungle': The Hermeneutics of the Sacred Text," Orbis Litterarum 36 (1981): 
302-22. For a somewhat negative view of James's technique, see Allen Tate, 
"Three Commentaries/' Sewanee Review 58 (1950): 1-15. And for a view that 
the tale is more ambiguous than most critics admit, see Janice H. Harris, 
"Bushes, Bears, and The Beast in the Jungle/ " Studies in Short Fiction 18 
(1981): 147-54. 
4. The Novels and Tales of Henry James, vol. 17 (New York: Scribner's, 1909), 
p. 61. Further references will be given in the text. 
5. Mary Doyle Springer identifies this attribute as an important source of 
221 Notes to Pages 68-84 
our sympathy with Marcher. See A Rhetoric of Literary Character (Chicago: Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1978), p.219. 
6. See Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, pp. 278-81. 
7. This perhaps mealy-mouthed identification of the narrative as tragic is 
done advisedly; I do not want to enter discussions of whether Marcher is 
more like Lear or Willy Loman, or of whether "The Beast" is a genuine 
tragedy. My point is that if we abstract from the progression and think about 
a loose generic placement, tragedy is appropriate. Readers who are more 
concerned with stricter or tighter generic placements will soon see that my 
reluctance to be similarly concerned stems from what I regard as the special 
quality of the tale—and of James's use of Marcher's mimetic and thematic 
functions. 
8. Interpretation, for Scholes, is itself the second step in a recommended 
three-step encounter with texts. The first step is reading, an activity con­
cerned with focusing on the particulars of texts; Scholes recommends that 
one highlight especially salient particulars by considering alternative versions 
of the text, or as he says, producing "text within text/' The third step is 
criticism, the activity of embracing or, more importantly, resisting the stance 
taken toward the cultural codes revealed by interpretation; Scholes's short­
hand for criticism is "text against text." 
9. Henry James, The Ambassadors (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 132. 
10. This observation might be the starting place for Scholes's kind of criti­
cism: does James's own anxiety of being like Marcher cause him to stack the 
deck against his protagonist, make him too easily the butt of the reader's and 
author's amusement so that we are left wondering why May would have any­
thing to do with him in the first place? For more on what Scholes means by 
criticism and how it works, see his three chapters in Textual Power on "The 
Text in the Class," pp. 18-73. 
11. Michael Coulson Berthold, "The Idea of 'Too Late' in James's 'The 
Beast in the Jungle/ " Henry James Review 4 (1983): 128-39. 
12. For an example of evaluation and its attendant problems, see my dis­
cussion of Catherine Barkley in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 3 
1. Some of Fowles's critics—even some of his better ones such as Linda 
Hutcheon—take at face value the narrator's reference to Sarah as protagonist, 
citing the title of the novel as support for their position. From the vantage 
point provided by a concern with progression, however, that designation just 
will not hold up: Charles is the figure at the center of the instabilities; they all 
cluster around his life and his choices; the story of his progress in relation 
to Ernestina and Sarah is the story that takes the narrative and authorial au­
diences from the beginning to the end of the book. Hutcheon's discussion 
is in Narcissistic Narrative (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980), 
pp. 57-70. 
2. Elizabeth D. Rankin, "Cryptic Coloration in The French Lieutenant's 
Woman/' Journal of Narrative Technique 3 (1973): 193-207, has also noted the 
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connection between the metafictional Chapter 13 and the refusal to complete 
the portrait of Sarah. For other related discussions of Chapter 13 and the 
other metafictional elements of the narrative, see Hutcheon, Narcissistic Nar­
rative cited above, and Philip Cohen, "Postmodernist Technique in The French 
Lieutenant's Woman/' Western Humanities Review 38, 2 (1984): 148-61. 
3. John Fowles, The French Lieutenant's Woman (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1969), p. 10. Hereafter references will be made by page numbers in paren­
theses in the text. 
4. For a useful detailed discussion of the narrator's temporal and spatial 
locations in the novel, see William Nelles, "Problems for Narrative Theory: 
The French Lieutenant's Woman/' Style 18 (1984): 207-15. Nelles discusses the 
interesting combination of the narrator's temporal distance and his occasional 
spatial proximity to the characters. In effect, Fowles extends along both the 
spatial and temporal axes the privilege of the omniscient narrator to know 
whatever he wants and to tell us whatever he thinks is relevant. 
5. Peter Rabinowitz, "Truth in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences," 
Critical Inquiry 4 (1977): 121-41. Rabinowitz's later essay, "Assertion and As­
sumption: Fictional Patterns and the External World," PMLA (1981): 408-19, 
also focuses largely on the different kinds of knowledge the different audi­
ences have. In Before Reading, Rabinowitz develops some further conse­
quences of the distinction, including its implications for the way we might 
understand realism, but he does not move the discussion in the direction I 
take here. 
6. Most critics argue that the second ending is better because it is more in 
the spirit of the narrative's emphasis on the evolution of both characters to­
ward the twentieth century. But Charles Scruggs's very fine defense of the 
plausibility of the first ending should, I think, make anyone who wants to 
reject it think twice. See his "The Two Endings of The French Lieutenant's 
Woman/' Modern Fiction Studies 31 (1985): 95-113. 
7. The next step for the rhetorical critic would be to ask about the possible 
sexist implications of Fowles's subordinating Sarah to Charles here. This is a 
complicated question because one does not want to legislate a principle that 
narratives cannot make male characters the primary focalizers of the narra­
tion, while what Fowles does here seems connected with his assumption that 
one can tell the story of the shift from the Victorian Age to the modern by 
focusing on the experiences of a man. As I noted above, I will take up a 
similar issue more fully and directly in Part III when I consider the problems 
raised by Hemingway's characterization of Catherine Barkley. 
8. See, for example, Rankin, "Cryptic Coloration," William Palmer, The 
Fiction of John Fowles (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), and Peter 
Wolfe, John Fowles, Magus and Moralist (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University 
Press, 1976). 
Chapter 4 
1. Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (New 
York: Knopf, 1984). Hereafter page numbers will be given in parentheses in 
the text. 
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2. Reader-response criticism that wants to locate the meaning of narrative 
not in the text but in the individual reader will of course challenge this 
basic assumption of my rhetorical theory—and of Brooks's psychoanalytically 
based one. But to argue whether the meaning of a narrative is really, finally, 
ultimately, in the text or in the individual reader is, I think, to engage in a 
fruitless debate. Worthwhile criticism of very different kinds can proceed 
from each of the two different first principles. To the charge that one cannot 
do worthwhile criticism proceeding from the principle that the text is the 
basis for a rhetorical transaction between author and reader, my only reply 
here can be this book itself. Brooks's model and my own can be fruitfully 
compared, however, because we share not only the assumption about the 
importance of the text but also the purpose of explaining the dynamics of 
reading narrative. For more on this problem of the relation of critical systems, 
see my "Data, Danda, and Disagreement," Diacritics 11 (Summer 1983), 39-50. 
3. For a related discussion of the whole-part relationship in the processing 
of a text, see Chapter 3 of my Worlds from Words (Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1981). 
4. In this respect, the rhetorical framework that I am developing here re­
jects the formalist notion that the text is only its formal features. It seeks to 
combine an interest in those formal features with an interest in the way they 
reflect the shaping of an author and call for a response from a hypothetical 
reader. In that sense, the model is really triple-layered, but for most practical 
purposes, including doing criticism of the kind that the concept of progres­
sion invites, the distinction between the author's shaping of the formal fea­
tures and the features themselves becomes unimportant. 
5. In this respect progression leads beyond the story-discourse and fabula/ 
sjuzet models of narrative structure. The idea of a synthesis between events, 
characters, setting, and the treatment of those events, as in Brooks's model, 
is not so much erroneous as incomplete. A narrative is a dynamic synthesis 
of all the materials of both story and discourse as well as the patterns of 
response built into the specific configuration of all those elements. 
6. Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and 
Winston, 1972), p. 1. Further references will be given by page numbers in 
parentheses in the text. 
7. For a useful discussion of the motif of reading, see Max Byrd, " 'Read­
ing' in Great Expectations/' PMLA 91 (1976): 259-65. 
8. Byrd's essay, cited above, has called my attention to this feature of the 
passage. 
9. But even before we go our separate ways, there are significant differ­
ences. Brooks's division of the narrative into four plots (the major difference 
between his division and mine is that he divides the Satis House plot into 
two) and his distinction between official and repressed plots already signal 
his tendency to convert reading for the plot into reading for the themes in 
motion. The difference between the two Satis House plots he identifies is not 
a difference based on instability but one based on theme: the second "plot" 
simply identifies the not very hidden underside of Satis House. Similarly, the 
division into official and repressed plots gives an odd prominence to "bring­
ing up by hand" as an official plot, since Pip never clearly honors his sister's 
224 Notes to Pages 122-31 
efforts: its prominence seems motivated more by Brooks's desires for his 
quadripartite division that allows him to make his points about the theme of 
plotting than by the narrative itself. 
10. In addition to Brooks, see Julian Moynahan, 'The Hero's Guilt: The 
Case of Great Expectations/' Essays in Criticism 10 (1960): 60-79; Lawrence Jay 
Dessner, "Great Expectations: 'the ghost of a man's own father/ " PMLA 91 
(1976): 436-49; Michal Peled Ginsburg, "Dickens and the Uncanny: Repres­
sion and Displacement in Great Expectations/' Dickens Studies Annual 13 (1984): 
115-24; and James L. Spenko, "The Return of the Repressed in Great Expec­
tations/' Literature and Psychology 30, 3-4 (1980): 133-46. These accounts, es­
pecially Spenko's, do, I believe, capture elements of Pip's character that are 
not readily explainable otherwise. More generally, the usefulness of the psy­
choanalytic perspective here illustrates the relation between psychoanalytic 
reading and rhetorical interpretation: the psychoanalytic perspective can be 
subsumed under the rhetorical on a case by case basis. The same principle 
applies to marxist, existential, anthropological and other "perspectival" ac­
counts of character: when the authorial audience needs the perspective to 
understand the nature of the character, the rhetorical critic will welcome the 
perspective. See my comment on this point in the introduction, pp. 11-12. 
11. This guilt is of course partly a consequence of his identification with 
the convict. Thus, although Pip knows that his sister is unjust to him, he 
nevertheless feels guilty, just as his knowledge that he is not responsible for 
assaulting her does not prevent him from feeling somehow guilty for what 
happens to her. 
12. Spenko, in the essay cited above, demonstrates these connections at 
some length. 
13. Lawrence Jay Dessner, in a thoughtful study of Wemmick's psychol­
ogy, "Great Expectations: The Tragic Comedy of John Wemmick," Ariel 6, 2 
(1975): 65-79, argues that the division between the two sides of Wemmick is 
not as great as first appears. But Dessner also says that his analysis "does not 
often correspond with the aesthetic experience of the reader" (p. 78). I think 
that the authorial audience does see Wemmick as sharply divided but is able 
to accept the "integration" of his character that I describe below. For a brief 
but useful discussion of Wemmick, see also Mary Ann Kelly, "The Functions 
of Wemmick of Little Britain and Wemmick of Walworth," Dickens Studies 
Newsletter 14, 4 (1983): 145-49. 
14. For a fuller discussion of the way this repression works, see James L. 
Spenko, "The Return of the Repressed in Great Expectations/' Literature and 
Psychology 30, 3-4 (1980): 133-46. For more on repression in the novel, see 
Michal Peled Ginsburg, "Dickens and the Uncanny: Repression and Dis­
placement in Great Expectations/' Dickens Studies Annual 13 (1984): 115-24. 
15. In this respect, I part company with Brooks, who sees the second end­
ing as suggesting an unbinding of the material of the Satis House plot, an 
indication that it has not been truly mastered. My point is that if the ending 
shows that both characters have mastered that material in their own ways, 
then the very fact of their union is not itself an unbinding. See Brooks, 
pp. 137-39. At a more general level, Brooks and I are in agreement that "the 
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choice between the two endings is somewhat arbitrary and unimportant in 
that the decisive moment has already occurred before either of these finales 
begins" (p. 137). 
Chapter 5 
1. Italo Calvino, If on a winter's night a traveler, trans. William Weaver (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), p.3. Hereafter references will be 
made by page numbers in parentheses in the text. 
2. This differentiation of the flesh-and-blood reader from the "you" ad­
dressed in the sentence continues in the rest of the paragraph as that "you" 
begins to get located, however generally, in space: "Relax. Concentrate. Dis­
pel every other thought. Let the world around you fade. Best to close the 
door; the TV is always on in the next room." 
3. In "Readers in Texts," PMLA 96 (1981): 848-63, W. Daniel Wilson offers 
some good first steps in the analysis of what he calls "characterized read­
ers." He distinguishes them from implied readers, but does not work, as I 
do, with their relation to narrative and authorial audiences. 
4. Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim (New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 205-6. 
5. Laurence Sterne, Tristram Shandy (New York: Norton, 1980), p.48. 
6. William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1963), p.87. 
7. Since the characterized audience in the Sterne passage is clearly female 
and that in the Thackeray clearly male, they together raise the question of 
how the reader's own sex will influence his or her response to a characterized 
audience of a specific sex. To take just the most obvious question, will women 
have trouble accepting the use of the characterized audiences here since the 
first can be seen as employing a sexist stereotype and the second seems to 
relegate women to the secondary role of wife? Many women and some men 
will want to become what Judith Fetterley calls "resisting readers," and speak 
out against the assumptions upon which the characterized audiences are con­
structed as well as the attitudes toward women that reading in the authorial 
audience asks them to adopt. Needless to say, this kind of criticism is ex­
tremely significant. At the same time, I think that such a criticism comes most 
appropriately after the sort of analysis I am proposing here, one which takes 
as its first step the understanding of the five-sided communicative situation 
among author, narrator, characterized audience, narrative audience, and au­
thorial audience. For much more extended discussion of these and related 
issues, see the collection Gender and Reading, ed. Elizabeth Flynn and Patro­
cinio Schweikart (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). 
8. Gerald Prince, "The Narratee Revisited," Style 19 (1985): 299-305. See 
also Prince, "Introduction to the Study of the Narratee," in Reader-Response 
Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, ed. Jane Tompkins (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1980), 7-25. 
9. For Wayne Booth, see the Afterword to the second edition of The Rheto­
ric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). For work on the 
narratee in addition to Prince's, see Mary Ann Piwowarczyk, "The Narratee 
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and the Situation of Enunciation: A Reconsideration of Prince's Theory/' 
Genre 9 (1976): 161-77; William Ray, "Recognizing Recognition: The Intra-
Textual and Extra-Textual Critical Persona/' Diacritics 7 (Winter 1977): 20-33; 
and Robyn Warhol, "Toward a Theory of the Engaging Narrator: Earnest In­
terventions in Gaskell, Stowe, and Eliot," PMLA 101 (1986): 811-18. 
10. See Peter Rabinowitz, "Truth in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audi­
ences," Critical Inquiry 4 (1977): 121-41. 
11. It is, I believe, for this reason that when Booth adopts Rabinowitz's 
model he leaves the ideal narrative audience behind and that Rabinowitz him­
self has silently dropped it out of his analyses. He makes no significant use 
of it in Before Reading. 
12. The phrase is used by Barbara Herrnstein Smith in Poetic Closure: A 
Study of How Poems End (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) to refer 
to the way new or surprising information in the later lines of a poem will 
cause its readers to revise their interpretations of earlier lines. 
13. Most of the narrators of the other titled chapters do, however, com­
ment on their own narration without raising questions of whether they are 
themselves metafictionists. 
14. Interestingly, the last two sentences of the chapter, which are again in 
the narrator's voice, are written not in second but in third person: "Actually, 
it seems the Reader really is about to leave. He will take with him On the 
carpet of leaves illuminated by the moon by Takakumi Ikoka to read on his jour­
ney" (p.198). 
15. In Chapter 1, the narrator summarizes the Reader's preference for the 
kind of book he likes to read in a way that is analogous to, though not iden­
tical with, the Other Reader's expression of her preferences: "you go on and 
you realize that the book is readable nevertheless, independently of what you 
expected of the author, it's the book itself that arouses your curiosity; in fact, 
on sober reflection, you prefer it this way, confronting something and not 
quite knowing yet what it is" (p. 9). 
16. For more on this point from somebody who finds tighter connections, 
see Marilyn Orr, "Beginning the Middle: The Story of Reading in Calvino's 
If on a winter's night a traveler/' Papers on Language and Literature 21 (1985): 
210-19. 
Chapter 6 
1. I take the term from Wayne C. Booth, Critical Understanding: The Powers 
and Limits of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), chap. 2 
and passim. Booth, however, sometimes uses the term in a sense that I do 
not intend here: appropriating some one's text for one's own purposes. I use 
it to refer to a process that follows rather than supplants understanding. This 
activity of evaluation is similar to what Scholes calls "criticism" in Textual 
Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 
2. Judith Fetterley, The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American 
Fiction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). Hereafter references to 
this book will be indicated by page numbers in parentheses in the text. Fet­
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terley, of course, is not alone in her assessment of the book and Hemingway's 
treatment of Catherine. For example, Millicent Bell claims that in Catherine, 
Hemingway has created a "sort of inflatable rubber doll woman available at 
will to the onanastic dreamer/' "A Farewell to Arms: Pseudoautobiography and 
Personal Metaphor/' in Ernest Hemingway: The Writer in Context, ed. James 
Nagel (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p. 114. But Heming­
way and Catherine also have their defenders, most notably Joyce Wexler, 
"E.R.A. for Hemingway: A Feminist Defense of Catherine Barkley," Georgia 
Review 35 (1981): 111-23, and Sandra Whipple Spanier, "Catherine Barkley 
and the Hemingway Code," paper delivered at Approaches to Hemingway 
Conference, San Diego State University, March 1987 (to be published in the 
Chelsea House volume on Hemingway edited by Harold Bloom). Virtually 
every commentator on the the novel acknowledges Hemingway's treatment 
as an issue that must be addressed. For another negative evaluation, see 
Edmund Wilson, "Hemingway: The Gauge of Morale/' in The Wound and 
the Bow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947). For some middle posi­
tions, acknowledging limitations but also justifying or minimizing them, see 
Daniel Schneider, "Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms: The Novel as Pure Po­
etry," Modern Fiction Studies 14 (1968): 283-96, Philip Young, Ernest Heming­
way: A Reconsideration (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1966), and Carlos Baker, Hemingway: The Writer as Artist, 3d ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963). 
For a worthwhile study of the relation between Hemingway's wartime ex­
perience and the novel itself, see Michael Reynolds, Hemingway's First War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
3. The larger point here is that the same material can be the basis for many 
different narratives with many different effects. The Second City comedy 
troupe does a wonderful rendition of Hamlet as a farce. It would be easy to 
make The Ambassadors into a melodramatic soap opera, and so on. These 
claims are very different from ones which would say that the covert story of 
Hamlet is farce, that of The Ambassadors melodrama. 
4. Fetterley's analysis on this particular point also depends on an assump­
tion that the introduction of the other text allows the interpreter considerable 
room to infer the applications of that text to the one under primary consid­
eration. Fetterley, it seems to me, takes advantage of that free rein in seeing 
Catherine's allusion as a sign of Frederic's feeling. The trouble with the 
founding assumption is that it usually leaves room for a contradictory inter­
pretation. In this case, one might with equal justice argue that the allusion to 
Othello reminds us that Frederic and Catherine can be considered among the 
company of those who "loved not wisely but too well." 
5. Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1929), p. 3. Further references will be given in page numbers in pa­
rentheses in the text. 
6. Eugene B. Cantelupe, "Statues and Lovers in A Farewell to Arms/' 
Fitzgerald-Hemingway Annual (1977): 203-05. 
7. Spanier, "Catherine Barkley and the Hemingway Code." 
8. Some critics see the Switzerland section not as an idyll but as a dead 
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end; Fetterley's comment that Catherine's death frees Frederic from the re­
sponsibilities of marriage, fatherhood, and family is related to this view. For 
the fullest articulation of it, see the essay by Bell cited in n. 2 above. I think 
that the progression both works against and leaves room for this view. 
In Switzerland, Frederic finally reaches the equivalent of the Abruzzi, the 
priest's homeland whose clear, cold, dry, and snow-covered landscapes are 
early set in opposition to the smoky cafes where Frederic spent most of his 
leave. But because Frederic and Catherine live there with the knowledge (on 
her part) and the feeling (on both of their parts) that they are living on bor­
rowed time, there is something constrained and barren about the idyll. I think 
that Hemingway worked hard to have his readers sense Frederic and Cath-
erine's own misgivings about their life with no future, but here his method of 
understatement finally does not serve him well. It works in the scene where 
Frederic and Catherine wake up and Frederic can't go back to sleep, but it 
does not work in many of their nonprogressive conversations. 
9. Spanier, "Catherine Barkley and the Hemingway Code." 
10. See Ralph Rader, "Fact, Theory, and Literary Explanation," Critical 
Inquiry 1 (1974): 221-45. 
11. See Gerry Brenner, Concealments in Hemingway's Fiction (Columbus: 
Ohio State University Press, 1983), pp. 30-31. As his characterization of 
these passages suggests, Brenner's reading of the whole narrative is very dif­
ferent from mine. He sees it as an expression of Hemingway's belief in the 
irrationality of existence, an expression made through the untrustworthy tale 
of a narrator who is on the verge of suicide. 
12. Sexists of course would claim that they are not denying full humanity 
to women but simply recognizing differences between the sexes—in this way, 
they claim not to be sexist. If they could be convinced that they were denying 
women full humanity, then they would be more likely to reform: such is the 
power of the norm that all humans be granted their humanity. 
Conclusion 
1. Norman Mailer, The Armies of the Night: The Novel as History, History as a 
Novel (New York: New American Library, 1968), p. 241. Hereafter citations 
will be made by page numbers in parentheses in the text. 
2. Though developed independently and employing different terms, my 
analysis here is similar to that offered by Robert Merrill, Norman Mailer (New 
York: Twayne, 1978). 
3. For a discussion of the metaphors in this section, see Wayne C. Booth, 
"Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation," Critical Inquiry 5 (1978): 
49-72; 175-76. 
4. George Eliot, Middlemarch (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 578. Further 
references will be given in page numbers in parentheses in the text. 
5. "A Comparative Anatomy of Three Baggy Monsters," Journal of Narra­
tive Technique (forthcoming, Spring 1989). 
6. Such things would include accounting for Bulstrode's role in enhanc­
ing the power of the Lydgate plot, explaining the principles of Eliot's 
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interweaving—why she leaves off one story line and picks up another at any 
given point—and analyzing Farebrother's role as one who also contributes to 
the growing good of the world. I have made a start on these matters in 
"Elaboration and Economy in Middlemarch: Farebrother and the Final Para­
graph/' paper delivered at the International Conference on Narrative, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, April 1987. Among the many accounts of the relations 
among the plots, most of which focus on the ideational similarities and con­
trasts, see especially Peter Garrett's discussion in the Victorian Multiplot Novel 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 
7. Virginia Woolf, Mrs, Dalloway (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1925), p. 3. Hereafter page numbers will be cited in parentheses in the text. 
8. Although I would not push the point too hard, I also think that honor­
ing flexibility over predictive power is generally a methodological strength. 
When theories honor prediction over flexibility, further inquiry can often be 
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